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Culture, Society and Market
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held at Sigtuna, January 24–25, 2000

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Cultural affiliation, values, identity and traditions have turned out to play a decisive role in many of the pressing and long-term problems confronting nations and the world as a whole. For a number of years the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation has been increasingly involved in questions concerning the relationship between culture and the development of people and society. The Foundation has taken a number of initiatives in the follow-up of the World Commission on Culture report, *Our Creative Diversity* (1995) and the Stockholm Conference of Cultural Ministers in 1998. The activities have comprised international and national seminars, support to research projects and the building of networks between researchers in the cultural field.

The Swedish National Council for Cultural Affairs, as the responsible government agency for culture, has long taken pains to stimulate research and the building up of knowledge within the field of culture. An important aspect of this has been the much-discussed question of the role of culture in social development. The field is multifaceted and our knowledge base is deficient and to a certain extent inconsistent.

The need for cultural policy research is great but is poorly developed in Sweden, as in many other European countries. In cultural policy research it is often necessary to adopt a cross-sectoral approach as it spans a wide field; sociology, the social sciences, ethnology and political science, are just a few examples of the disciplines included within the research field.

As part of their common interest in encouraging research into economic aspects of the role of culture in society, the Foundation, in association with the Council, organised in Sigtuna on 24–25 January 2000 the first major conference in Sweden on research of relevance to cultural policy. The conference, which went by the name of *Culture, Market and Society*, brought together close on sixty participants.
The remainder of the conference was structured around four topics, which were introduced in the form of prepared contributions. Most of the contributions were subsequently elaborated into articles and are published in this volume. The conference also included outline presentations by researchers of possible research projects. As a direct result of this, a large number of project outlines were received by the Foundation during the 2000 spring round of applications. The Foundation has made a combined project grant to Professors Folke Snickars, Sverker Sörlin, Geir Vestheim and Svante Beckman, together with a project grant to Dr. Eva Hemmungs-Wirtén, University College of Borås.

The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and the Swedish National Council for Cultural Affairs consider the conference in Sigtuna and the presentations given there to be a very important first step in promoting Swedish research on the role of culture and cultural work in social and economic development. By jointly publishing this volume we hope to inspire further research on those issues and also to strengthen the dialogue between the research community and practitioners working in the cultural sector. We also want to inform an international audience of the ongoing activities in this field, and we hope that this volume will lead to increased international contacts and inspire establishment of new scientific networks.

We would like to express our gratitude to the editor of the volume, Professor Folke Snickars, and his assistant Per Seigerlund, m.a., for their work.

Stockholm, May 2001

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Research on culture and society has traditionally been regarded as a question of studying cultural policy. Public decision makers have demanded research, which is relevant for national cultural policy formation. Examples would be research focussing on how certain art forms might reach broader groups in society, the effect of public support to cultural institutions, or research as a means to enhance the competence level of personnel employed within the cultural institutions.

During recent time-periods an increased attention has been given to culture in a wider context, as a carrier of important assets for society in the pursuit of societal progress in general and economic progress in particular. A clear illustration of this is provided by the 1996 UNESCO report on our creative diversity. It was worked out in correspondence with the programme put forward by the Brundtland commission in the late 1980s concerning our common environmental future. Another source of inspiration was the programme for Agenda 21 worked out in conjunction with the Rio de Janeiro conference on environment and development in the beginning of the 1990s.

It is obvious that the supply of scientific knowledge is fundamental for our cultural development. Research in the field of the history of ideas has forcefully shown that science has been an important source of strength in for cultural expressions. This was one of the leading themes in the seminars organised by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Fund on “Cultural Research for Human Development” at the UNESCO world conference in Stockholm on “The Power of Culture”. The latter conference is documented in the 1998 report “Promoting Cultural Research for Human Development” edited by Carl-Johan Kleberg.

The theme of the current volume is “Culture, Society and Market”. The theme can be seen in several complementary perspectives. A first question concerns the role of culture in the every-
day life of the ordinary citizen. Who demands culture? Who is prepared to pay for it? Does it make a difference where culture is consumed, at home or at a cultural institution? What dividing lines are there in the sociology and geography of cultural consumption?

A second dimension concerns the role of culture for public spaces and the built environment. Where is the dividing line between the responsibility of cultural actors and architects and city planners? Is the dividing line on the move? Is the scope of culture being extended to other areas of public policy? Or is it on the contrary being marginalized when arts, artefacts, and events are seen to become components of local marketing and national economic policies?

How does the use of culture differ from the art of creation? What can the individual citizen contribute? The issue is also related to the role of culture and cultural policy in the democratic process, to the formation of political ideas concerning culture, and to the instrumental role of culture in public policy at large. To borrow an expression from the field of regional policy, what distinguishes the small from the large cultural policy?

Culture has a peculiar role as work area and labour market. Large parts of the work is not seen in the open labour market but is performed during leisure or education. The employment patterns are complex to say the least. Incomes are extremely uneven especially for artists. The individual returns to long educations is generally small. Excess education and labour supply, idealism, individualism, and competition make many cultural workers have a weak position in the market and weak trade union organisations. The traits of cultural work have implied that the area has been given little attention in the otherwise large body of labour market research.

These theoretical considerations provide a background for the current volume. It presents a number of Swedish and international papers in four selected fields of research relevant for future cultural policy in Sweden:

- Is there a need to see the cultural field in a new way in a multicultural society and a globalising economy?
- What are the driving forces behind the increasing expectations on culture as a positive driving force for regional economic development?
- What roles does culture play in the modern democratic system?
What characterises culture as a provider of quality of life and quality of environment for individuals and groups in society?

How is the work life role and professional identity of those who make a living out of culture?

The volume is intended to provide a broad picture of these questions to be further developed in research programmes, and individual research projects, in close contact with the public and private actors in the cultural policy networks in Sweden and abroad.

The papers in the volume are organised in the order they were presented at a research seminar in Sigtuna in the winter of 2000, which forms the basis for the current document. The level of homogenisation of the papers in the editorial work has been kept rather modest. This also holds for the language editing. Some papers have been translated from Swedish while other authors have provided English-language manuscripts. The reference lists included after each paper have been moulded into the same format.

I thank the authors for their contributions to the volume. The translators mentioned in the beginning of the relevant papers are also thanked for their contribution. Finally, I thank Per Seigerlund who has smoothly assisted me in putting the volume together.

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Part I

International Perspectives
My brief for this paper is to place our concerns in the field of culture, society and market in a broader setting by, first, reviewing the historical development of modern forms of cultural policy and, second, deriving from that history a preliminary mapping of the issues of culture and governance that are at stake in contemporary cultural policies. With a topic so broad, some limitations are necessary and I can perhaps best explain the ones that I shall be operating with by elaborating a little further the difference I have in mind between the broad category of culture and governance and the somewhat narrower and historically more specific one of cultural policy.

For, understood in their broad sense as concerning the ways of life, beliefs and attitudes of different sections of the population, questions of culture have occupied a central place in all systems of rule. Their role in the relations between Christianity and feudalism in regulating the relations between different estates is as evident as is their significance within contemporary theocratic regimes. It is equally the case that in the present, questions of culture—again, in the broad sense—are involved in many different areas of policy that we would not normally want to call cultural policies: immigration policies, for example, both depend on and have consequences for the forms of cultural diversity that are possible within particular societies, but are not themselves cultural policies.

To speak of cultural policies, by contrast, is to speak of relations of culture and governance which take a more specific form; it is to speak of the ways in which, through a variety of means (legal, administrative, and economic), governments seek (through a range of specially constructed entities: ministries of culture, departments of heritage, arts councils) to provide, regulate and manage cultural resources and the uses to which they are put. This is not to suggest that a Chinese wall exists between this and other policy spheres in which questions of culture are at stake. To the contrary: questions concerning the relations between the cultures, in the
sense of ways of life, of different ethnic groups are clearly just as much at issue in current cultural policies as they are in immigration policies. But these questions are posed in different ways, and are acted on by different means, in these two policy fields—by managing the production and distribution of cultural resources in the case of cultural policies, and by rules regulating the international flows of peoples in the case of immigration policies—just as they are subject to different pressures arising from the constituencies and pressure groups that are actively involved in these different policy fields.

There is, equally, no absolute separation between contemporary cultural policies and the relations of cultural and governance that have characterised earlier systems of rule. But the development of culture as a distinctive area of government and administration with its own dedicated personnel, forms of expertise, and administrative apparatuses does presuppose a number of pre-conditions, most of which have been closely associated with the development of nation states: the secularisation of culture; the role accorded culture and heritage as parts of national patrimonies; and the public significance invested in this newly nationalised and secularised domain. It was, by and large, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that these conditions—shaped by the histories of late absolutism, the enlightenment, the radical democracy of the French and American Revolutions, and the emerging forms of liberal government—were first met to a degree that was adequate to support the emergence of specialised forms of cultural policy and administration recognisably similar to those of contemporary governments. It is accordingly from this period that I shall take my initial bearings in tracing the historical formation of the relations of culture and governance that are involved in contemporary forms of cultural policy. I shall suggest that these can be divided into three broad, but overlapping, categories—the symbolic, the social, and the economic. In exploring these, and the political rationales on which they rest, I shall also look at the varying ways in which the relations between culture, government and the social have been viewed within different political regimes and philosophies. I shall also, in concluding, look at the extent to which current challenges posed by the increasingly global flows of both cultures and peoples call into question the viability of the nation state as the primary level of cultural policy development.
Cultural Policy and State Symbolism

But let me look first at the relations between cultural policies and state symbolism. The cultural policies of contemporary governments are most evidently continuous with those of earlier political systems when supporting cultural activities that symbolise the virtues of a particular nation, people or political system. The most obvious precursor for these concerns consists in the use of the arts as instruments of state policy associated with the absolutist monarchies of early modern Europe. These were characterized by two contrasting orientations. The first aimed to weaken the nobility by involving its members in a socially demanding and economically debilitating cultural life centered on the court (Elias, 1983). The second aimed to symbolize the principles underlying the political order through a public theatre of power (statues, processions, palaces), which magnified the king’s potency so as to incline his subjects to obedience (Burke, 1992). Culture, in such practices, symbolized sovereign power with a view to enhancing its effects.

If this connection between sovereign power, culture and the arts of governing was most fully developed in France, it was given a new interpretation during the French Revolution. This consisted in the role that was developed for the arts, and culture more generally, of symbolizing the more abstract form of sovereignty that was now vested in a democratic citizenry (McClellan, 1994). In this new conception—evident in the policies developed for the Louvre as much as in the debates over language policies, public monuments and architecture—culture served as the means through which a democratic citizenry made its own power as a sovereign people manifest to itself (Duncan & Wallach, 1980). But it also allowed that citizenry to exercise a direction over itself through the ideals—of heroism and sacrifice, for example—the citizen was exhorted to emulate.

These relations between the arts, culture and sovereign power have undergone a number of mutations in the subsequent development of the rationales underlying state support for specific kinds of cultural provision. The logic underlying continuing state patronage of the art forms that had been most closely linked to court society—ballet, theatre, opera, and the art museum—often continues to be one of forging particular forms of elite sociability, bonding the powerful through shared rituals and symbols. The evidence in all societies where relevant studies have been conducted
shows that participation in these cultural institutions is mostly limited to elite social strata (Bourdieu & Darbel, 1991). Their role in symbolizing a cultural distinction between such strata and the generality of the population plays an important part in the cultural dynamics of class societies. This is, therefore, an aspect of government involvement in the cultural sphere that is often regarded as in conflict with the democratic principle of equal cultural entitlements for all citizens which, in the post-war period, has become a guiding principle for cultural policy development—a conflict that is currently being worked through in Britain in the requirements (better management, more popular programmes) that New Labour is attaching to its continuing support for opera and theatre, although with what long-term success remains to be seen.

Government support for more spectacular cultural forms as a means of symbolizing the power of a particular people or nation has also remained an enduring aspect of the cultural policies of modern polities. The festivals of the French Revolution constituted a symbolic use of public space, which, in making a citizenry visible to itself, redirected the earlier symbolism of royal processions (Ozouf, 1988). The subsequent development of participatory forms of public spectacle—international exhibitions, national celebrations, and spectator sports—has yielded a range of contexts in which a people is made visible to itself and its virtues celebrated in ways which put them in competition with other nations, races (the prime cases being Nazi Germany or fascist Italy) and political regimes (especially during the Cold War).

Important questions of publicness concerning the forms in which the identity and qualities of a people, citizenry or nation are to be represented are at stake in these festival, celebratory and commemorative forms. The relations between the policy structures and processes through which these matters are resolved and the perspectives of political constituencies organized in terms of relations of race, class, gender or region have played a crucial role here in redefining both who gets to be counted as citizens and the exemplary virtues that are held up as models for their emulation. A continuing history connects those who criticized the revolutionary festivals for a public iconography of womanhood, which portrayed women as mere helpmates to a republican brotherhood of men (Schiebinger, 1993), to late nineteenth-century feminist criticisms of the male-centred norms of publicness associated with inter-
national exhibitions and museums (Weimann, 1981). And there is a continuing history connecting both of these to contemporary debates centred on the adequacy of the forms of representativeness—whether in terms of gender, race, gender or region—that are to be aimed for in major forms of national commemoration or celebration. The debates occasioned by Georges Pompidou’s grands projets (Loosely, 1995), by Aboriginal engagements with the Australia’s 1988 bicentennial celebrations, or by Britain’s Millennium Dome are all cases in point. As such, they illustrate how ways of making power manifest inherited from an earlier political regime based on a singular source of authority are imbued with a more contested content as a consequence of their relations to a civil society that is plural and divided.

**Acting on the Social**

As well as investing in culture to symbolize power, modern governments have invested in culture as itself a power that is capable of bringing about changes in conduct and ways of life. These are not entirely different functions. Debates concerning how best to symbolize a citizenry—how best to present to them their collective power and virtue—have been centrally concerned with reinforcing some kinds of conduct and changing others. The early modern period, however, also saw the development of an orientation toward culture, which, although it had precedents in earlier forms of pastoral power, represented a new departure so far as secular forms of cultural administration were concerned. This consisted in the role that was accorded culture in the Polizeiwissenschaft (science of police) of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Knemeyer, 1980). The science of police aimed to bring a new order to the social body in place of that which had characterized the relationships between different estates in the old social order with its clear rules regarding the forms of behaviour, dress, duty, and demeanour appropriate to particular stations in life. It thus concerned itself with ways of life both negatively and positively: negatively in prohibiting particular kinds of behaviour (public drunkenness, for example), and positively by providing the cultural means through which problematic forms of conduct might be transformed through programmes of self-improvement.

Within the emerging class dynamics of nineteenth-century industrial societies, such conceptions, when translated into the pro-
grammes of liberal government, typically split the field of culture into two. On the one side, the culture of the working classes presented itself as an assembly of ways of life that needed to be acted on, often with varied aims in view (combating political sedition, inducing habits of thrift and sobriety), as a means of social reform. On the other, the rational and improving culture that had once formed a part of the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 1989) appeared in a new historical guise as an instrument of government, providing the means whereby individuals might be led to transform their own conduct (Minihan, 1997).

This was the general impetus behind the nineteenth-century development of public libraries, museums, art galleries, concert halls, and public schooling through which, in Europe, governments undertook to make cultural provision for the population as a whole. It was, however, the needs and aspirations of government, rather than any sense of democratic cultural rights of the kind that had been asserted during the French Revolution, that supplied the rationale for this provision. Government action in the cultural sphere was based on the expectation that the improving influence of a rational, enlightening and elevating culture would lead, through the accumulation of thousands of individual acts of self reform, to a transformation of working-class ways of life and, consequently, a re-ordered social body. The guiding principle of state cultural provision in this period was accordingly focused mainly on leading ‘the people’ away from cultural activities and traditions that were popular with subordinate social strata and towards greater participation in elite cultural forms that had received the official sanction of state approval. There is, however, an equally important although less-noticed aspect to this moment in the history of cultural policy formation—namely the importance of culture to liberal strategies of government more generally in providing a means of acting on the social that worked through the voluntary activities of free and sovereign individuals rather than through more directive or coercive forms of social management (Bennett, 2000). It was for this reason that culture was so often invoked as the means of solving social problems—drunkenness, vice, improvidence—that mid-to-late nineteenth governments otherwise had no means of addressing that did not involve breaching the principles of liberalism. But, in such formulations, the everyday cultures of the popular classes were usually identified as a problem, as something to be eradicated.
if possible and, if not, as a force whose influence on behaviour was to be weakened.

It is not until the 1930s that questions concerning the responsibility of governments for maintaining and promoting popular pastime, traditions, and ways of life came centrally to the fore. The contexts in which this occurred were often nationally specific: the development, in the context of the New Deal in the United States, of community-based cultural programmes (Harris, 1995), the programmes of leisure-time organization (dopolavoro) of fascist Italy, (de Grazia, 1981), and the role of the Popular Front in France in opening up a new politics of popular leisure (Loosely, 1995). These tendencies were continued in the Second World War which, if it was 'the people's war', also brought the question of the people's culture—and its role in maintaining their morale—to the fore in new ways that made it increasingly imperative for democratic governments both to know about popular ways of life and to nourish them so that they might thrive. This trajectory toward more democratic understandings of the concerns of cultural policy has been continued throughout the post-war period, although by no means consistently or without reversals. Indeed, exceptions to this tendency have often been institutionalised as the administrative apparatuses established to develop government support for art, culture and leisure have reflected the lingering influence of older elite values. The histories of the Arts Council in Britain and the Australia Council are cases in point. In both cases the criteria of excellence that have guided their allocations of funds have often been at odds with their obligation to meet the cultural needs of all sections of society (Hawkins, 1993; Pearson, 1982).

The predominating tendency of the period since the 1960s has been to call into question these socially exclusive conceptions in favour of more democratic conceptions of the range of cultural tastes and values governments should support. While these criticisms initially centred on questions of social class, feminist criticisms brought questions of gender to the fore in the 1970s while, since the 1980s, questions of race and ethnicity have tended to displace the importance that was earlier accorded social class. The responses to these pressures have varied. The cultural policies developed by Jack Lang as a member of Francois Mitterand's governments provided an influential model in the 1980s in view of the accent they placed on the values of pluralism and democracy.
(Loosley, 1995). The cultural policies developed in Australia under the Labour governments of Bob Hawke and Paul Keating were also innovative in developing cultural policies that recognized the diverse needs of a society with a history of culturally varied migration and an indigenous population with highly distinctive cultural needs and traditions (Stevenson, 2000).

The recognition and promotion of cultural diversity—now the major international leitmotif of cultural policy discourse—is not, however, simply a matter of recognizing cultural rights. To the contrary, programmes of cultural diversity are now central components in the governing strategies of modern polities. They supply a means for acting on the social—by celebrating cultural diversity, and marshalling a variety of legal and moral sanctions against racist forms of conduct—that is widely accepted as crucially important for managing the relationships between ways of life in contexts where the mix of peoples is increasingly diverse (Gunew & Rizvi, 1994). That said, the use of arts and cultural policy as a means of managing or administering cultural diversity is not without its problems or its critics. The risk that these might provide a means of exhibiting a liberal tolerance for different forms of artistic and cultural expression while also requiring that minorities conform with the core values of their ‘host’ societies is evident in the chequered histories of multicultural policies, especially in those formulations that advocate cultural diversity as a means of social cohesion (Blommaert & Vershueren, 1998; Hage, 1998).

However, these two tendencies—toward more democratic forms of cultural access, and the promotion of cultural diversity—are neither universal nor irreversible. The links that had earlier connected cultural access policies to social justice principles are now also weaker in Europe where policies based on the logic of social inclusion often fail to acknowledge the relevance of social class to either social or cultural distributive issues. The new right’s criticisms of political correctness in the United States have also challenged cultural diversity policies which, while they are nominally supported in many European countries, often stand in marked contrast to the increasingly tight regulation of immigration in countries like Britain and the negative treatment of asylum seekers. The disparaging treatment of Aboriginal issues that has characterized John Howard’s government in Australia also testifies to how quickly progressive policy agendas can be overturned by political developments.
Culture and Economic Development

Whatever the importance of the social and civic issues associated with cultural policies, these are now often eclipsed by the economic significance of the cultural and media industries. This is not entirely new. Tourism has played a role in the calculations that have guided investments in large cultural infrastructures since the eighteenth-century spa movement and the museum and exhibition boom of the second half of the nineteenth century. The industrial issues at stake in the development of new communications technologies have also been clear from the outset: witness the variety of legal and technical barriers developed in early twentieth century Europe to combat the dominance of American cinema.

However, the economic aspects of cultural policy have assumed an altogether unprecedented significance in the closing decades of the twentieth century. There are a number of reasons for this. Some have to do with the demise of more traditional industrial sectors and the increasing importance of cultural industry development to the employment strategies of once prosperous industrial regions. Some have to do with the changing relations of work and leisure, resulting in increased effective demand for cultural activities. This is reflected in the increasing role accorded cultural tourism as a means of attracting visitors to particular tourist destinations. But the key driving force over the past two decades has consisted in the intersections of a number of technological developments that have revolutionized communications in ways that have profoundly affected all aspects of the cultural and media sectors of advanced societies (Collins & Murroni, 1996). The role of computing and the internet in the development of the ‘information economy’, and the convergence of these with new developments in television and telecommunications, have been especially important.

The cumulative effect of these developments has been to forge a stronger connection between cultural policies and economic policies. This is especially evident in contexts where local or national cultural industries are threatened by the more global pattern of cultural flows associated with the new international media order. In France, Australia, and Canada the case for government investment in cultural industries—film and popular music, for example—has been urged as a means of retaining a viable base for their future expansion in the face of American and British imports (Rowe, 2001). The same rationale lies behind policies that restrict the amount of
foreign content that can be broadcast on radio or television, or regulations limiting foreign ownership of media. However, it is also clear that, in these cases, the considerations at stake are not only economic. In view of their role in circulating not merely economic value but also cultural values and meanings, viable cultural and media industries are seen as necessary for maintaining and developing nationally, regionally or locally distinctive heritages and identities. In other contexts, however, economic and cultural considerations may be in tension with one another and in need of mediation. The requirement that tourism policies should be ‘culturally sustainable’—that is, not be promoted to an extent that will detract from the quality of the specific culture or way of life of a particular locality—is a case in point.

Here too, then, questions of ways of life and the relations between them are at stake. The same is true of the increased interest in questions of intellectual property associated with the new media. A part of the concern here has been with the extent to which intellectual property regimes developed in an earlier media environment can provide for sufficient security of title to sustain the viability of investment in cultural forms whose reproducibility opens up the prospects of their free circulation via the internet. A second area of distinctive concern, however, has been with the intellectual property protocols that are needed to mediate the relations between specific cultural producers and the marketplace in ways that do not prejudice the cultural traditions of the former. The debates that have accompanied the use of the Internet to market the art of the indigenous peoples of Australia, Canada and New Zealand are a case in point, comprising a sub-set of a broader group of policy questions concerning the relations between new media and indigenous cultures (Michaels, 1994).

Considerations of this kind, however, do not address what is perhaps the most important issue associated with the new media order: the increasing division between ‘information rich’ and ‘information poor’ societies. The fact that there are few, if any, international mechanisms that are capable of addressing this issue underlines the extent to which cultural policies remain, in the main, the instruments of national governments—a point I shall return to. But I want, first, as a necessary qualification to the somewhat generalising nature of my discussion so far, to look at the varying constructions of the relations between culture, state and civil society that
have characterised the approaches to cultural policy associated with different systems of rule.

**Culture, State and Civil Society**

The development, over the last two centuries, of these different kinds of governmental involvement in the cultural sphere has occasioned debate concerning the extent to which such involvement is justified and the means through which it is most appropriately exercised. These questions are rehearsed, in the specialist literature, in assessments of the respective virtues of the different models of support for culture that have been developed in connection with different political regimes and philosophies. These range from the view, prevalent in the United States and Japan, that the role of government should be purely facilitative, regulating cultural and media markets by legal and fiscal means to provide the conditions in which the arts and culture might flourish, to the assumption of direct responsibility for funding and directing cultural activities associated with communist regimes (Vestheim, 1996; Watanabe, 1996).

The main point at issues in these debates concerns the relations between state and civil society that different kinds of state action in the cultural sphere entail. Within the formulations of the eighteenth-century science of police, the allocation of a responsibility to the state for the cultural well-being and development of the population formed part of a more general programme of government in which the state was to become directly involved in the administration of all aspects of life. There is a significant continuity between these formulations and the approaches to the administration of culture associated with communist regimes of the mid-to-late twentieth century in their aspiration to replace market mechanisms by means of a cultural plan developed by state functionaries in the light of officially sanctioned criteria of aesthetic and political excellence.

This construction of the relations of culture and government entails a denial of the autonomy of civil society as a realm separate from the state. Instead, in the cultural policies of communist regimes, the institutions of civil society, including those of culture, are integrated into the state in order that the citizen might be directly moulded in accordance with cultural ideals endorsed and supported by the state. This integration of the institutions of civil
society and of the citizen into the state was also a characteristic of fascist cultural policies: the *dopolavoro* was a clear assault on the autonomy of Italian working-class culture and an attempt to integrate it into the state where it could be subjected to more direct forms of regulation (de Grazia 1981; Stone, 1998). The same was true of the influence—by no means inconsiderable, especially in colonial settings—of eugenic conceptions on cultural policies in the early twentieth century since these presupposed an omniscient state and sanctioned its right to interfere with the freedom of citizens (from selective breeding programmes to programmes of cultural genocide) in the name of racially conceived mono-cultural norms (McGregor, 1997).

However, this has not been the predominating tendency in western democracies where the role of liberalism and its criticisms of the totalising aspirations of the earlier science of police have given rise to a different set of relations between state, culture, and civil society. Within liberal conceptions of government, the autonomy of civil society is to be not so much respected as constructed, organized as a zone of rights and freedoms on which the activity of government must not trespass. This has meant that cultural policies that have aimed to bring about specific changes of conduct have done so in ways that have accepted the independence of civil society. This has entailed fashioning cultural resources into means of acting on the social that work indirectly, through the agency of the citizen’s voluntary activity rather than via state imposition, and at a distance in the sense of accepting the autonomy of the social as a realm of behaviours and relationships that exist independently of the state (Burchell, Gordon & Miller, 1991).

These principles of liberal government have been a constant feature of the cultural policies of the United States, Britain, Canada, France and Australia. However, their implementation has been, at different historical moments, either muted or modified in view of the expansion of the state’s functions associated with its role in the provision of social welfare and, since the Second World War, corporatist strategies of economic management. They have, however, come into the ascendancy once again with the phase of neo-liberalism inaugurated by the Thatcher and Reagan administrations and subsequently greatly assisted by those accounts of globalisation, which suggest that the global flows of both culture and capital now exceed the regulatory capacities of national governments. The
process of rolling the state back out of the lives of its citizens has resulted in a tendency to reduce the levels of direct government funding and support for specific forms of culture in favour of the operation of private cultural markets and corporate or philanthropic forms of sponsorship.

In these circumstances, ‘audience development’ has become the policy buzzword of the 1990s. At the same time, where government funding remains a significant factor, new relations of competition have been fostered to make the institutions of public culture more responsive to the effects of market forces. This has been most notably true of the restructuring of the British broadcasting industry over the period since the 1990 Broadcasting Act (Goodwin, 1998). Taking a broader perspective, however, perhaps the most significant changes in the relations of state, culture and civil society at the close of the twentieth century are those evident in China where new forms of cultural consumption associated with the development of new cultural markets now increasingly take the place of state-provided culture.

However, if the policy catch phrase of the 1980s and 1990s has been deregulation, this tendency has not gone unchallenged. Indeed, the consequences of deregulating the culture and media industries have often been sufficiently problematic to lead to more-or-less instant demands for their re-regulation. There is, however, no escaping the historical shift that is entailed in a policy discourse that now sees the state’s cultural role primarily in terms of the exercise of its regulatory capacities rather than as itself directly a significant agent of cultural production.

But perhaps the larger challenge for our times concerns the relations between nation states and the contemporary patterns of both cultural and population flows, and the ability of the former to meet the need for internationalised forms of cultural governance required by the latter. Yet, if this is a distinctive challenge, our capacity to meet it will be strengthened if we do not exaggerate the issues that are stake—as in those accounts which rest on the notion of a qualitative rupture between a past of hermetically closed nations and a present and future of untrammelled globalisation. The historical flimsiness of accounts cast in these terms should not, however, blind us to the fact that the post war period has given rise to two new forms of cultural movement—first, the movement of cultures as ways of life associated with the increased, and increas-
ingly global, mobility of peoples in the post-war period compared with the inter-war years; and, second, the increased mobility of cultural goods associated with the new electronic and telecommunications environment (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999).

It is, of course, too early to see how the relations between these two tendencies will play out. But three things, I think, are clear. The first concerns the development of new forms of cultural networks and communities, cutting across those operating at the national level, that depend on international cultural flows—ranging from diasporic cultures to virtual communities of various kinds. The second is the absence of any vehicles, except for exhortatory ones like UNESCO and the Council of Europe, for posing and addressing cultural policy issues at the international level: for better or worse, cultural policies are still, by and large, national instruments. Are we at a historical moment where the balance of relations here will shift from national to international ones? Or is the shift more likely to be from nations to regional blocs—Europe, the Americas, Asia? The third has to do with whether the concept of culture that has so far provided the mainstay of cultural policy discourse—culture as a national patrimony, as a nationally defined set of relations between diverse ways of life—will need to be revised if it is to assist the promotion of cultural diversity. The interface that is emerging between the rethinking of the concept of culture that has been underway in cultural studies—from culture as fixed and essential expression of differences to culture as hybrid and dialogic—and the administrative vocabularies of cultural policy suggest that this is so as well as providing some pointers to the directions that this revision will need to take (Appadurai, 1996).

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If I look back upon the development of the Swedish society during the half of the century that I have been able to follow, I recognise two fields that have emerged out of a remote corner to central political spheres of interest: environment and international development co-operation. During my time in Uppsala University in the 1950s they existed as fields of discussion in associations but not at all in the political debate and still less in political action. Today environment is a central theme in the government’s policy making. The discussion on development co-operation is about the number of billion SEK. Behind these fundamental changes lies the interplay between researchers on one side and broad groups of citizens and politicians on the other side. The biologist Hans Palmstierna made an especially important contribution in a number of books and articles that awakened the public opinion. The political leadership listened and the first big international conference on environment was arranged in Stockholm in 1972. And this, in its turn, lead to an explosive development of research giving a better basis for debate and decision-making. Twenty years later came the Summit in Rio 1992 that decided upon Agenda 21. That in its turn started a unique process, where the international, national and local levels got the impulses for interaction in a way we have never seen before (United Nations, 1992).

**Culture and Sustainable Development**

Speaking about cultural research as basis for decision-making—an undeveloped field—we often point to the development in the field of environment as a model. Agenda 21 seems to be an inspiring model. Sometimes we have spoken about a cultural Agenda 21 or a cultural dimension of Agenda 21. Today I prefer the wording used by The World Bank (1999), culture and sustainable development.

With this general background my questions for the cultural field are the following: Where is the vital research on the cultural devel-
opment that can influence decision-making? Who are catching the huge problems? Who can take the role of being the culture's Hans Palmstierna? What can be done to initiate changes?

The researchers have not been those who have forced through cultural policy making. Many of them have played a role in the background but mostly as a help to official report activities. Other forces have pushed the development of cultural policy. And we have seen enormous changes. When I started in the Ministry of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs in the 1960s the expression cultural policy was not allowed to use. Culture and policy should not be mixed up. Thirty-five years later in 1998 the Ministers of Culture of the whole world met in Stockholm and decided on a common Action Plan for Cultural Policies for Development that is really surprisingly radical. The public expenditure in Sweden cannot compete with those for environment and international development support but 16 billion SEK which is the money spent by state and municipalities and 28 billion SEK spent by households and individuals show that culture is not an insignificant area seen through economic spectacles.

It is necessary to depart from a realistic picture of the positive aspects of reality but we must also face the weaknesses and shortcomings. We need the researchers especially for the broad, basic perspectives for pointing out the problems and helping to solve them.

A basic issue is: What has been achieved? It is important to examine critically the development until now. In 1999 we got an extremely important contribution in form of the book by Sven Nilsson Kulturs vägar (The roads of culture) (Nilsson, 1999), a unique critical study of a researcher who combines his background with a long broad experience of cultural policy making in different positions in regional and local administration and finally as the head of the public library in Malmö. In his book we find an inspiring summing up analysis of the development of cultural policy in Sweden to be considered by all involved in studies of the reality of cultural policy. It is of course not the final answer. As all important research it invites to objections but most of all it stimulates to further studies. One aspect in the book that I find especially important is to get a clearer picture of what is happening on the local and regional level in the municipalities and the county councils. There are no longer the uniform models we saw before. I hope that using a refined tech-
nique we can learn what has happened with culture after reorganisations and saving programmes all over the country.

The environment researchers uncovered hidden problems and threw light over trends, discoveries that in a later stage created action. But it is easier to show the increased content of carbon dioxide, rain forest fading away and dying lakes than to find the cultural problem areas. Already the delimitation of the concept of culture and field of cultural policy is itself a problem. Ten years ago it was looked upon as such a huge problem that we could not solve it at home ground. It may be looked upon as one of our big successes in cultural policy that we together with our Norwegian friends managed to start a procedure that gave us the World Commission on Culture and Development with the task to describe the role of culture in development or culture into a wider context. The commission report *Our Creative Diversity* from 1995 and the European sub-report *In from the margins* from 1997 presented a new role for cultural policies even if their conclusions are not always quite clear and not enough developed. They were not research reports but based on research and elaborated with the help of a number of researchers.

**An Ambitious Action Plan**

The Ministers of Culture of the whole world drew in the 1998 ministerial conference their conclusions of the two reports in the *Action Plan for Cultural Policies for Development*, the so called *Stockholm Action Plan*. Its basic principles begins with the following two statements:

- “Sustainable development and the flourishing of culture are interdependent.”
- “One of the chief aims of human development is the social and cultural fulfilment of the individual.”

Here and in the rest of the action plan we find a new approach, a new level of ambition that goes far beyond what most people associate with cultural policy, which is support to arts, preservation of monuments and media. Even that delimitation represents a development of the field of cultural policy since the year of founding of the new Swedish state cultural policy in 1974 (Kungl. Majts Proposition 1974:28). At that time media were in reality not a part of the field. It took another ten years. In 1996, the year of the revision of
the cultural policy, another important increase was decided by the Parliament through the inclusion of architecture or all kinds of built environment as well as design, covering articles for everyday use as well as artistic objects (Regeringens proposition 1996/97:3). That means that the whole built environment and all the things in our surroundings are included in the cultural policy field.

This decision has got consequences. The Ministry has e.g. produced an unusually critical report on the huge transformation of the Swedish towns after the World War II with the subtitle Erfarenheter från ett kulturmord (Experiences from a cultural murder, Johansson, 1997). Here we really find a problem analysis! The Parliamentary decision forced a new form of co-operation between the Ministry of Culture and several other ministries, sharing the responsibility for the built environment. They formulated together an action plan with a number of proposals. One of them is legislation on road building with regard for cultural aspects. Another idea is the arrangement of a campaign Year of Architecture 2001 (Arkitekturåret 2001) with the participation of a great number of actors. The goal is to create a demand and understanding for good architecture and design all over the country.

But this problem analysis resulting in broad action covers just one new part of the cultural field. Other fields are equally important to study with the same high ambition and involving the interministerial co-operation that is decisive for a new approach in line with the ideas in the Stockholm Action Plan.

The cultural policy of today has developed from the need to support the cultural institutions and the artists. This is a self-evident point of departure but still insufficient. Shall we realise the goal set up in the Stockholm Action Plan about cultural fulfilment of the individual the ambitions must be set much higher. In an article in the magazine Kulturrådet, published by the National Council for Cultural Affairs I have allowed myself to be provocative arguing for a new third step of development of the national cultural policy in our country just to realise fully the goals set up in the Action Plan. The first step was the period when the new policy was prepared and the second the period after the basic parliamentary decision in 1974. Nobody has until now answered my provocation. One part of such a third step is that we should consider much more the field of responsibility for cultural policy, Kleberg (1999). In an article that has been published in The International Journal of Cultural
Policy: The concept of Culture in the Stockholm Action Plan and its Consequences for Policy Making

I discuss the need of enlarging the territory covered by cultural policy as well as the need of a broad analysis of the interplay between the territory of culture and other fields (Kleberg, 2000). The reality is not divided according to the field of responsibility of ministries and we must catch the reality. I would like to find committed researchers who are interested both in interdisciplinary work and a comparative approach.

Early Warning Signals

The preface of this volume talks about the reach of culture and one section of the volume will discuss the fundamental problem of who will be reached by the cultural policy efforts to which in fact every taxpayer is contributing. This is an area where the Swedish National Council for Cultural Affairs (Statens kulturråd) in 1990–91 presented a whole series of reports on cultural participation (Statens kulturråd, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1991d). They were entirely based on research experiences. The idea was to analyse the behaviour of different groups of visitors to institutions and organisations, their motives and the ways to overcome their obstacles to participate. The reports covered each cultural field to find solutions to its specific conditions. The reports were widely spread and discussed among institutions and organisations. But I wonder about the long-term result of these efforts. Did the cultural institutions follow the advice? What is really decisive for them in the efforts to keep their public and to find new groups? This question—very decisive for the outcome of the public cultural policy efforts—is still open.

I am generally pleading for a deeper problem oriented analysis of the cultural field. We need early warning signals. Is it true that the theatre institution in its actual form is condemned to death? Will the voter in a near future—as some voices in the cultural debate believe—do away with the actual public support to culture and replace it by an American model with sponsors and private contributors? The cultural politicians should not mix into the content of culture but cannot completely disregard from its use. Destruction of culture is an important element in the civil war of today. The neo-Nazis devote huge efforts to the spread of their destructive culture. The carriers of culture—music, books, magazines, etc.—can be used both for tackling the essential questions of
life but can also be used for spread of violence and terror. What shall we do? The National Council for Cultural Affairs presented some years ago a report called Konsten att motverka främlingsfientlighet och rasism (The art to counteract xenophobia and racism, 1995). That is a theme, more pertinent than ever, where we should enter deeper.

For the discussion and decision-making in the field of environment relevant indicators have been decisive. The same is since long true for e.g. economics and health. One of the most important background documents to find the position of a country from most aspects is The Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme), a basic source combining statistical data with a clearly formulated analysis of them. The report is unfortunately lacking cultural indicators. UNESCO has produced a World Cultural Report in 1998 and 2000, but it is still more a collection of essays than a standard reliable source like Human Development Report. A broad development is needed to achieve the relevant cultural indicators. An initiative with that purpose has been taken by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and the Sida (Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency). The work is carried out within the frame of an international project titled Improving the tools for the planning, reporting and assessment of cultural policies for human development.

An International Research Agenda

Descriptions and retrospect are necessary but insufficient if the decision-makers should get the basis they need to create the good society. The development of society today is in a phase of development where I—in my moments of hope—find an un-dogmatic openness to manage vital issues. My dream as a committed cultural administrator is that the research community should take up the really big, exciting tasks about the achievement of the good society—a main issue for cultural policy making in the spirit of the Stockholm Action Plan. But to succeed the Swedish researchers must extend links to the world outside our small country. UNESCO has got the task to elaborate guidelines for the development of an international research agenda with regard to culture and development. Together with Professor Karl Eric Knutsson I have developed the theme in a paper, Culture, Human Development and the Need for an International Research Agenda (Kleberg & Knutsson, 2000). It is a huge and difficult task to develop such an agenda in an area, where
we are lacking national agendas in most countries. But international co-operation today is much more easy to achieve than before with the help of email and homepages. In fact there are already a number of useful tools for co-operation like The International Journal of Cultural Policy, Culturelink, Circular and Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidskrift (Nordic Journal of Cultural Policy). I look upon them as a bunch of keys to open new doors and channels for co-operation.

In the beginning of the report we have learned about the motives from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and the National Council for Cultural Affairs to organise the first cultural policy research seminar in Sweden during the last twenty years. The co-operation between the two spheres they represent—research and policy making—is crucial. With my own long experience in a position as the head of the Council’s Department for Studies and Research, which meant trying to build bridges between the two worlds, I should not hide the problems. I have found a lot of frustration that must be looked after through talking and co-operation. Often the researchers do not find an understanding for the results of their research projects. The cultural politicians do not think that the researchers select the most important problems or help them enough to draw the conclusions relevant for their decision-making. We need much more of dialogues. It is not steering of the research when those involved in cultural policy making point out what they want to see studied and get the help to interpret the result of studies made.

My hope is that the current report will contribute to an increased mutual understanding between the two worlds we live in. Hopefully such urgent ideas should be born that researchers could choose and find stimulating to carry through at the same time that cultural politicians will find them relevant for their decision-making. The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation then certainly with pleasure will provide the projects with generous financial support.

References


Part II

Culture in the Democratic System
At the foundation of history there is an explanatory level—interpreting events that really happened. But historical explanations are both interpreted and used for many social and political purposes. A study of how history is used is sometimes just as interesting as the history itself! To have power is to have the right to interpret history. History can serve to legitimise viewpoints or activities. History can be used to create identities. History can be used as a bond in diverse ideological constructions. Even today, we see frightening examples of the use of history in e.g. the former Yugoslavia or, in our own society, as support for xenophobic sentiments.

A central instrument in the use of history is the exploitation of cultural heritage—everything from buildings, folklore objects and food traditions to art and classical music. Let me take an example from the last of these as an introduction to my later, more theoretical discussion.

**Beethoven’s Ninth—A Struggle for the Right to Interpretation**

“Freude, schöne Götterfunken”—most people recognise the choral finale of Beethoven’s Ninth. But when they hear it, probably not many of them come to think of the technical problems Beethoven was having with his composition, or the situation in Vienna in the 1820s, or even what Beethoven imagined the piece would sound like. Beethoven’s Ninth is an object of cultural heritage that for almost everybody represents something from their own time (see also Dennis, 1996). The question is, what do people associate it with? What does this music symbolise?

A qualified guess is that many people think of Beethoven’s Ninth, and especially the choral finale, as a symbol of the European Union, or more generally, of a sense of European community. This piece of music has become an important and effective part of a
very deliberate construction of a European identity. But the Ninth has been used in constructing still other identities through the years. My brief presentation here will show how Beethoven’s Ninth has been used by many different groups in Germany in the 20th century. Such a study could be extended to include the entire western world. But my point is not primarily to make some sort of sociological musical study but to give an example for a further discussion of how cultural heritage is used in the construction of group identities, among other things, as an important instrument in the use of history.

The working class movement in Germany set great store by the symphony, especially, of course, the words of the choral finale. A leading representative of the movement, Eisner, wrote in the newspaper *Vorwärts* at the turn of the century that the Ninth Symphony “… leads to the day of victory for all the revolutionary forces of the world … when all of mankind will be brothers”.

In 1905, a concert was held in Berlin, “Revolutionsfeier”, when the Ninth was played “for workers and by workers”. Eisner wrote in connection with the concert that the symphony “describes the demand that the revolutionary duty of mankind is not fulfilled until freedom for all has been attained”. There was a very clear-cut effort to interpret and use Beethoven’s Ninth (and Beethoven in general) to strengthen the proletarian movement. The great composer became an ally, which gave weight and legitimacy to the movement. His work, being both universal and serious from a (high-)cultural point of view, became an active part of a conscious identity construction within the working class movement.

During the First World War, interpretations of the Ninth became quite complex in light of the nationalistic propaganda. Even within the working class movement, large groups had given their support to the war efforts, so, more than ever before, the Ninth came to represent the German nation (in war). Among other things, there was discussion of using the Ninth in the propaganda for new war loans.

In the period between the wars, we see numerous interpretations of the Ninth, all differing according to class affiliation and ideology. Common to all these groups is the significance they attributed to Beethoven and how important his works were in the identity constructions of the widely differing groups. It is therefore all the more interesting to see how they all tried to squeeze Beethoven and
not least the Ninth into diametrically opposed interpretations that suited each group.

The working class movement continued to use the Ninth for its own purposes. In *Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung*, it was described as the work of “a proud freedom fighter”. Without mentioning the fact that the Ninth was actually dedicated to Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia, *Vorwärts* claimed that Beethoven had no respect for royalty and had not written his piece as entertainment for the aristocracy.

Practising what they preached, at the 100th anniversary of Beethoven’s death in 1927, ‘folk concerts’ were arranged at which the Ninth was performed for workers. The concerts were sometimes introduced with speeches that further emphasised their own interpretation of the work. Today we would say that they tried to inculcate the symbolic value that suited each group’s identity construction.

Another group in Germany was the educated middle class, which felt affiliation to neither the working class movement nor the more or less extreme right-wing groups. In *Berliner Tageblatt* a well-known culture journalist claimed that the most important aims of the Beethoven concerts (in 1927) were not to categorise his music as part of daily working life experience or to make unrestrained propaganda for his music. The main purpose was to inspire people to feel a deeper involvement in art per se. According to this group Beethoven and his Ninth Symphony symbolised pure art, not a clearly political objective. Accordingly, the writer argued that Beethoven had conquered his fate not through external factors but through an inner strength. This was perhaps a typical viewpoint among the educated middle class of the period, the same middle class that was partly silenced under the Nazis.

For the more right-wing groups in Germany, Beethoven and his Ninth stood for something else. They used him for an entirely different purpose. The right-wing newspaper *Der Tag* called the Ninth Symphony “the final song of victory”, symbolising the German people’s victory over their enemies. Beethoven’s Ninth was not a symbol of the working masses, or of the human race, or of art. It symbolised the German People.

This theme of Beethoven as a symbol for the German people, more than anything else, was shared by the more than extreme right-wing forces in Germany, not least the Nazis.
third symphony, for example, expressed a longing for a strong ‘Führer’. But they had problems with the Ninth and its words, “all men are brothers”. *Völkischer Beobachter* wrote that the Ninth resembled the difference between ideal and reality, and that human beings were not yet mature enough to follow the challenge of the Ninth. Until the German people stood united and great (and could lead the human race in the right direction), the focus should be on other works by Beethoven.

However, this viewpoint became subordinate to that of another Nazi ideologist, who claimed that the call to “Kuss der ganzen Welt” was not at all an appeal to fraternise with every Tom, Dick and Harry but was an expression of the dream that humans “so deutsch wie möglich gedacht”.

When the Nazis did come to power, the Ninth was used profusely. The interpretation of the Ninth as an expression of the German People, or the German Nation, clearly had the upper hand. Other interpretations were probably not tolerated at all. When the choral finale was performed at the Olympic Stadium in Berlin in 1936, it was seen by the organisers to be an expression of the ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ established by the Nazis. It was played under the direction of Furtwängler as a tribute to Hitler on his birthday in 1937. When the war later broke out, Beethoven’s work was used by the Nazis even more intensely. None the less, performances of Beethoven’s Ninth were forbidden in the occupied countries of Eastern Europe. Obviously the people there did not belong to the community of peoples!

But the Nazis having enforced their exclusive right to interpret Beethoven’s Ninth did not make the piece intolerable after the end of the Third Reich. When the war was over the Ninth came to be played on both sides of the German partition. At the first Olympics after the end of the war the melody of the choral finale was used as the song of the combined German team. But both sides were dissatisfied with this arrangement and after a time the countries sent separate teams that had their own national anthems, without the melody of the choral finale!

In Eastern Europe the view of Beethoven was influenced, among other things, by the fact that Lenin was said to have loved the composer. The *Apassionata Sonata* was, according to Lenin, an expression of the Marxist dialect in art. Thus it was admissible to play the Ninth Symphony at the party convention in 1946. Beethoven
and his works were once again interpreted as expressions of a revolutionary way of thinking. Even Walter Ulbricht claimed in 1970 that the words of the choral finale meant “that now everyone can be brothers because the workers have freed themselves from the chains of the imperialistic profiteers and taken their fate into their own hands!”

In Western Europe, too (I am inclined to say of course), Beethoven’s Ninth was played frequently. But not only that. When East and West Germany were reunited in 1989, the celebration included a huge concert at which it was precisely Beethoven’s Ninth that Leonard Bernstein conducted. In the phrase, “Freude, schöner Götterfunken”, however, he had the words changed to “Freiheit, schöner Götterfunken”. Strictly speaking, a rather serious transgression, but many listeners were said to have cried unabashedly. I for one have never heard of Bernstein doing anything like this before or after. But the political and social situation was exceptional, and the use of the heritage that is Beethoven’s Ninth was adapted accordingly.

But the Ninth had already begun to be filled with a new symbolic meaning that was not the nation, not the proletariat, not the human race, not freedom, and not pure art. As early as 1967 the famous melody began to be used as a hymn of the new European trade organisation and in 1972 it was selected as a kind of official anthem of the EEC. Today, it plays a very active part in the creation of a European identity. Will this interpretation have the same precedence over other interpretations as the Nazis’ interpretation had in Germany during their time in power?

The above was merely an example. The basis for my arguments is that history is not just something that is researched and discovered but also something that is used. A central instrument in the use of history is thus what we call cultural heritage. Cultural heritage is therefore not an objective phenomenon but a subjective construction. The way with which we select certain so-called objects of cultural heritage can in turn be called the musealisation process (Vergo, 1997). This process always related to the power structure of the society; there is a struggle for the right of interpretation in the musealisation process. This power struggle is reflected not least in the institutions that are created around cultural heritage.
Cultural Heritage

Ashworth & Larkham (1994) describe the connection between history and heritage:

History is the remembered record of the past; heritage is a contemporary commodity purposefully created to satisfy contemporary consumption. (quoted in Grundberg, 1999)

The quotation takes us to the next step in describing the content of the study of cultural heritage—the concept of cultural heritage.

By cultural heritage, I mean, beginning in the word’s first syllable:

Culture is the value systems that groups of people share. These value systems leave their marks in various cultural expressions, material as well as spiritual. Some of these cultural expressions are considered to have especial symbolic value and are therefore chosen to be cultural heritage. In practice, the objects we define as cultural heritage receive special, institutionalised attention.

Cultural heritage can be material and spiritual relics such as art, utility goods, archives, buildings, cultural and historical environments, written and oral memories, traditions, languages and customs. In this way, the concept of cultural heritage becomes quite broad. But this broadened concept of cultural heritage does not automatically mean that all of these factors are cultural heritage, only that they can become cultural heritage.

Naturally this definition requires an explanation. One way to begin is to see how the concept of cultural heritage is interpreted today. It is possible, in reading publications and investigations and in discussions, to distinguish three main senses behind the concept of cultural heritage. I will call these senses the exemplary, the all-inclusive, and the analytical.

- Cultural heritage is the relics we regard as our own or others’ positive (that everyone can appreciate) heritage, which should therefore be given priority in preservation and conveyance. (The exemplary sense)
- Cultural heritage is essentially everything we have inherited. (The all-inclusive sense)
Cultural heritage is the relics that hold the greatest symbolic value—whether we like them or not—and which have formed us, and others, and therefore should be given priority in preservation. (The analytical sense)

The first sense of the concept of cultural heritage is to be likened to the traditional concept of high culture—the interpretation is based on an evaluation of things considered ideologically, politically, or socially positive, things that can function as good examples. The second sense can be likened to the anthropological concept of culture—i.e. an all-inclusive approach. The third sense of cultural heritage is based on the view that, out of an infinite number of cultural expressions, society always defines certain ones, due to their symbolic value, as being cultural heritage. This sense of cultural heritage is the most analytically applicable, and the one that my definition rests upon.

This definition implies that cultural heritage is always something subjective, a choice made from a virtually infinite number of choices. But unlike the exemplary definition, in our research perspective we assume that cultural heritage is analytically value-neutral. If something we have studied is later used by others, who give it a value charge is another matter. There is thus an analytical gain in letting culture and cultural expressions stand for the totality, i.e. letting cultural heritage stand for the subjective selection that is the main goal of the study of cultural heritage. Not everything is cultural heritage, but everything can become cultural heritage!

The next step is to acknowledge that processes in the definition and conveyance of cultural heritage have not been studied sufficiently. Here lies perhaps the most important research goal of cultural heritage studies, to discuss the role of values in the definition of cultural heritage. We point out the beauty of Nynäs Palace, for instance, and moralise over the ugliness of the Million Homes Project housing (for now). Up to this point, there are no controversies, since we are dealing with values that are shared by almost everyone. But the picture can get much more complicated. At a cultural heritage conference in 1996 the journalist Anders Björnsson pointed out a paradox he had recently experienced. He had been in Prague and seen art from the 17th and 18th centuries that glorified the bloodiest of religious wars and acts of genocide. Despite the ideological content, it was considered self-evident that this was art. At
the same time, at Liljevalch’s in Stockholm, there was an exhibit of art from the Soviet Union during the Stalinist era, where the works were exclusively discussed as ideology and not as art (with the exception of the paintings in the room called ‘Forbidden art’).

A hypothesis could be asserted that the definition of cultural heritage, and the symbolic meaning given it, is directly related to the time that has passed after a historical event. The examples are manifold—the use of history after the fall of Stalin and the demise of the Soviet Union, after the fall of Nazism in Germany, even after the breakthrough of the Swedish welfare state.

Close to the Time of a Change

A clear tendency close in time to a change is the desire to destroy the old cultural expressions completely, because they represent an evil time. They are seen as so symbolically charged that they should be eradicated. They are definitely not defined as cultural heritage. In the Soviet Union and its satellite states, statues of Lenin were torn down and museums of communism closed. In Germany, relics of Nazism were destroyed. In Sweden, many Social Democrats during especially the fifties and sixties pursued a policy of tearing down old working-class neighbourhoods, since they represented dirt and poverty and ought therefore to be done away with.

A Certain Amount of Time after a Change

After a certain amount of time, there is a greater tendency of wanting to preserve relics as a reminder, as a means of educating. The symbols are still negatively charged, but not so dreadfully so that they can’t be used for edification, for example about the dangers of going the way of Stalinism. We can now see how this second phase is beginning to reach the use of the history of Nazism. In Berlin a museum is being built on the site where Gestapo had its headquarters and there is discussion of preserving what remains of Hitler’s underground bunker. In Sweden’s industrial towns, this second phase has meant an attempt to stop the demolitions. In Norrköping, as Annika Alzén has discussed in her dissertation, people have successfully put a stop to the demolition of the old factory area in the centre of town (Alzén, 1996).
A Longer Time after a Change

When a longer period of time has passed after a change, there is a tendency to recode the relics to give them a different symbolic value from the one they had before. This phase has not yet taken place regarding the relics of Nazism. The wounds are still far too visible. But as for the old Swedish industrial landscape, this third phase is now emerging. Many industrial buildings are being recoded as the bearers of architectural aesthetic value. The industrial landscape in Norrköping is becoming the town’s greatest attraction, and even high culture, in the form of Norrköping’s symphony orchestra, has moved in to the area.

A fourth approach to cultural expressions, running parallel to these temporal phases, is to view them with their original symbolic value and therefore as worthy of preservation and conveyance, an approach that is common among groups like the neo-Nazis and the die-hard Stalinists.

The examples above constitute basic ways of approaching objects of cultural heritage. They can be destroyed, they can be preserved with their original symbolic meaning (as far as possible) and they can be given a completely new symbolic meaning. Another very important approach is, of course, that cultural expressions can be forgotten. Oblivion is just as important a component in the study of cultural heritage as memory and preservation.

The above arguments have focused mainly on the first part of the concept of cultural heritage—the choice of what is to be defined as culture. But as the concept says, there is also a heritage. We do not always actively choose what to take care of—we have inherited a cultural heritage. Our cultural preservation institutions must tend to buildings and environments that have been defined for generations as important and worthy of preservation. There is legislation on what is to be preserved, and all that an agency like the National Heritage Board can do is abide by it. Museums have large collections that today’s museum personnel must attend to, no matter what values they themselves attribute to these old collections. They haven’t been the ones to choose what should be defined as cultural heritage, either. In this way the choice of cultural heritage is a complicated process governed by earlier ideologies and choices that influence today’s evaluations of what is cultural heritage.
The Musealisation Process

With the above discussion being relatively general, it is important to dig deeper into the processes that bring various cultural expressions to be defined as cultural heritage, and how these expressions are later preserved and conveyed. A central process is the musealisation process, i.e. how cultural heritage is identified and incorporated into our consciousnesses and practices.

The phenomenon of musealisation has been discussed in several studies, e.g. Lowenthal (1985) and Walsh (1992). County curator of antiquities, Karin Lindvall, said at a conference on museums and cultural heritage held at the Nordic Museum in 1997: “Musealisation is always a part of an ideological and cultural battlefield, where different groups and activities fight for the right to define what our history is, what is important and what is ephemeral, what should be preserved, what should be told.”

These arguments can be summarised by presenting a number of functions that lead to the classification of cultural heritage, a classification that many things, from objects, cultural and natural environments, archives, memories and traditions, all can become.

The most important functions of musealisation are:

- Identification (determination);
- Isolation (change of context);
- Symbolisation (coding).

Identification (Determination)

First there has to be an identification and determination of what is worth regarding as especially worthy of preservation. What should be defined as cultural heritage, out of an endless ocean of presumptive cultural expressions worthy of preservation, is not a foregone conclusion, even if there is almost always an attempt after the fact to make the choice look obvious. Identification is a societal process governed by many different power factors.

Isolation (Change of Context)

One consequence of identification is that the phenomenon chosen as cultural heritage becomes isolated from its original context. This is most noticeable when the phenomenon is moved somewhere else, such as to a museum. But to mark out something on its site is also a form of isolation. A building or an environment labelled with a sign has also been isolated from its surroundings. Even...
without these outward insignia, the mere knowledge that a house is special and under the supervision of authorities contributes to isolating it in people’s consciousness from surrounding buildings.

Isolation can take place on several levels—geographic, temporal and in terms of use.

The heritage-declared phenomenon is lifted out of its geographical milieu. Things that are everyday in their original setting can be given special value after a change of context (or just the opposite, in some cases).

The phenomenon is locked into a special time span, of longer or shorter duration. In this way, a house that is several hundred years old can be used to represent just a few days, like the Ornäs cottage in Dalecarlia (Dalarna).

The phenomenon loses its connection with its original usage and users. The nuances that a farmer might use to describe a tool are reduced to formula-like descriptions in books or in teaching. For example, the peasants’ violin music in Sweden was transformed, after a musealisation process at the turn of the last century, into something entirely different from what it had been in its original function in young people’s lodges.

Symbolisation (Coding)

The isolated phenomenon is given a symbolic meaning and is recoded to mean something entirely or partly different from what it meant in its original context. Musealised objects are recoded as the bearers of a special contemporary meaning, based on contemporary value judgements. The bridge in Mostar can on the one hand be used as a symbol of the will of one’s own culture to survive, but from another perspective it is a symbol of foreign culture in one’s country. For a long time, the banners of the labour movement symbolised the democratic and pioneering spirit that forged our welfare society. Today they risk being recoded into expressions of a somewhat naive labour movement bureaucracy.

The final goal on Karin Lindvall’s ‘cultural battlefield’ is to be victorious in deciding what the objects of cultural heritage will symbolise today and in the future (Bohman & Lindvall, 1997). In this way, symbolisation plays a crucial role in the musealisation process, strongly dependent upon the dominating value judgements of the society. Naturally the choice of central symbolic values also governs which cultural expressions we choose to define as cultural her-
itage. Thus, the various functions of the model are linked together and should be outlined as follows:

Symbolisation → Identification → Isolation → Symbolisation → Identification
(choice) (change of context) (coding)

In Bohman (1997a, 1997b, 1997c) a pattern is pointed out regarding the symbolisation process that has led, among other things, to the coding of our cultural heritage as an expression of especially a national identity, whereby new cultural expressions are identified as objects of cultural heritage because they are considered to symbolise a Swedish national identity.

**The Right of Interpretation**

A main thread through musealisation and the use of history is the struggle of various groups for two rights: the right of interpretation regarding the focus and themes on which to base the writing and use of history, and the right of interpretation as to what will be defined as cultural heritage and how this should be symbolised.

The sometimes entirely divergent interests as to what should be defined as cultural heritage have been presented in Jonas Grundberg's licentiate dissertation, with examples of what he calls “the inborn dissonances of the cultural heritage process' of today” (Grundberg, 1999).

In very generalised terms, it is possible to discern various power centres that govern the musealisation process.

- **Political and official power.** The royal court, politicians, governmental authorities and the like.
- **Professionals within cultural heritage administration.** Museum staff, culture preservationists, archivists, people at universities in relevant subjects and others.
- **The public culture sector.** The media, public debaters, interest groups and others.
- **The general public.** Existing and presumptive audiences/users, including economic interests.

These power groups can both unite around and fight each other for the right to define cultural heritage and how the definition should be used and conveyed. When the institutionalisation of the work
of cultural heritage first began, the above power centre 1, not least the royal court, dominated greatly. Later, during especially the 19th century, a professional cultural heritage sector was created and its members gained an increasing degree of influence over cultural heritage—museum employees, university archaeologists, etc. Today a hypothesis would be that group 2 is losing its impact while groups 3 and 4 are more and more influential. Artists, theatre people and other non-professional cultural heritage workers are now considered to be able to contribute more and more to museums. There is an increasing need to adapt to the paying public in order to find financing. The need for sponsors from not least the business sector is rising. There is also a tendency today that the political level, through such measures as earmarked funds to cultural heritage institutions, wants to strengthen its right to interpretation over the activities of these institutions.

Since this is an important research field in cultural heritage studies, one of the most important issues is to find the instruments that can analyse how different economic, ideological, and political groups choose their definitions of objects of cultural heritage and how they are symbolised. Key words are focus, theme and stereotype.

- **Focus** means the main direction of the writing and use of history. This is often given a dominant role, objectified to appear self-evident and scientised through the creation of new university disciplines.
- **Theme** stands for that which we choose to research and write about within the given focus, often implying that the theme is the best choice for understanding the particular focus. Theme, too, tends to be objectified and scientised.
- **Stereotype** stands for the will to create simplified concepts that can exemplify the theme. This is the most active function in the educating element of the use of history.

These functions can be used to explain different groups’ definitions of cultural heritage for their own ideological, political and economic purposes. Thus the dominating historical writing for a long time has been:

The forming of the nation (Focus) ➔ The role of rulers (Theme) ➔ The character of the Swedish king (Stereotype)
In Swedish cultural heritage institutions, especially the cultural history museums, the forming of the nation has long been the focus of the use of history, with theme and stereotype changing from time to time, for example during the struggle of cultural historians against traditional historians at the turn of the past century. This growing group of professional people working with cultural heritage formulated their own theme and stereotype, ones that later became highly dominating in the musealisation process:

The forming of the nation ➞ Peasant culture ➞ The farmer in Dalecarlia

(Focus) (Theme) (Stereotype)

Institutionalisation

The institutionalisation process has to do primarily with level 2 in the above enumeration of power centres that govern the musealisation process—i.e. the professional cultural heritage administration. Professional cultural heritage administration means all institutionalised activities that have a more or less official role in the society’s musealisation processes. This includes museums, archives, activities within the general concept of cultural preservation, and libraries. These institutions have come to exist partly due to society’s need of creating and preserving cultural heritage, and their main activity can also be linked to various functions within the musealisation process.

The history of the creation of a cultural heritage administration in Sweden can serve to elucidate some general concepts applicable to a cultural heritage studies analysis instrument. Here is a brief summary: in the seventeenth century, the Swedish throne began to institutionalise the musealisation of cultural heritage as a means of strengthening Sweden’s position as a great power. Charles XI’s regency issued a “Placard and Decree regarding Old Monuments and Antiquities in the Realm”, after which the Board of Antiquities was founded. This began with a job of identification, the so-called antiquities inquiry of 1667–1684. During the 18th century there was reduced interest in the central government in cultural heritage, prompted partly by the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Instead initiative came from intellectuals and individual promoters of education. When Sweden lost Finland in 1809 the need to look
backwards was reinforced, as witnessed by, for instance, the founding of historical societies and the compilations of folk songs.

The nineteenth century came to signal an upsurge in the use of history. Folklore and ancient monuments (objects, environments and archives) were none the less long regarded as coherent expressions of an ancient national soul. The particularisation of cultural heritage administration into separate professional branches did not begin until the second half of the 19th century. Bror Magnus Hildebrand built up a central, national collection of ancient relics. The state-owned Museum of History opened in 1865. The study of antiquities began to be scientised at the same time, and the university discipline of archaeology was established.

But the theme of the use of history began to shift. Nations were now expected to stay united not through power by through underlying principles of affinity: language, mentality, customs etc. This meant giving more room to the history of the people than before. The first ancient monument society was founded in Närke in 1865. In 1869 the Nils Månsson Mandelgren Swedish Ancient Monuments Society was founded. In 1873 Artur Hazelius created the Nordic Museum. The Swedish folklore movement had its organisational heyday. Soon the provincial museums entered the scene. This cultural and historical focus in the use of history was also scientised, e.g. through the creation of the university disciplines of ethnology and cultural anthropology. The chair in cultural anthropology at Stockholm University is to this day directly linked to the Nordic Museum.

State-financed research on ancient monuments, with its administration, like the university discipline of history, came to stand in opposition to the cultural-historical focus, with its museums and assemblies. This may seem odd in view of the fact that they had a common goal, to reinforce a feeling of patriotism. But the two sides had differing views on which themes within this focus the use of history should be concentrated upon. It was also a question of the organisational and personal territorial conflicts that often follow in the wake of particularisation.

During the 20th century various initiatives were taken to link together parts of the cultural heritage administration. In 1916 the Society for Regional History Preservation was founded. In 1923 Sigurd Curman was appointed national curator of antiquities and he later founded the Central Board of National Antiquities (now called the
National Heritage Board). During the 1980s five museums in Sweden were appointed national ‘special responsibility museums’ within their fields. Parallel to this development, particularisation of cultural heritage continues, as witnessed by, among other things, the creation of a steady flow of museums with increasingly specialised subjects. At the same time, there is a tendency today towards a growing internationalisation (the EU, the internet, etc.) that probably has lead once again to an increased need to identify and symbolise objects of cultural heritage as expressions of a national identity.

Some key words in the analysis of heritage administration in the present and past are thus: particularisation, professionalisation, scientisation and objectification. Heritage institutions have been created in a particularisation effort, as a basis for professionalisation. Heritage administration over the past centuries came to be increasingly regarded as its own activity, separate from e.g. political institutions. Gradually certain institutions were chosen for particular kinds of heritage. In this way the view was strengthened that special professional skills were needed in working with heritage institutions. Particularisation can be driven quite far, as Svante Beckman argues in his book Modernisering och kulturarv (Modernisation and cultural heritage) (Beckman, 1993). To assert for instance that christening fonts can only be handled by people with special skills leads to a situation where people who have those skills are able to claim, through their special professionalism, that they have an absolute right to interpretation within their field.

This particularisation and professionalisation is aided by the scientisation of the activity. Certain subject fields in heritage administration are also given increased legitimacy by being made into university disciplines. The connection between archaeology and cultural preservation is clear. When the first cultural history museums were created, the academic field of cultural anthropology was also developed. The creation of university disciplines in their subject fields strengthens the institutions' professionalism and thereby their demand to the right of interpretation in questions of cultural heritage.

An active component in the demand for the right of interpretation is to assert the objectivity of an item of cultural heritage. This means proclaiming the obviousness that these particular buildings, these particular objects or these particular archives are our cultural heritage. By virtue of their scientised professionalism, the staff of
heritage institutions can claim that their judgements are in practice objective truths that cannot be questioned by people who lack this kind of professionalism. Cultural heritage is thereby transformed into something more or less predetermined that is thought of as following its own laws, separate from social or political ideologies. Objectification becomes a means of proclaiming one’s right of interpretation, through one’s institutions, in the musealisation process that leads to a selection of the objects of cultural heritage that play a more or less active role in the use of history.

References


Democracy under Pressure

The question of the position and conditions of democracy has become an important issue in the West. In the Nordic countries democracy has long been taken for granted. It has been deemed a political system, which survives from its own inner force. Since the post-war period, the Nordic model of society has often been highlighted as an ideal type and in an international context, people from the Nordic countries have gained the habit of presenting their political system as an optimal model of democracy in which the balance between an individual right to freedom and a concern for collective matters have found an ideal form. We have created an image of ourselves outside the Nordic countries, which seems to have gained acceptance even internationally. This has been achieved in spite of the awareness that all is not what it could be as far as democracy is concerned, but a main argument has been that even though our goal has not been achieved, we are heading in the right direction. The fact that we are encumbered with certain problems which we have not had the desire or courage to admit to the existence of ourselves, has been made clear during the last ten years of the 20th century. One of many signs of the times is that Nazi and semi-criminal organisations are gaining ground among the young in the Nordic countries. Yet, even though this threat against democracy is serious enough, and should not be taken lightly, it is, nevertheless, restricted. Furthermore, it is detectable.

However, there is another kind of pressure set against democracy which is less dramatic, on the face of it, and which is connected to deep structural changes in industrialised societies. This structural pressure against democracy is not easily detected. It is an expression of a harder financial climate, a tendency to exclude deprived groups in society, racism, contempt of democratic procedures and systems, increasing egoism among citizens and noticeable difficulties in recruiting people into democratic organisations. As social
and material structures alter, an ideological displacement also occurs, consisting of the replacement of major, long-term collective programmes by individually oriented short-term projects.

Together, these phenomena can be interpreted as a sign that it is the form of society in itself that is under pressure. This means that the very form of democracy that the Nordic welfare states have been based on is being questioned.

**Criticism of Democracy and of Democratic Institutions**

The political system in western Europe and in the Nordic countries—which historically has its roots in the ideology of the French Revolution and of Liberalism, in industrialisation as a productive system and in capitalism as a financial system—has evolved over a period of about two hundred years. During the past twenty–thirty years of this long space of time, this system has undergone considerable internal reforms, which mainly have to do with the decentralisation of political decision-making and with corresponding changes in the structure of administration. These internal reforms have gained broad political support. In a wider context, one can say that discussions about the political systems have never threatened the system as a system. On the contrary, the reforms have altered and made legitimate the political system from the inside and have made it conform to a global form of capitalism, which demands speedy, decentralised decisions. Changes in the political system and in administrative structures can therefore be said to be a reflection of a restructuring of capitalism from standardisation to decentralised flexibility and local adjustment.

If we disregard attacks by Nazi organisations and anti-democratic semi-criminal groupings, it is possible to state that the harshest criticism of the political system found today has not been forwarded by political actors within the system but from groups of critics of society and culture who distance themselves from the system but who, sociologically, are no less part of the system, should this be in the form of a Devil’s advocate. Hence, it is from this position that they assume the role of outside critics.

The groups I have in mind are analysts of society and its culture in the academic world, artists and people in the media, in brief, the intellectual establishment. In these political milieus it is the green activists and groups of young neo-liberals who have raised critical
voices. This criticism has been forwarded against the background of many different premises of which I have chosen to select a few for comment.

In brief, the criticism concerns the basic prerequisites of the traditional democracy, which, the critics assert, are no longer in existence: The economy is no longer national, but global. The modern media is eliminating geographical distance between people and places. Previous class-distinctions are being erased and new forms of distinctions arise. People are being grouped according to patterns of identification that cut across traditional class barriers. There is no longer a super imposed system of values but a set of systems of value that merge. The individual is no longer socialised into an assigned social environment, but has been ‘nomadised’ and can ‘choose’ an identity on the lifestyle market. Against this background, fixed democratic institutions become inflexible, hardly representative and, in reality, fictitious institutions that are mainly preoccupied with maintaining their own power, the critics claim. The alternative is ‘de-institutionalised’ organisational structures, which can meet the demand for individual adjustment, flexibility and the need to act within short horizons of time. Individualisation, de-regularisation and ‘projecting’ seem to be important keywords. Some critics have collected their political ideas from neo-liberalism, and, intellectually, many of the critics are inspired by the so-called ‘post-modern’ cultural criticism of which the French philosophers Baudrillard and Lyotard are most prominent.

The growing scepticism against the idea of progress, representative democracy and all-embracing ideologies and programmes for society has also struck institutions of culture and education. This concerns educational and research institutions and, also, culture institutions. Institutions of this kind can be interpreted as bureaucratic or material artefacts, which emerge as symbols of the dominating values and power in society. When displacement occurs within the social structure and values in a society, it is logical that institutions in this society are subject to pressure. This pressure works from the outside, but established institutions have a marked urge to survive and therefore strongly resist outer pressure. Knowledge and culture institutions are no exception, since they have been closely integrated into the political system. When the political system in general is subject to criticism it is evident that the institutions, which gain their legitimacy through the system—and among
these are to be found knowledge and culture institutions—defend themselves against criticism from the outside. Thus a conflict regarding the cultural policy emerges between the representatives of the established institutions and the people who devote themselves to public criticism of cultural affairs.

This, of course, is not new in history. On the contrary, it only serves to confirm the ease of adjustment and flexibility of the liberal political tradition and the elasticity of capitalism as a financial system. As pointed out by the French philosopher Edgar Morin (1987, pp. 149–150): What denotes Western European traditions of culture is not only the dominating directions of ideas based on Christianity, Humanism, the tradition of reason and science, but also the differences and contentsions between them. A prominent trait of this culture is a highly developed capability to problematise. This phenomenon finds its conspicuous expression in social sciences and humanities, but can also be found within art and politics. The rationalisation and intellectualisation of all spheres of life and society have created an incessant critical verve, which deems no subject too sacred to escape problematisation, analysis and evaluation from a variety of angles. All ideas nurtured within such a tradition will create its own conflicts and downfall. This is the core of what Morin names the ‘dialogics’ of European culture, in which changes and movement constitute the norm, not passivity and peace.

With Morin’s ideas in mind one can ask oneself how fundamental the criticism against the traditional political system is, or rather: Is the critique of established political and cultural institutions at the turn of the millennium more fundamental than the critique of culture and cultural pessimism we experienced at the turn of the last century? A hundred years ago, materialism, the belief in progress and science and bureaucratic power, the depreciation of the individual and the suppression of feelings were common topics in debates on culture and society. Anti-democratic stands and anti-rationalism were also supported at the time. The author and winner of the Nobel Prize for literature, Knut Hamsun, was a typical representative of the critique of civilisation which flourished at the turn of the last century: He fought for “the subconscious spiritual life”, “the whisper of blood” and “the prayer of bones”, all directed against rational tyranny and materialism. Hamsun adulated the social outsider in his novel *Sult* (Starvation, 1890) and the romantic...
natural genius in *Markens grøde* (Crops of the Ground, 1917). He took a stand against liberal democracy and parliamentarism. He despised the labour movement and demanded living space for the super human genius who left the chores of daily life to the masses or ‘the mob’, as he chose to call them.

Let me avoid extending the Hamsun case too far. In his time, he was an extreme case. Yet, this brief look back over our cultural heritage can be said to illustrate that the cultural critique we are experiencing today has a historical background. A hundred years have passed and debates have fluctuated. Quite paradoxically one can mention that the modernistic artists between the wars and after the Second World War attacked the expansion of modern (!) society. In fact, we can recognise a great many standpoints in modernistic cultural criticism held by those who now call themselves post-modernists and declare themselves anti-modernists! Against this background it is difficult to discern a real intellectual conflict between e.g. literary modernists of the first half of the 20th century and the post-modernists from the latter part of the century.

My comment on this state of affairs is that it might be in place to speak of the Emperor and his new clothes or of nothing being new under the sun. Nevertheless, there are differences in the critique of the society of each generation. Even though points of view and basic beliefs resemble each other to a great extent, the critique voiced by the different generations should be evaluated in the light of their own particular historical contexts.

The critique of culture and society today is a critique of the fundament of the welfare state democracy as a political system with adjoining institutions. For research work it is important, on the one hand, to scrutinise institutions and democracy critically from both a historical and a contemporary perspective, but it is also important to investigate who it is that criticises democracy and what the motives for their criticism are.

### A Historical Heritage: Institutionalisation and Rationalisation of the Culture Field

The cultural policy of the industrialised West has to a great extent followed the principle of general welfare policy. The governing principle of welfare politics has been the ideal of a fair distribution of society’s resources and the State and municipalities have as their task to level out the social divisions created by the market
of private capitalism. The supply of knowledge and cultural resources has been regarded as politically important, if not to the same degree as the supply of material resources or of social and health services, pensions and security. For a long time cultural policy was tied to school and educational policy, but since the first part of the seventies cultural policy has emerged as an independent political area and has to an increasing extent been separated from school and educational policies. This does not prevent school policy and the position of culture within the school system up to and through secondary level, from being the most fundamental of cultural policies—but this is part of another discussion, which will not be included in the present one.

Welfare policy after the Second World War was to concern mainly distribution and organisation. Cultural policy was no exception, and discussions regarding distribution and organisation have continued within the debate on cultural policy. Until about 1970, the concept of culture was taken for granted and, from a functionalistic point of view, cultural policy was about finding the most rational methods of distribution. When ‘the new cultural policy’ was introduced in the seventies, the picture was more complex, since one was expected to take into consideration a more varied concept of culture and the needs of several different social categories. The social aspects of cultural life and activities were emphasised. Yet, in spite of this alteration, the traditional cultural institutions such as the theatre, the opera, libraries and museums, maintained their stronghold within cultural policy. If the theatres or operas do not do well this gives rise to an ensuing political debate. Because of this, we can establish that, in spite of all well-intended rhetoric regarding the importance of popular movements and organisations and cultural activists, still it is that are the main concern of debaters of cultural policy.

Whether this is right or wrong from the point of view of cultural policy is a question of evaluation, but I believe that there is a historical explanation.

Historically speaking, liberalism and capitalism were antibureaucratic in essence and emerged in reaction against centralised bureaucracy and leadership. Yet, national and international markets, the rapid expansion of communications, the spreading of books and newspapers and the development of a bourgeois public opinion for debates on society enabled the creation of institutions
with an impact on the nation. The political legitimacy of such institutions was originally to be found, not locally, but at a national level. The organisation, institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of culture institutions were the result. Quite against the liberal ideology of the 19th century, the objective structural changes in capitalist society laid the foundations of what was later to be a bureaucratisation of the culture institutions of the bourgeois public sphere, governed by the state and the bourgeois general public. Ironically, many of these institutions were owned and run by the state.

What we are faced with is one of the main paradoxes of our time: Although art and culture from the Romantic era and up to the present day have asserted the right to remain excluded from “the iron cage of rationality” as Max Weber (1971) put it, and, indeed, art and culture has to some extent attained independence by establishing spheres of their own with specific standards of artistic quality, economic bureaucratic rationality has to a great extent ‘colonised’ the cultural field—the field which was to be a free zone for the non-rational, in a completely rationalised community. As mentioned, this has first and foremost been achieved through institutionalisation i.e. through a formal organisation of artistic and cultural activity, through the erection of hierarchical bureaucratic organisations with political power and financial means. Physically this has found an expression in the building of temple-like monumental buildings. Whether art and culture have been organised according to market liberal models or have been tied to political systems and a state bureaucracy it has inevitably landed within the boundaries of ‘the iron cage of rationality’. For, the market is ruled by financial rationality, while the state is dominated by bureaucratic rationality.

What kind of conclusions can be drawn from a historical analysis of this kind? My suggestion is that what is considered art or culture in a modern society cannot exist in a social vacuum caught between the market and the state. Rather, they are tied to the rationality in financial, political and bureaucratic systems so that, if these ties are ruptured, art and culture cease to exist as societal phenomena. The rationalisation process within social institutions in the West which Weber calls “die Entzauberung der Welt” (“the demystification of the world”) has already come so far that no community activity can escape being influenced. This does not mean, however,
that all community activity is of the same kind or that the same kind of rationality is prevalent. Even if art and other cultural expressions are subject to the basic structures of the market and of the state, they are relatively independent, which enables them to protect themselves from the dominant rationality of the political and financial system. This relative state of independence is primarily the result of a profound and considerable differentiation or specialisation which has developed in our modern society in which the domains of art and culture have been singled out as domains of their own with their own forms of understanding.

The relative state of independence of art and culture (and of sciences) shows in the contents, that is, in the ideas, the values, and the forms that constitute the artistic or cultural form of expression. For ‘the inner circle’ of the public within the artistic and the cultural sphere, the individual expression can in fact maintain a major part of ‘die Zauberung’ even in a society which has been demystified, provided that the inner circle sees it as a value to cherish the mystical. For a work of art to maintain this function through its content there must be a critical number of art experts, artist colleagues and a ‘distinguished’ audience with the right taste who are familiar with the ruling norms of understanding art as an expression of what is free, limitless, subconscious, mystical and irrational. The notion of ‘distinguished’ has been taken from Pierre Bourdieu’s book *La Distinction* (1979). The background of this is the past participle form of the verb ‘distinguer’ (‘distingué’) which means both selected, which is evident to those who see it, and also refined and cultured. It is in the latter meaning, that is, for when an audience has ‘good taste’ that I am using it here.

However, as soon as art is to be presented to a larger audience at community level, a functional change takes place. A general transference to large groups of audiences calls for organisation, institutionalisation and financing. Through transference in a social and political system and through being sold on the market, art steps out of its proper sphere and enters a connection between the financial, the bureaucratic and political rationality. The aura which art must maintain from the non-rational does not work as a value in itself, but possibly as a market value or as a cultural policy value. It is characteristic and not to be disregarded that art and culture in this connection are instrumentalised which means that art may serve other ends than purely artistic ones. This can be a matter of financial in-
terests on a privately organised market or it can be interests of cultural policy, which have been defined by governmental powers.

But if it is right that art and culture are qualitatively different from traditional goods and services, a fundamental problem without an immediate solution arises: Through organising, institutionalising, administering and financing, with the help of formal and rational aids, attempts are being made to convey that which on principle cannot be conveyed through bureaucratic, financial and rational systems of planning. An important question arises: Can art maintain the critical edge and the intellectual and moral freedom while being subject to administration and political decisions?

Hans Skjervheim, the philosopher, discussed this problem in a critical essay already in the late sixties, where he claimed that bureaucratic planned distribution led to art becoming a piece of goods and a welfare product together with other goods, and that what was special about art—the critical overstepping of the given society—had been done away with. Yet, he did not wish to eliminate cultural policy for that reason. He desired a cultural policy which would be “aware of the antinomy which lies inherent in cultural policy thought” (Skjervheim, 1987, p. 57).

Idealistically, a democratic procurement of culture ought to consider what is specific about culture as a phenomenon, but the question is whether it is possible, since procurement is to be carried out on a large scale and with a differentiated audience. That the singular content residing in culture can be procured in the encounter with an audience as individual is one aspect, but whether the same thing can take place in relation to a mass audience is a different matter.

With this we have approached an essential question of democracy: When art and culture is conveyed to the chosen few in the inner circle, preferably in a personal, physical meeting with the audience, the artistic content will be conveyed directly or will almost remain intact without being particularly affected by outer organisation or political measures. Whatever the case, the encounter with an initiated audience in small locked rooms will be more warded off from ‘disturbances’ of different kinds for example money matters, bureaucratic rules, political prophesies etc. In these tiny locked rooms the outer material, financial and political framework will be made invisible, and in such social contexts it is possible to keep up illusions about art and culture for a world of their own,
without being connected to the miserable world we live in. This creates opportunities for empathy, identification, understanding, understanding and an emotional outlet for those who have good taste and know the codes, so they are able to leave the room richer and more fulfilled than on their entering.

The taste of the mystical and irrational in art and culture, that is ‘die Zauberung’ to stick with Weber, seems to get lost when one attempts procurement for a large and composite audience through organisation and administration. The development of culture institutions, such as theatres, concert halls, operas, museums, libraries, galleries, archives etc. point in that direction. Most major culture institutions are bureaucratic and hierarchical in structure. They have to an increasing extent been made to think and act according to financial categories. Narrow government budgets have opened to market thinking. Audiences often go together with sponsors and are primarily considered as a potential source of revenues, not as a group of individuals who are the targets of an educational and cultural venture.

The historical development I have referred to can be characterised as a secularisation process in which art has been made more worldly and gradually caught up in financial and political mechanisms which have resulted in a consistently increasing degree of organisation and institutionalisation. At the beginning of the 20th century this situation was evident in industrialised countries, the Nordic countries included. As farmers and workers became politically and culturally conspicuous, they approached the culture institutions of the bourgeoisie. These institutions could also convey the experiences of farmers and workers, as supplements to the bourgeois cultural heritage. The labour movement created own culture institutions, but they also took over the bourgeois tradition. As soon as the Social Democratic parties in the Nordic countries attained a position of power and became part of the establishment the culture institutions of the labour movement assigned to carry out the class struggle were marginalised.

It is paradoxical that the aesthetisation of culture i.e. the singling out of art and culture as a sphere of its own with specific logics and qualities, has made it possible to make art and culture into objects of economy, politics and administration. The sociologist Tony Bennett claims that because art and culture have been singled out and form a visible object in society it has been possible to organise
“civilising programmes in which they could function as instruments of cultural improvement directed towards the population at large” (Bennett, 1993). A major part of national state policy in our century has had the ‘civilising’ of citizens as a goal and cultural policy is no exception. This is above all noticeable in countries where the state has had a strong position and has functioned as a guarantee for a just distribution of national resources, and even cultural resources. The states in these countries have mainly built and supported institutions in order to achieve these ends. That is why there has been a direct connection between the emergence of institutions and the establishing of a state policy for the cultural field. Institutionalisation and ‘becoming part of the state’ have been instruments for the integration of culture into the political system.

From an aesthetic point of view it can be concluded with some certainty that a profanation of art and culture has taken place through these processes in history. A profanation of such a kind is beyond doubt inescapable when desiring to unite art and culture with democracy in modern political systems. Culture must lose its sacredness and to a certain degree be objectified before being steered into democratic processes and systems. This profanation of art and culture is not a question of state involvement and bureaucracy or not. In countries where the state is weaker than in the Nordic countries e.g. in the USA, art and culture have also been rendered more profane—not by the state or by government bureaucracy, but by commercialism and by the free market. The shape given to the profanation of art and culture in modern society varies according to the model of society and ideology.

Culture Institutions and Models of Democracy

According to classical liberal thought based on Hobbes, Locke, Smith or Bentham, the political system with the state at its centre is there to protect the interests of the individuals as private people. Democratic rights were primarily seen as individual rights and the state was therefore considered to be an instrument for protecting the private interests of the bourgeoisie, primarily their private property. On these grounds, the state ought to be a minimum state (‘night watchman state’), which was to safeguard law and order and prepare for a free development of society and trade. However, even though it was a matter of limiting the activity of the state and to control it through elections of an assembly in which the members

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2 My discussion in this section of the article has been inspired by political scientists in Sweden and Norway, especially Mats Dahlkvist and Erik Oddvar Eriksen. Important references are: Dahlkvist (1995) and Eriksen, (1994).
were replaceable, it would not be correct to claim that classic liberals were hostile towards the state. On the contrary, they voiced the opinion that it was by the construction of a state that one could establish a political order and form what was known as a ‘civil society’ i.e. a community of well-to-do citizens with certain rights and duties within a political order. An important point in this connection is that according to this conception individuals are primarily private people even though they are bound to the state through representation in a legislative assembly.

The republican tradition which has its philosophical point of departure in the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his *Contrat Social* from 1762 bases its theory of democracy on the individual as subject of the state. According to this tradition individuals can only practise their rights by being parts of a larger unit, the state. Whether a society is democratic or not can only be judged after the extent to which the citizens can take part in decisions concerning local political matters. Against this background, the American Republicans were sceptical towards a strong central power when the American Constitution was being debated in the 1780s. They preferred to advocate direct and active democracy on local political arenas. As opposed to the liberals, they looked upon the state as means of forming a common will and common action, not as a means of defending private interests. They were more geared towards collective interests and preferred keeping private interests away from politics.

Another variant of democratic theory emanating from Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill and in modern times Jürgen Habermas—often called the deliberative model—can be seen as a combination of the liberalistic interest in the private person represented in a national assembly of independent representatives, and the republican credo in participation and communication through debates and negotiation. Within this model, the public debate, the process surrounding the political discussion, the public dialogue all play a decisive part. The belief in public access goes in line with the belief in information and knowledge. The qualified or enlightened respectable citizen who reasons in a holistic perspective on the basis of social and political norms is the ideal for this theory of democracy.

A deliberative model of politics is primarily concerned with decisions being founded on rational talks and an exchange of argu-
ments based on knowledge. The institutions in society, which are concerned with the formation of common wills and opinions, have to justify their actions in a critical public debate.

This perspective on democracy is very much relevant to the discussion of culture institutions and democracy. These institutions can show their strength by contributing to the formation of common wills and opinions and this can be carried out by furnishing the citizens with knowledge and perspectives, and by giving them an identity and a sense of belonging. First and foremost, it is by representing normativity, knowledge and critical reflection that they can strengthen democracy.

The liberal democratic tradition with its interest in the rights of the individual are not outdated either. More than ever before it is important to protect the rights of individuals and social groups against ethnic, political and commercial discrimination. Here, culture institutions have an important task, but in order to succeed with it, they have to step forward and make themselves prominent on the political landscape.

Communicative aspects and the relationship between modern media and different publics are of great importance. Traditional culture institutions, whether they like it or not, are bound to the media and their enormous power in the process of forming public opinion. They cannot oversee the power of modern media but at the same time they should not simply adapt to the conditions imposed by a commercialised media world. Culture institutions like the theatre, the library, the museum, the concert hall, the gallery etc. legitimate their existence by being physical places which are visited by real people, and in that respect they are becoming more and more unique in a mediated world where human relations are often reduced to indirect contact.

In a political context it is important to stress the physical existence of culture institutions. In the process of forming public opinions the direct contact with the publics should not be underestimated. Culture institutions have so far not succeeded well in reaching democratically representative groups of national populations. But democracy is about more than access to all. A democratic dialogue is necessarily not a dialogue where all representative social groups are participating. The quality, the content and the form of the dialogue are all of political importance. By communicating directly to living people where physical space and time is part of the
quality of the message, culture institutions can offer experiences and insights that are not attainable through the media.

**Hard and Soft Enlightenment**

The Swedish Professor of the History of Ideas, Sven Eric Liedman, makes a distinction between what he terms “hard and soft enlightenment” in his book *I skuggan av framtiden* (Shaded by the Future, 1997). Liedman points out that it is incorrect to speak of only one tradition of enlightenment, when there are in fact several.

The tradition that Liedman refers to as hard enlightenment is exact assessments, which are based on experiments and calculation. This concerns the technical handling of a problem. Hard enlightenment is reflected in the achievements of machines, in financial calculations and in bureaucratic routine. Rationality for hard enlightenment lies in what is to be quantified and measured. Hard enlightenment is more interested in the means than in the motive. It is also typical of this tradition of enlightenment that the knowledge, which accrues, is cumulative and can be standardised. Scientific and technological progress within this tradition has a common trait, which is to transcend cultural differences: A modern car, regardless of the brand and nationality, is built on knowledge, which was acquired by a few car manufacturers early in the 20th century. The knowledge inside the boundaries of this field is cumulative and, in a neutral sense, progressive and geared towards the future.

Soft enlightenment, however, is tied down by traditions and expresses itself differently in different environments and cultures. To this enlightenment belong fundamental values, norms of action, artistic forms of expression, existential questions concerning life, death and love, ethics and religion, and also the areas of politics that do not deal with economy or technical administration. It is within this domain of enlightenment that we encounter questions regarding aims and means. As opposed to hard enlightenment, the knowledge which emerges from within the soft tradition does not become standardised or cumulative, but points in many different directions. The variation regarding content appears to be endless. This knowledge or insight is open to reinterpretation, and it is not evident that the most recently acquired pieces of knowledge or the latest expressions of culture will be ‘better’ or ‘more certain’ than knowledge developed by earlier generations. The questions raised by this tradition of enlightenment can never receive a yes or a no as
an answer. One cannot only keep moving ahead. Sometimes it is necessary to look back and perhaps start moving in a different direction.

In our modern age, these traditions of enlightenment have become more and more remote from each other. The hard and the soft enlightenment have become two separate worlds, something Max Weber was aware of quite early in the last century when he distinguished between Zweckrationalität (purposive rationality) and Wertrationalität (value rationality). Weber expressed some apprehension while viewing how impersonal purposive rationality was spreading in institutions and organisations.

Presentations of the tradition of enlightenment have had a tendency to focus on the position of natural science and technology, while the role of man and society, of art and culture, has attracted less attention. This, however, was originally not the case.

Let me proceed by referring to the Finnish philosopher George Henrik von Wright who has focussed on tracks that lead back to Ancient Greece and the development of philosophical science and of the urban community, polis, (von Wright, 1990). The point of departure for Greek philosophy was logos i.e. the meaning and the logical order that Greeks saw in nature. Furthermore, philosophers claimed that man, through his own power of thought, was capable of understanding the logical order of nature and objects—without having to seek guidance from supernatural authorities. The belief that our existence is comprehensible has become the foundation for all forms of science. For the Greeks, it was a question of reading the language of mathematics in nature and finding logos as a basis for creating kosmos also in human life.

An interesting trait to be found with the Greek philosophers was that the meaning of adulating intellectual tasks was to attain wisdom rather than gather knowledge. The knowledge acquired, was to serve a higher purpose, that of gaining an understanding of our existence, which was tantamount to having an insight into what was good and true. What was ethically correct and philosophically true represented two sides of the same coin.

In modern form the latter found its expression among 18th century French philosophers who also considered the unity of human existence. Jean Antoine de Condorcet wrote his famous book on human progress in 1793 (Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain), while political conditions in Paris were harsh:
Robespierre and the Jacobins considered Condorcet an adversary and he was caught when escaping from Paris, thrown into prison and executed, at the age of fifty. That was in 1794. It was a stroke of historic irony that Condorcet, who believed in revolutionary progress more than anybody else, was to become a victim of a revolution meant to symbolise improvement and increased humanity.

In Condorcet’s writings we find reflections of the hard and soft enlightenment mentioned by Sven Eric Liedman: Condorcet was a mathematician, but he was also a theorist regarding society. He was secretary to the French Academy and a politician. He believed that technology and material progress could make life easier and more pleasant for the majority, and he spoke in favour of richness in variation and artistic freedom. He believed that citizens would find rules for cohabitation that would prevent conflict and that laws could be passed to regulate a frictionless society. Condorcet was an idealist, a true child of French 18th century enlightenment. For contemporary philosophers the Enlightenment was a total and complete worldview and within this worldview different traditions of reason and rationality were joined: Natural sciences and technology, theories of society, ethics and law, and, in addition, aesthetics and existential human questions. What is the relevance of this to cultural policy and the role of cultural institutions?

**Conclusion**

On the background of the preceding historical analysis I shall conclude this article by some normative reflections on the future.

Innovations regarding cultural policy or culture institutions that have to do with democratic ideals can only take place within the Enlightenment as a united tradition of ideas. The disregard for humanistic values one finds within the hard tradition of the enlightenment has led to financial and material cynicism. To me, it will be necessary in the future to take both directions seriously, bearing in mind the negative consequences that have followed the one-sided tradition of enlightenment. A balance between the two in which the hard side does not suppress the soft, must be sought. Or, to use the words of Sven Eric Liedman:

> It is not the logic of hard enlightenment that must be broken; it is its direction. And that is how the ideal of soft enlightenment must be involved. These ideals must constantly be conquered.
anew in an incessant process of enlightenment, which must not be allowed to deteriorate but must grow richer and more open to munificence than in the days of Condorcet. It even has to include its own opposite, the particularism which takes as its point of departure the special, the different and the incomparable. (Liedman, 1997, pp. 540–41).

Finally an injunction on my part: So as not to end up in a back-water from the point of view of history of ideas or politics, politicians, administrators and professionals within the field of culture and knowledge must learn to separate aims and means. Large sections of the debate on cultural policy and educational policy concern measures taken. The enchanter of our time, caused by hard enlightenment, is not the steam engine, the automobile or the aeroplane it is computer technology. Once we are made aware and are allowed to see clearly that computer technology is a fantastic means of assistance which cannot, however, relieve us of the slow and infinite task of discussing aims and means, we will start to discuss what kind of cultural policy and culture institutions we would like to see in the new millennium.

References


Part III

Culture as Life Form and Environment
I have chosen to interpret the somewhat ambiguous title I was provided for this volume as a statement about the place of the arts in everyday life. The title asserts that the activities, practices and symbolic forms that constitute creative culture can be seen and understood as embedded in and forming daily life. In its ambiguity, however, the statement raises a number of questions central to the theme of this volume. Whose everyday life is the focus here? Is it the artist’s, the presumed producer of ‘Culture’ (with a large C)? Or is the focus on the everyday life of the intended ‘consumer’ of creative culture? I propose that we circumvent the question by dropping the distinction between cultural production and consumption as separate activities carried out by different individuals and groups of people. What happens if production and consumption are collapsed under a common rubric, which we could call symbolic aesthetic practice, and we examine the relationship of this realm of activity to daily life? My proposition here: to take as the point of departure for investigating ‘creative culture as life form’, an interrogation of the ways that aesthetic practice frame and form the broad spectrum of experience that constitutes everyday life.

A corollary to this proposition is that the everyday does not respect institutional boundaries. People’s everyday lives continually intersect with cultural institutions. I recently attended a conference on the topic of how culture in the schools could enrich children’s life experience, where a participant urged that we confine our discussion to what children actually do in school, and disregard ‘their everyday lives’. It struck me as odd, given the many hours, weeks and years that children spend in school, to exclude this central cultural institution from what the speaker included in the concept of daily life. The statement pointed to the conceptual wall that exists between culture on the one hand and the everyday on the other, where the former is characterised by formal institutionalised activities, and the latter is seen as informal, outside the sphere of
cultural production and consumption. In order to place our investigation of aesthetic practice in the context of everyday life, we must examine the range of expression and their meanings for people both within and outside of institutions of culture.

A third point I wish to make by way of introduction is that we can learn a great deal about creative culture as life form by looking at the aesthetic practices of non-professionals. My own research has been concerned with the visual aesthetic practices of a variety of groups, including people whose work falls outside what would ordinarily be considered cultural or artistic production. The ways, for example, people’s gardening practices follow patterns they have brought with them from far away—as immigrants from another country or from a childhood in the Swedish countryside—even as they innovate and borrow visual forms from their current neighbours. Or the ways people create, select, and display visual documents of family and friends, first in their photography albums, on video and now increasingly over the internet. In these examples, the seemingly simple categories people draw upon to create and perpetuate a pleasing visual environment, or a satisfactory and usable collection, are built upon aesthetic values and distinctions. Although not always formulated in words, these practices reflect deeply grounded hierarchies of aesthetic value.

Each of these statements—that aesthetic practice is constitutive of everyday life, that it takes place both within and outside of cultural institutions, and that it is carried out by both artists and the people we for lack of a better term call ‘ordinary’—implies a political position and carries therefore consequences for cultural policy.

The values we find embedded in and expressed through everyday symbolic practice bear a close and complex relationship to forms of cultural consumption enacted in the public sphere. We see evidence of this in the controversies that occasionally arise over the appearance and placement of public art, or the explosive debates over whether a child is displayed as a sexual object in a contemporary artwork, or the expression of fascist and racist attitudes in a contemporary play. Aesthetics and ethics are deeply intertwined in these conflicts. The moralising tone that often infects such debates is further evidence of the impossibility of holding so-called private attitudes and practice outside the public arenas of cultural production and consumption. Cultural values are embedded in the hierarchies of what people regard as good and bad, ex-
exclusive or common, tasteful or trash, ours vs. theirs, etc. These hierarchies of value inform both private and public life, with consequences for both. They wield power in the choices people make in their cultural production and consumption and have broad implications for cultural policy.

**Cultural Politics or Politics of Culture**

In English there are two words, ‘politics’ and ‘policy’, with two distinct sets of meanings and uses. In Swedish, on the other hand, there is only the single word ‘politik’ to refer to both politics and policy. This leads to a confusing ambiguity in the way we use the term *kulturpolitik*. It can mean either cultural policy or cultural politics, or (as is often the case) both at the same time. What are the consequences of this multivalent concept?

If we begin with *policy* we find the term defined as “political wisdom or cunning; diplomacy; prudence; artfulness; … any governing principle, plan or course of action.” (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1960, p. 1131). In this sense ‘kulturpolitik’ would refer to the plans and courses of action, which produce and support culture. An analysis of cultural policy considers such questions as the amount of funding and other kinds of official support allotted to various activities, which groups and which cultural forms receive this support, and which groups and forms are omitted or neglected. The investigations aim at evaluating the effectiveness of programs and policies. In practice this means calling upon identifiable groups, usually those with an institutional base, to evaluate the program from their perspective. ‘Kulturpolitik’ in the sense of cultural policy is thus normative, formulated through processes of weighing and counter-weighing institutionally based ideals of what culture is and should be.

*Politics*, on the other hand, encompasses “political affairs; the conducting of or participation in political affairs; political methods, tactics, etc.”. It includes, “political opinions, principles, or party connections; factional scheming within a group—as in office politics” (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1960, p. 1132). Inquiry into ‘kulturpolitik’ in this sense implies an examination of cultural politics, that is, the political methods, tactics, opinions, principles and party connections that form contemporary culture. It examines how culture becomes political and politicised.

Clearly, cultural policy also involves politics in this second sense.
But understanding the politics of cultural policy requires a critical shift of perspective. Instead of evaluating the effectiveness and success (or failure) of cultural programs, a politics of cultural policy takes one analytical step up in order to examine the methods, tactics, opinions, which comprise the policy itself and its enactment. From this level of analysis, the politics embedded in the policy can be seen and sorted out. Rarely do we make this shift, however. Very little research is being done on Swedish cultural politics, while huge amounts of resources go into assessing cultural policy and programs. At the same time, the ambiguity inherent in the Swedish term politik is strategically exploited in order to avoid the conceptual and methodological, not to mention political, problems of investigating the politics of culture and its relationship to the formation and enactment of cultural policy. It is, furthermore, a strategy that permits the convenient neglect of research into the ways cultural policy affects non-institutionalised aesthetic practice in the context of everyday life.

A central problem in forming cultural policy is deciding what forms of cultural expression, which cultural groups, and which regions merit support. There may be no way for cultural policy to escape this dilemma, but the investigation of cultural policy and making an inventory of recognised cultural forms and groups need not experience the same problem. Consider, for example, with Stuart Hall, the distinction Culture/not Culture (or for that matter, Art/not Art, or Folk music/not Folk music, etc.), “not as a descriptive problem, or a matter of coming up with the right inventory of cultural forms, but rather in terms of the ‘forces and relations which sustain the distinction, the difference’ between what counts as a genuine tradition, a revival, folklore, or elite culture”. Hall suggests that the categories tend to remain, though the inventories change, and that institutions such as universities, museums and arts councils play a crucial role in maintaining the distinctions. “The important fact, then is not a mere descriptive inventory—which may have the negative effect of freezing … culture into some timeless descriptive mould—but the relations of power which are constantly punctuating and dividing the domain of culture into its preferred and its residual categories” (Hall, 1981, p. 234, as cited in Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, 1998, p. 76, emphasis mine).

Against this background, a central question for research into the relationship between culture and politics in Sweden is: “How does
cultural policy punctuate and divide the domain of culture into preferred and residual categories?"

A full answer to this question requires a general theory of the interaction of art and social life (to paraphrase Dell Hymes, 1964), a theory, which encompasses the multiple relations between aesthetic means and social meaning. Rather than propose such a theory (beyond the scope both of my presentation and of this symposium), I will use the remainder of this article to sketch out the concepts of performance and display, addressing how they can be useful to investigating the place of the arts, and aesthetic symbolic practice, in everyday life.1

Performance

The study of aesthetic practice as performance gained prominence among ethnographers of speaking in the 1970s (Kapchan, 1995; Hymes, 1964 and 1974). Taking inspiration from its long tradition in theatre studies, performance represented a move away from static text analysis to the analysis of cultural ‘enactments’ and ‘speech events’, Bauman (1977). Instead of studying language abstracted from its context of utterance, performance takes account of the pragmatics of discourse in interpreting the speech event. This perspective in turn has been broadened beyond language and speech in order to analyse aesthetic practice across a wide range of expressive forms and modes. The concept of performance further links behaviour and contingency in the aesthetic display, keeping in focus the emergent dimension of cultural expressions and their multi-semiotic modes of meaning. Emergence is important as a reminder of the ‘temporal dimension’ of indeterminacy in cultural analysis (Marcus, 1994, p. 426; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1998, p. 75). Performances must be seen as processes that unfold as they are being studied.

A performance includes and presumes an audience. In folklorist Richard Bauman’s definition, performance entails the “responsibility to an audience for a display of communicative competence” (Bauman, 1977, p. 11; Kapchan, 1995, p. 482, emphasis mine). Thus the public is also ‘performing’, in accordance with its expectations of and competence in the particular mode of cultural expression. Insights into the dynamic and, again, emergent quality of the audience’s role in performance have made it necessary to reconceptualise traditional notions of cultural ‘consumption’. As Hymes

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1My ideas here owe a great debt to previous research collaborations and a subsequent rich intellectual exchange with professor Barbro Klein, Director of the Swedish Academy for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences. It was also through Klein’s initiative that I was introduced to the important work of Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Professor of Performance Studies at New York University, and 1999 Research Fellow at Scasss.
described the dilemma, “The common dyadic model of speaker-hearer specifies sometimes too many, sometimes too few and sometimes the wrong participants” (Hymes, 1974, p. 54). Thus, in the model for ethnographies of speaking, the word participant replaces the terms producer and consumer, or sender and receiver, in order to open up the analysis to the actual types of participant relations.

The performance perspective directs its inquiry into the relations among participants in the course of a cultural event. It considers what roles are relevant and how these roles are assumed or assigned by participants. It further considers when and under what conditions roles shift during a performance, particularly relevant when interactivity is a factor in judging quality. The performance can thus be seen as a bounded arena of aesthetic practice where the participants’ relations to each other and to the performance include an assessment of the performance quality. Is it good? Is it stellar? Does it deserve a standing ovation? How is the success (or failure) acknowledged, and by whom? Who assumes the authority of judging the competence and quality of a cultural performance? The answers to these questions reveal the ways that the enactment of a performance situates participants not only in time and space, but also structures individual and group identities (Kapchan, 1995, p. 479).

Participant relations are also significant when examining the thorny issue of who is qualified to perform culture. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett raises the issue in the context of folk festivals (or other manifestations of traditional culture) where ideals of authenticity are at stake. In such cases the response to the question of who is ‘culturally’ qualified “reveals the implicit privileging of descent over consent in matters of cultural participation” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1998, p. 75). In other forms of performance, the response to the question will reveal a different hierarchy, based on type of education, income, age, gender, place of residence, occupation, institutional affiliation, etc. Although rarely clearly articulated, many of these distinctions come into play in the development of cultural policy. Raising the critical question—who is considered qualified to perform culture—can throw light on which groups and competencies the policy privileges and who is ‘defined out’ of its sphere.

Performance theory has also drawn inspiration from the study of ritual, by viewing the performance as a social drama bearing
within it a *metacommunicative function* that attempts to make sense of, explain or confront ambiguities and schisms in the social fabric (Turner, 1990; van Gennep, 1960; Klein, 1995). Performance ‘de-naturalises’ the world, splicing signs from their referents and giving rise to new meanings. Other rules, structures and norms guide the performance, separating it from the everyday experience. Participants are pushed into an attitude of reflection over the rules and norms that seem to govern their daily lives and form their worldview. This *reflexivity*, as a component of cultural performance, is critical to understanding the relationship between the performative and the everyday. Compared with the discourses and material practices that compose everyday life, performances are more stylised and self-reflexive enactments that comment on and transform the everyday. This is accomplished through intertextual references woven into the performance, often as traces of the past that define its relationship to a specific genre, invoking words and works of others in order to establish its authority (Jameson, 1981; Bakhtin, 1981; Kapchan, 1995). Note that this definition can be applied to the staging of Arthur Miller’s *Death of a Salesman* by the Stockholm city theatre\(^2\), to a child’s drawing, which incorporates mass media references, or to the preparation and performance of a family’s Hanukkah celebration.

Each case involves the experience of aesthetic expression, in which the actors are performing parts in a cultural script that enters into a dialogue with the past at the same time that it tracks a course for the future, Kapchan (1995, p. 500). Performance, as Kirshenblatt-Gimblett points out, can be seen as the centre of a chain of relationships linking genre, gender, history, ethnography and social practice. Whether as a focus for research or the basis of cultural policy, a performance perspective is compatible with efforts to deal with issues of diversity, pluralism, cultural equity and empowerment, (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1998, p. 75).

**Display**

The performance perspective can be most readily applied to aesthetic performances where there is contact between participants, at least in a mediated form. By introducing the concept of *display*, attention is drawn to a broader range of visual arts as ‘cultural performance’. Consider how even a static work (the painting, the sculpture, the exhibition), like any cultural product or artefact, is

\(^2\)Millers play in Swedish “En handelsresandes död”, directed by Göran Stangertz, was part of the city theatre’s repertoire during the 2000–2001 theatre season.
embedded in a context which takes account of the creator and the activities and materials involved in the creation of the work. Why else would one question the authenticity of a news photograph that is later revealed to have been staged, or the painting that is found to be, not the work of the master, but of his student. What is the ‘aura’ of the original as described by Benjamin (1931/1969), if not a performance experienced by those privileged to stand in the presence of the work?

In recent years the concept of display has provided a key in investigating how visual forms are used to communicate ideas about aesthetic value and hierarchy, about history and power within the context of specific cultural environments. The centrality of vision and the visual world in producing meanings, establishing and maintaining aesthetic values, including stereotypes of gender, otherness and power relations within culture, has been the focus of this work. Yet visual discourses cannot be isolated from other discursive forms, either in practice or in theory. Examining the field of vision as an arena in which cultural meanings are constituted simultaneously anchors it to a range of analyses of the audio, the spatial and other aspects of spectatorship, Rogoff (1998, p. 14).

Visual display has been described as “the other side of the spectacle” (Wollen, 1995, p. 9). Display appears to focus on the side of production rather than consumption or reception. In principle these two aspects of vision are inseparable; what one sees is always constituted through a way of looking, and the display always addresses and positions its viewers, inclining them to see in specific ways. Indeed one of the strengths of the concept ‘on display’ is its inclusion of a viewing public.

Exhibitions, whether they are displays of art or of cultural history, are the artefacts of specific institutions and disciplines. No matter what the ostensible subject, the exhibition also exhibits those who have assembled it. The first order of business for a politics of display is to examine critically the conventions guiding exhibition, “to explicate how displays constitute subjects and with what implications for those who see and those who are seen” (Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, 1998, p. 78). This requires, for example, a consideration of what cultural fragments are selected and how they are arranged in relation to each other, what Kirshenblatt-Gimblett calls the “poetics of detachment” operating to create the
distanced attitude which an exhibition represents. The question is not whether any given object is of visual interest, she argues, but rather how interest of any kind is created.

Tony Bennett's analysis of the British open-air museum initiatives, “orientated towards the collection, preservation, and display of artefacts relating to the daily lives, customs, rituals and traditions of non-elite social strata” offers an example (Bennett, 1995, p. 109). While these exhibits acknowledge the importance of the everyday lives of ordinary people, this way of ‘peopling the past’ subordinates the cultures and values of the non-elite to bourgeois culture and values.

There are clearly different tropes of display for the cultures of different social classes, as can be seen in the many Swedish forerunners of the museums to which Bennett is referring (see also Becker, 1992). “For while what is shown in museums is important, the question of how museum artefacts get displayed and represented—and thus of what they are made to mean is at least as significant” (Bennett, 1995, p. 117). He draws a contrast between the major 19th century museums, which simply omitted working class culture and the late 20th century museum (Beamish is his example), which ‘re-styles’ the memory and the lived experience ordinary people in its display forms. The latter, he argues, “has a greater capacity for organising the visitor's experience precisely to the degree that it is more likely to pass unnoticed” (Bennett, 1997, p. 117).

How seeing is organised through the museum exhibition leads us to a politics of display, and an inquiry into how objects are ‘enacted’ or ‘performed’ in specific ways for the visitor’s experience. The formation of an aesthetic structure of vision is, as Bourdieu has shown, part of a historical process. It involved first, the formation of spaces and institutions in which works were assembled and arranged to be seen as art. The process involved, further, the production of spectators, people capable of recognising and appreciating the works as art, Bourdieu (1987). The order of significance of the works is not immediately apparent, but must be learned or made visible, Bennett (1995, p. 163). It is the categories and principles of classification, which mediate the relations between the visitor and the objects on display. “For some but not for others, seeing the art exhibited serves as a means of seeing through those artefacts to see an invisible order of significance that they have been arranged to present” (Bennett 1995, p. 165). The order of significance is of
course different for different classifications of artefacts and different display forms.

It is important to recognise that these are not invariant, all-powerful relations. The specific ideologies of the visible—what can be displayed and how—mediates what the spectator is prevented from seeing explicitly. Displaying objects chronologically, to take a simple example, can convey an invisible order of the significance of historical progress and development. Yet the same collection may have a multi-levelled structure, capable of conveying different orders of significance, Bennett (1995, p. 166). A central question for cultural policy is how spectators may be given access to the orders of significance, so that they may understand what the ideologies of the visible work to obscure.

There is no longer a simple or single ‘politics of the invisible’ of the modern art museum, or cultural history museum. To the contrary, critiques of these institutions developed from within and outside their walls have politicised the museum space. By pointing out the ways in which ‘art’ is made visible to some, but not to others, the museum can address the diverse social histories in which the displayed artefacts have been implicated. Bennett argues that it is possible to arrange objects so as “to produce, and offer access to, a different invisible—women’s exclusion from art, for example, or the role of museum practices in the aesthetisation of the primitive” (Bennett, 1995, p. 172).

This is related to museum didactics and to the different publics, which different didactics imply and produce. A thorough renovation of the museum space theoretically and politically requires a simultaneous commitment to new means of instruction that can, in Bennett’s words, “bridge the gap between the invisible orders of significance it [the museum] constructs and the social distribution of the capacity to see those invisible significances” (Bennett, 1995, p. 173). This is the responsibility of a cultural politics in the broadest sense of that term, to reach beyond the institutional boundaries and the current inventory of cultural forms that guides policy. It requires examining what is meant by cultural performance and the performance of culture, respectively, and a commitment to forming new links in the chain of relationships between art and social life.
References


Background Story

Let us start with a simple statement: Sweden is a sparsely populated country. I grew up in Lapland, one of the most sparsely populated regions in Sweden. Apart from the obligatory visits to the public library, my cultural diet consisted of occasional trips with my parents to see an operetta. I remember seeing Oklahoma and the Czardas Princess in the mid-1960s. We shared the theatre with forest workers and their families who had travelled to the Community Centre from their villages. They probably arrived in the first cars they had ever owned. The politically supported cultural system envisaged by Minister Arthur Engberg in the 1930s was still intact in the 1960s.

I always had the feeling that this was just something one did, a ritual, as when I went to listen to the all male choir on Walpurgis Night—an hour of torture among the snowdrifts. These were the rituals of a small local community, no more remarkable, and perhaps of no greater consequence to our lives, than the ritual of the Sunday walk was to Madame Bovary and her husband.

Perhaps it was more important to us what happened on Saturday nights when we travelled in a group to the barn in Siksjö, or Silvadien in Dalasjö, to down a few drinks and court the girls. Just speaking these names aloud evokes an entire world irretrievably lost in the past. So I thought, until last autumn when I saw a wonderful television documentary. It was about the Ascension Day dance at Skirvingen, a barn in Lossmen in the County of Västerbotten. The documentary evoked my past as it documented the sunrise, just after one o’clock, and the club cashier counting the ticket proceeds in his little booth. The documentary captured a slice of the local cultural life, which existed in my youth and somehow still goes on today.

However, most people can live without barn dances. There is a large and growing urban-based population with serious cultural interests of an entirely different type. This includes me, and almost
every one I know. How deep are these interests? How much do they affect the decisions we all make regarding our choice of living environment?

I have always believed these attitudes are rather strong. Regional economists and geographers have become highly skilled at measuring the significance of various factors that affect the location of companies and other institutions, as well as on the population’s mobility and the reasons people choose to live where they do. Nevertheless, I would like to suggest that we should find out more about the nature and cause of our attraction to certain locations. I am fully aware that answers will vary according to whom we ask. “Where we want to be” depends on which ‘we’ we are a part of.

I shall never forget reading many years ago an economic report stating that people in the third world move to the cities despite running a 75 percent risk of remaining unemployed. There was justifiable reasoning behind this, as those who found jobs stood to earn ten times more than a job in their home villages. It was a sort of roulette of life: big winnings—but long odds.

However, what this type of calculation often fails to take into account is that there is always another factor involved, often something more elusive. An atmosphere, an image, and a hint of something that produces the feeling, “I want to be here”, or perhaps more often: “In any case, I don’t want to be here”.

As I mentioned earlier, I did not initially know of much research in this area. However, I have since found out that a certain amount of research has been conducted. To start with, different regions vary widely in terms of their attractiveness. Studies of Oberpfalz and Niederbayern have shown that a significant increase in employment in these regions—by 53 and 17 percent, respectively—only resulted in a population increase of 7 and 14 percent. People commuted there and those who were previously unemployed found jobs. Few chose to move there.

In East Anglia, another region that has been researched, the opposite is true. East Anglia’s villages and historic settings are attractive, and young, educated career people flock to Cambridge in East Anglia. A population increase of 18 percent over 20 years has produced a 20 percent rise in employment.

There is no doubt that car transport, communications, and it has made these changes possible. For certain groups, however, an attractive living environment is the main factor for choosing a place
to live. A study in the journal *Urban Studies* refers to the ‘urban-rural shift’, but in this highly populated region, where two million people are crammed into an area of about a hundred square kilometres, and with London only a stone’s throw away, the word ‘rural’ should be interpreted loosely.

The importance of our living environment is illustrated by the fact that “an attractive living environment for company management and staff” ranked as Cambridge’s top determinant of location preference out of 20 choices among high-tech companies in the region. Eight out of ten companies considered living environment to be ‘extremely important’.

What characterises such environments? The word culture readily comes to mind. At any rate, it is certainly not the culturally impoverished areas that tend to attract people. Is it a question of recreation? Entertainment? This is certainly part of it, but I venture to presume that the type of culture that we are primarily referring to is the sort that also appeals to people in small towns. Although this hardly means barn dances, it certainly means culture that makes a difference in our lives.

This includes the type of art that attracts people to theatres and galleries and provokes discussions about its true meaning, the artist’s intentions, and what it means to the audience. But it also includes the type of culture that manifests in buildings and structures, in the design of rooms and other spaces, and in civic surroundings, which provide opportunities for personal development and interaction in the form of meeting places, community halls, libraries, art galleries, and theatres.

I shall approach the subject from a different angle. Around 1990 (I have forgotten the exact date), I lectured at the so-called Uppsala Meeting in the main lecture hall at Uppsala University. I had been asked to speak about “The Small Knowledge-centred Town”. I was not sure what I was supposed to be talking about, but the lecture provoked a powerful response.

I stated that small knowledge-centred towns appear to combine certain characteristics that are not normally found in a single place:

- Übersichtlichkeit due to the smallness of the location.
- Cultural diversity, due to the information and sociological characteristics found in the location. Every small knowledge-centred town is a large melting pot. A variety of tastes, radical views, and experiments are indications of a healthy spiritual life.
These two characteristics ensure constant renewal.

There were many architects present, and they cornered me afterwards in the council rooms among the wine and grapes, and insisted on speaking to me at all costs. However, I had nothing to say, as I had already exhausted my knowledge on the subject. By discussing the characteristics and spiritual life of small towns within a historic learning perspective, I had evidently provoked a number of reactions from this professional group, a group who would be required in the 1990s to design university and campus areas throughout the country. They had done so also in the 1960s and 1970s.

Opinions abound regarding universities and campuses, and rightly so. However, there is a consensus that the ones built during the 1990s are better than those built during the 1960s and 1970s, when the affiliated universities were built. Arkitektur, the main Swedish architectural magazine, has run several special feature issues on the subject. The magazine focused on the Nyréns Architect Studio, which won the Kasper Salin Prize for the outstanding design of a university building—the new library and other parts of the new wing of the Gothenburg School of Economics. The library houses Gunnel Sahlin’s great glass light fitting which hangs beneath the dome of the ceiling, with enormous tree-tops on Vasagatan forming a vault outside.

Universities and colleges are cultural centres in themselves. This is inevitable since they have a high concentration of culturally active individuals and are centres of learning and research, which are cultural disciplines. The United States is perhaps the primary source of inspiration in this sense, since American universities have served as cultural centres in regions where high quality aesthetic culture would otherwise be hard to come by.

A number of issues come to mind that should be addressed in future research:

- Can universities and colleges develop a stronger role as cultural centres?
- How have they worked in this capacity in the past?
- If their cultural role is further emphasised, how will this affect community planning and the location and design of universities?
- Could this lead to the marginalisation of smaller communities, such as the one I grew up in?
What do we know about the research in this area?
Does culture help promote regional development?

We do know that the presence of universities produces an upsurge in culture; this has happened in several places in Sweden, perhaps most notably in Umeå:

What do we know about the role of culture in the building of the regional resource centres that could become cornerstones of a new regional policy?

What international examples are there to compare with?

Research on Culture and Regions

In research regarding the information society, increasing focus has been placed on the regional level in recent years (see e.g. Saxenian, 1994; Castells & Hall, 1994; Lundquist, 1996). In practice, the production environments of today’s industry occupy relatively small areas: towns and their environs. These production environments are locally based, but are also intricately linked with international networks. Many businesses, in actuality, are mobile, not just within a country’s borders but also between continents. Consequently, regional production environments are increasingly competing for investments and industrial locations beyond the national barriers.

Considerations such as these make it increasingly important to begin studying the phenomena that affect the fate of towns and regions—and thus, indirectly, of businesses and nations—in the emerging information society. These factors undoubtedly include universities, colleges, and other educational and knowledge-creating environments. We are witnessing the gradual start of research on these environments, in Sweden as well as abroad (see e.g. Andersson, 1988; Sörlin, 1994; Sörlin, 1996; Sörlin & Törnqvist, 2000).

So far, however, the role of culture in the information society has not been as well documented. The research conducted to date suggests that knowledge and culture reinforce each other in the current societal transformation process. They tend to produce complementary relationships, and mutually contribute to favourable agglomerations and networks. They tend to co-exist particularly in large, densely populated and innovative urban regions, while more sparsely populated and one-sided urban environments often have a paucity of both knowledge and culture. The information society
appears to be a society characterised by concentration and innovation. Will it also concentrate its culture? Does innovation require dense networks? What problems and opportunities would these developments entail?

As far as Sweden is concerned, such observations raise important questions, as shown by both international and Swedish research:

- How do the distribution-based, democratic cultural policies with their roots in the 1930s and the welfare state stand up to competition with global entertainment networks and the information society’s tendencies towards concentration?
- What can study groups offer people in the era of e-learning?
- How can national institutions such as operas, theatres, and central museums hold their own as globalisation leads performers, audiences, and sponsors to seek out a spotlight, which, while increasingly intense, has an ever narrower radius?
- Is there a way to counteract this concentration by allowing cultural policy to be more actively integrated with other policy areas, such as industrial and educational policies?
- Should the institutions of the information society, such as schools, universities, and colleges, be allocated new cultural-political roles?
- How should the Swedish ‘cultural landscape’, with its theatres, ensembles, institutions, and meeting points for producers and audiences, be designed in order to make the best use of the driving force in today’s societal transformation, without selling out to it in the process?

A pivotal question in this research is whether closer links can be created between research and cultural production. Tentative steps are being taken in this direction, not only along the traditional line of culture–art–humanities, but also along a line emphasizing culture–art–natural science–technology.

In other words, the underlying observation here is that a society is emerging around us in which culture is an increasingly important factor. Culture is growing in almost every sense (see below). It is growing in a problematic and interesting way, and in a way that the cultural policy that emerged during the classic era of the welfare state has so far found no means of handling. Broadly, and from a number of humanistic and social science perspectives, we should define and explore the new cultural landscape now emerging with-
in the framework of the information society. We should primarily examine its present state—a task involving the reporting of fact—as well as its potential state. How can cultural policy be given a dynamic socio-political role adapted to new opportunities, and be integrated into an increasing range of societal areas?

**Culture, Environments for Innovation and the Social Fabric**

It is therefore important to gain an understanding of the relationships among the institutions of the knowledge sector—colleges, universities, and research-intensive industries—and the cultural sector. These relationships should be studied from a national and international perspective, but the consequences of the policies, and of today's societal transformation, should also be examined at a regional level. This analysis should be conducted from a broad regional and cultural perspective. To take a move from the educational sector, it is not sufficient to examine a variety of easily measurable characteristics of a location in order to analyse the possible consequences of establishing a university there. The results produced by the university will also be affected by less readily accessible factors such as the local historic conditions, the cultural mentalité of the residents, and environment: what has been called the 'social capital' (Maskell, 1999; Putnam, 2000).

Another term for this is 'the social fabric'. This denotes the pattern of countless contacts, meetings, and social events, which combine to form social patterns and networks, and of which it is hard to gain a comprehensive picture. In some communities, these networks are sparse and delicate, with little confidence or solidity. In others, they are strong and dense. The expression 'social fabric' primarily refers to the latter, dense type of infrastructure (Hägerstrand, 1996; Törnqvist, 1998; Sörlin & Törnqvist, 2000).

Today, there is extensive research on the relationships between, on the one hand, universities, colleges, and R&D, and on the other hand, regional innovative dynamics and economic growth. With certain exceptions, the findings are consistent: it is difficult to achieve the desired growth effect to any general or radical extent solely by establishing universities or colleges. However, it is not impossible, and there are cases, both in Sweden and other countries, where the establishment of universities and colleges has had large impact on a region. One should also be cautious when interpreting
these results; the college or university is not always the only reason, or even the primary reason, for such development.

In the light of this view of regional success and regional economic growth, it is imperative that further research be conducted that analyses the effects and societal impact of universities and colleges within a local and regional context in which culture in general is an important component. In one of the few studies of this type based on Swedish conditions, the authors show that this perspective is highly relevant (Olsson & Wiberg, forthcoming). A large proportion of the empirical data in this study is from Umeå. The higher education and research initiatives conducted there have, at least so far, produced particularly positive regional effects, although primarily within a fairly limited geographic region in and around Umeå. The effects on more distant parts of Västerbotten and surrounding regions in northern Sweden appear to be more limited.

One of the main aims of this study is to demonstrate how the mechanisms of the social capital work in the local and regional environment. The town of Umeå and its university have certain characteristic features: religious devotion, a strong temperance movement, a great deal of interest in academic learning, and a strong social fabric in the community. These are social practices and values that can be viewed in many ways as civic virtues, and are echoed in classic works such as Max Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930). The present study offers an insight into what could be described as the regional growth laboratory.

The study also sheds light on what might otherwise appear to be a local paradox. Umeå University is one of the cases where investment in research and education has been less successful in producing local industrial growth. The number of spin-off companies formed during the 1980s was significantly lower in Umeå than in other comparable cities. Even the Luleå University of Technology, a smaller and younger institution, produced more spin-off companies than Umeå (29 compared to Umeå’s 19), while Chalmers University of Technology in Gothenburg produced 161 (Olofsson & Wahlbin, 1993). The expansion in Umeå has occurred in other areas: small service companies or businesses run by one or a few individuals, in many cases staff members or former students of the university. Major private and public businesses have also moved to Umeå in order to benefit from the large output of highly educated individuals, a tendency frequently noted when studying the link be-
tween universities and regional development (Gulbrandsen, 1995; sou 1996:89; www.swedepark.se).

However, perhaps the most remarkable development of all has been in the culture sector. Although there are no exact figures showing the regional impact of Umeå’s cultural expansion on employment and economic growth, there is no doubt whatsoever that this expansion is linked to the university. The region already had a rich and well-established cultural tradition in areas such as amateur theatre and the visual arts. However, after the establishment of the university, and in conjunction with an expansion of the broadcasting media, Umeå’s cultural sector expanded rapidly. Soon after the university’s opening a jazz festival, several theatre groups, opera, dance, film productions, and folk music productions were established. Eventually, several more festivals and major cultural events in areas such as music, film, puppet theatre and the visual arts were also established. Umeå has museums and an unusually large number of active galleries for a city of its size. The culture sector is probably Umeå’s single largest economic sector after health care and education. The active cultural life of the city indirectly benefits tourism by providing business for subcontractors who serve the tourists who come to the city because of its cultural activities.

The cultural life in Umeå has more similarities with Lund, a geographically distant university town, than with Örnsköldsvik and Skellefteå, its closest neighbours. Apart from other university towns, few cities outside main urban areas have had such high cultural ambitions. Umeå and Lund have been cited here as Swedish examples of a process that needs to be examined empirically in order to determine the extent of its impact. How does culture affect the dynamics of a region? The direct economic benefits hardly reveal the whole picture. Perhaps culture helps to create what is widely perceived as a high standard of living in a town or region. Lund and Umeå, for instance, are both cities that consistently tend to rank high in quality of life surveys. It could be argued that in an information society, a growing proportion of the industry would cease to rely on physical resources nearby. The strategic resources consist of the knowledge and skills of qualified individuals. Consequently, the preferences of these individuals increasingly determine the location of businesses. This means that businesses and private individuals share the same preference for location.
Consequently, a high standard of cultural activity could contribute to regional development. A relative abundance of cultural institutions and consumers is generally seen as one of the characteristics of expanding regions. This idea is closely linked to the size factor highlighted in the research of recent years on the relation between R&D investment and regional economic growth and the capacity for innovation (Varga, 1998). A similar trend has been noted in the economic analysis of the cultural sector. Theatres, museums, and other major cultural establishments have fixed expenditures that require support by a large number of people and high ticket-prices, and in many cases, it may require a subsidy and sponsors. This means that they can only survive in cities with a large number of potential visitors. In turn, they contribute to the city’s attractiveness for both tourists and residents. Sponsorship funding follows the same pattern. In Sweden, 53 percent of sponsorship funding goes to Stockholm while Malmö, Sweden’s third largest city, receives only three percent (Föreningen Kultur och Näringsliv, 2000).

Yet, there are exceptions. Some smaller towns also have an abundance of cultural activity and creativity. This is a well-known phenomenon in sparsely populated parts of North America. Small and medium sized towns, even in Mid-Western and Southern states that otherwise lack many traditional cultural institutions, are capable of maintaining a varied and thriving cultural life, thanks to the presence of a university (Turner, 1984). In some cases, universities have become something of a cultural oasis that includes museums, musical groups, theatres, concerts, and dances in towns that would otherwise have been too small to sustain this type of cultural activity. This is well worth considering for those concerned with cultural and regional policy-making in a sparsely populated country such as Sweden. Can a bringing together of culture, education, and research, all substantially funded by public funds, help create the type of local quality of life that would attract skilled individuals who, in turn, are required for innovation and development? This question, although perhaps irrelevant in conventional cultural policy, is proving increasingly important.

This line of reasoning suggests the need for a broader view of the roles and functions of universities. It is easy to conclude that if a university or college aims to promote regional growth, it should concentrate on economically orientated activities such as engineering and the natural sciences. If culture affects innovation with-
in the local environment, perhaps the question should also be raised whether local culture is affected by the university or the university is affected by the local culture. Of course, culture can utilise any given area of information. Artists are inspired by geology and brain research as much as by the academic study of the arts. What is the significance of the humanities viewed from this perspective?

This reasoning finds support in the literature on regional development and growth. Research also suggests that many thriving regions feature a rich cultural life and a strong collaboration between both professional and voluntary individuals and organisations within the community (Nilsson, 1999). Yet, there is still a substantial lack of empirical research on the relationship between universities and cultural activity, and how this relationship affects the local culture and the climate for innovation. The existing studies, however, suggest that positive spiral effects of the type referred to here in the cases of Umeå, Lund and American university towns also occur in other places. There is a dense concentration of culture, arts, science, entertainment and trade fair activities in the area surrounding Korsvägen/Götaplatsen in Göteborg. The cultural activities include: Liseberg amusement park, the Swedish Exhibition and Congress Centre, the Scandinavium arena, the Faculty of Arts and School of Theatre, Opera and Musicals of Gothenburg University (there are several theatres under construction), the Museion Science Centre, and the Museum of World Culture. A study of Stockholm shows a great amount of activity among artistically trained individuals such as cultural entrepreneurs and individual professionals in areas such as film, media, art, and writing (Snickars, 2000). How do other places measure up in this respect?

This examination of the way the ‘social fabric’ affects universities and colleges shows that factors such as physical and cultural infrastructure contribute in many ways to success or stagnation in towns and regions. The connections are notoriously complex, and can be charted only through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. However, the examples presented and the international literature also suggests another conclusion with a potentially vital bearing on higher education policy as well as on regional and industrial policy. This conclusion is that under certain conditions, the ‘social fabric’ can compensate for the small size that characterises Sweden’s urban regions. So far, the debate as to
whether a critical mass is required in order for higher education and research initiatives to pay off has primarily focused on education and research institutions themselves. The characteristics of the surrounding community, such as its cultural activity and social fabric, have been largely disregarded. It is now time to conduct full-scale analyses that take account of these factors, and to thoroughly examine the role of the cultural infrastructure. Such an analysis also opens the doors for a debate regarding the relationships between various policy areas.

Knowledge Intensive Locations and the Innovation Process

Globalisation, cross-border exchange, and virtual flows are essential concepts frequently used to describe today’s societal transformation. This can easily lead to an impression of technological, economic, social and cultural processes that are isolated from physical geography. At the same time, paradoxical though it may seem, increasing focus has been placed on physical locations, towns, and regions in a number of research areas as well as in the public debate. For instance, in his much discussed work, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture* (1996–98), Manuel Castells places great emphasis on the new knowledge-intensive environments where creative synergies arise. Similarly, in his extensive work, *Cities in Civilization* (1998), Peter Hall examines innovative environments, cities, and places that provide opportunities for unexpected meetings between people, skills, and activity areas. The works of Castells and Hall provide valuable starting points for further research on the creative centres of the information society, with emphasis on the interaction between knowledge and culture.

There are many links between culture and knowledge. Universities and their immediate surroundings can be seen as environments for intellectual and cultural production. Like all other production environments, they are both directly and indirectly linked with other players, customers, suppliers, and service institutions. Universities often have close ties with laboratories, high-tech companies, as well as with establishments that provide cultural activities.

It is widely agreed that today’s industrial and economic dynamics are dependent on science and high-tech innovation, and it is also clear that key segments of this type of industry, particularly its
high-growth segments, are in some way connected to research and education. In some cases, this connection can be seen geographically in the form of closely situated incubator or seed companies, or in research or industrial parks; Swedepark manages more than 30 such parks in Sweden, some of which are in a state of very rapid growth. These institutions generate ideas and innovations that are circulated gradually throughout society and the economy. These production environments could be referred to as the ‘creative centres’ of the information society. How they work, and how well they thrive and develop is probably of considerable significance to long-term economic success at a regional level and, indirectly, at a national level.

Towns with universities or other information centres are often characterised by a relative diversity of cultural activities and institutions. This also applies to smaller knowledge-centred towns. Avant-garde youth culture typically thrives in these towns, with some of the more successful artists and cultural groups later moving on to the larger arenas of the big cities. Due to the expansion of higher education and research, a relatively large number of towns in Sweden have certain opportunities for nurturing this type of culture.

At the same time, there are relatively few systematic studies on this aspect of culture. Even research that examines universities as environments and locations has been limited. Although more extensive research has been conducted on the role of universities as a driving force and growth engine, especially on an international level, this research is fragmented. There seems to be a deep gap between, on the one hand, research examining the mechanisms of today’s growth and societal transformation and, on the other hand, studies of urban environments, cultural activity, and the physical design of universities. A deeper understanding could be reached by combining these two research cultures, of which one is essentially based on social science and technology, and the other is largely humanistic.

Are university towns, which are scientifically creative almost by definition, also creative in other respects, for instance culturally? What are the life-styles and life patterns of university towns? To what extent do they include characteristics such as cultural and ethnic variety, and how do these characteristics affect the capacity for industrial and economic innovation? Are there ‘creative cities’, and does culture have a place in them? Are all university towns
actually similar? Are they divisible into groups of towns with different characteristics? Such questions have not been widely addressed in previous research, and would be interesting subjects for anthropological, sociological, or ethnological research.

Some preliminary ideas for research projects, outlined below, could provide a way into furthering the understanding of these issues.

From Community Hall to Institute of Higher Education

Such a study would focus on universities and colleges and their actual and potential role as cultural centres and possible areas in a renewed debate on cultural policy. It has been noted that in sparsely populated parts of the world, particularly North America, the cultural life of small and medium sized towns is closely linked to colleges and universities. There is also a distinct geographical concentration; i.e., the cultural events take place on campus, making the university not only an environment for education and research, but also a cultural meeting place for the local inhabitants. In communities established in the spirit of the Swedish popular movement, such meeting places were built around community halls, civic centres, prayer houses, and other local centres. These civic meeting places served as democratic institutions and centres for learning and they also served as an introduction to democratic structures and norms. These environments are now fading away, or have been transformed beyond recognition; no new institutions have been opened that reflect today’s society. Universities and colleges, with their formalised educational structure, cannot provide the same type of flexible and voluntary education offered by folk movement institutions. However, at a local and regional level, cultural functions could be brought up and discussed in the context of the information society and its opportunities.

At the same time, it is crucial to examine the structure and regional patterns of government funded cultural activities and institutions. This research has its methodological counterpart in a study entitled The Role of Universities for International Competitiveness and Regional Development: The Case of Sweden in an International Perspective, which I conducted with a research group at the Department of Cultural Geography and Economic Geography at Lund University. This study resulted in a number of publications and a volume entitled Kunskap för välstånd (Knowledge for Prosperity) (Sörlin &
Törnqvist, 2000). This volume examines the regional effects of colleges and universities.

It would be interesting to conduct a parallel study on the effects of culture and cultural policy. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, there is a lack of detailed studies on the effects of culture at a regional level, despite a large number of more or less well-founded theories. The objective of producing strongly positive regional effects through cultural initiatives is paralleled by the goal of producing regional growth through investment in colleges and universities. Consequently, these effects should also be empirically examined in the area of culture. Secondly, there is much to suggest that culture and knowledge complement each other at a regional level. Preliminary studies, see above, indicate that places that have institutions of research and higher education also have a substantial cultural infrastructure and a thriving cultural life.

First, these patterns should be defined more clearly. Do knowledge-centred environments have a broader range of cultural institutions? If this is so, as evidence suggests, is it the result of conscious central and/or regional policies? Alternatively, have the processes of culture and education and research reinforced each other in other ways? How have regional patterns in cultural policy-making affected overall regional success? How do culture and the production of information interact with each other?

To a certain extent, this can be examined through detailed studies of the government's higher education and research funding and cultural funding in towns with universities and colleges. What funding policies have been employed? How has state cultural funding been distributed? What ambitions have been defined for the funding? What is the relationship between central and local cultural policies? Is it true, as was claimed by an alliance of cities (Malmö, Gothenburg, Umeå) in the 1990s, that Stockholm has been systematically favoured by being allocated a disproportionately large share of the government's cultural funds? If so, is this at all connected to regional development?

Even if there is a certain geographical connection between state investment in knowledge and culture, few political objectives to this effect have been delineated, although an increasing tendency towards decentralisation has caused regional funds to be used for clearly defined regional aims. Therefore, research in this area must also use data from other countries to examine the effects of more
explicit ambitions of this sort as well as study examples of how universities work as cultural environments. An investigative study of this type focusing on Europe and the United States could be followed by an investigation of Swedish university and college environments, focusing on the same issue:

- How have universities and colleges worked as centres of culture?
- How have they defined their ambitions in this area?
- How have universities and colleges set about achieving them?
- How have their ambitions been supported by various levels of government—county, municipal, and national?

One should also examine the potential of integrating the aims of education policy and research policy with those of both cultural policy and regional policy on the basis, for example, of the currently discussed regional growth contracts.

The Cultural Geography of the Information Society

It would also be interesting to examine what could be termed the cultural geography of the information society. To what extent is culture location-bound or predominantly controlled by individuals with various preferences and resources such as cultural capital, educational capital, etc.? Culture can be location-bound by being based in a specific social environment that requires the participants to be physically present: discussion groups, choirs, sewing clubs, athletics clubs and other youth associations, and political associations. Theatres, museums, libraries, cinemas, and sports arenas require a certain physical infrastructure. Bird watching, hunting, sailing, mountain climbing and other activities require physical environments with specific characteristics. Student associations, carnivals, and festivals are based on a historic tradition that requires customs and habits specific to a location. Culture that is less determined by its location is practised independently of personal meetings, physical infrastructure, and physical environments. Examples of these activities include reading books and newspapers, watching television and videos, and chatting or surfing on the Internet.

The question remains: To what extent is culture based on location-bound traditions and on social practices? A corollary makes itself apparent: Does the presence of a university or college accentuate and/or generate certain cultural tendencies? The presence of universities and colleges can be measured in terms of educa-
tional and research potential, but also in terms of the regional variation of the groups that frequent the university (students, teachers, and researchers) and their surrounding social environment.¹

Statistics Sweden offers a variety of indications as to the range of cultural activities offered and the level of public participation, such as borrowing library books and attending study circles. The range of cultural activities can also be measured by the number of employees in sectors concerned with public culture (libraries, theatres, and museums) and with commercial/private culture (book cafés, bookshops, cinemas, and independent theatres). Other organisations and agencies also offer statistics. For example, the National Council for Cultural Affairs provides statistics on theatres, museums, dance, and the like.

Although it is necessary to compile a detailed picture of the cultural geography of the information society, such a picture serves a descriptive rather than an explanatory purpose. Consequently, an in-depth analysis must also be made of the link between universities and culture, highlighting which factors affect the cultural participation of individuals. The theories of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu provide a theoretical starting point. According to Bourdieu, different social groups in a community share varying levels of similarity. Those who are more similar, for instance because their economic resources are of a similar quality and structure, tend to develop similar pre-dispositions and tastes in various areas such as style of dress, musical taste, social habits, and food preferences. According to Bourdieu, these assumed pre-dispositions determine “the distinction between good and bad quality, good and evil, refined and vulgar, but this distinction is not always the same; for instance, a certain behaviour or property may be perceived as refined by one individual, pretentious or boastful by a second and vulgar by a third” (Bourdieu, 1999). These pre-dispositions are also likely to include perceptions of what constitutes valuable culture. Differences in cultural habits, in universities for example, are likely to vary. University teachers may have different cultural habits than university students. In addition, university teachers may have different cultural habits than other professional groups (Bourdieu, 1996).

¹The concepts educational and research policy were developed and operationalised in conjunction with the project "The Role of Universities for International Competitiveness and Regional Development".
Knowledge and Culture in the 20th Century—Three Cities

Studies of regional processes involving interaction between culture and information production systems must necessarily include historic factors:

- When are attempts made to integrate art, culture, and higher education?
- What opportunities is such integration expected to produce?
- Who defines these expectations?
- On what grounds?
- Where, in which cities and regions?
- How are alliances formed between, on the one hand, the public representatives of cultural and knowledge processing and, on the other hand, industry, municipalities, and central government?
- How are such local efforts integrated with official cultural policies?

A feasible hypothesis is that a dynamic knowledge environment promotes fertile cultural conditions, and vice-a-versa. The emphasis on knowledge production makes it natural to focus particularly on the university and its immediate surroundings. However, the task is not so much to examine the internal activity of universities, but rather to explore their social, economic, and cultural contacts with both the immediate local environment and the wider international networks. The role of universities as local and regional driving forces has already been studied, but their impact and function are also known to be affected by the surrounding social, economic and political infrastructure, the institutional landscape, the local history, the branches of the network, the combinations of groups of involved parties, and the educational traditions of the region (Ambjörnsson, 1988; Olsson, 1994; Sörlin, 1997; Sörlin & Törnqvist 2000; Sörlin & Törnqvist, forthcoming). For this reason, it is necessary to study the local and general interpretations of research and cultural policies and their practical applications. However, this calls for a long time perspective. The overall aim is to examine today’s societal transformation, which will only become clearly definable with the benefit of hindsight.

The design of knowledge-promoting and cultural institutions in an area is determined largely by historic factors. Local educational traditions, institutionalised meeting places, and favourable eco-
onomic structures can provide opportunities for a fruitful interaction between knowledge and culture, just as the absence of these factors can prevent such interaction. ‘Cultural policy’, a central government concern, is a new historic phenomenon, essentially dating from after the Second World War. However, meetings between knowledge and culture have also occurred in previous periods. The main difference was that political decisions and private initiatives primarily occurred at a local level, even if they were driven by a nationally determined rhetoric. Thus, the local and historic perspectives go hand in hand, while at the same time helping to highlight our own time and its central government cultural policies.

Studying knowledge production and culture production as two interacting, location-bound processes gives rise to a number of questions:

- Does such interaction exist?
- How, and to what extent?
- Does it form part of a deliberately defined local strategy, and if so, on what grounds?
- What results does it produce?
- What is the relationship between the knowledge institutions and the cultural institutions?
- What are their channels for mutual communication?
- How did this institutional geography take shape, historically?

In this context, it would be suitable to study three urban regions—Stockholm, Umeå and Malmö—during three separate periods, the 1960s through the 1980s, the 1920s through the 1930s, and the turn of the century. However, the chronological emphasis is on the 1960s through the 1980s, with an opportunity to extend the perspective into the future.

The three periods chosen can be described as three formative stages in terms of cultural mobilisation and political formation, where the role of knowledge in society is emphasised in various ways. This makes it possible to study the ways in which the strategies originated. Thus, the period from the 1960s through the 1980s coincides with the formation stage of modern cultural policy, as well as with a sharp expansion of higher education (including the nationalisation of Stockholm University and the beginning of Umeå University). The period from the 1920s through the 1930s is known as the period when the modern Swedish state was formed. In
addition, characteristic of this period is an upsurge of cultural institutions, the breakthrough of functionalism, and a lively interaction between knowledge and culture (manifested, for instance, in the Stockholm Exhibition), see Ekström (1997) and Rudberg (1999). The turn of the century is notable as a historic landmark period in terms of the institutional networks that were built up between knowledge and culture. Stockholm University played a central role in the 1897 Art and Industrial Exhibition in Stockholm and it can be seen as an early collaboration between knowledge and culture. Similarly, in Umeå, the nature of the public sector paved the way for a regional learning tradition.

This choice of topographical case studies is based on a desire to present three differing examples, where the meeting between knowledge and culture manifests in different ways.

Stockholm is a major city with many producers and consumers of knowledge and culture, forming an intricate network of contacts, meeting places, and networks. Here the local and regional strategies converge to some extent with nationally defined interests. Naturally, there is no room here for a comprehensive study. We shall focus on Stockholm University. Its founding (1878) as a private institution (then known as Stockholms Högskola), in close collaboration with private initiatives and liberal trends, offers some clue to its staff and institutional networks, and to the goals in the areas of information and culture policy that stand behind its founding. During the 1920s and the 1930s, the University served as a hub for several partially interconnected circles of scientists, engineers, architects, artists, and politicians. Examples of this include the economic school of thought known as the Stockholm School, the Myrdals’ school of thought, and the group involved in acceptera, (Asplund, 1931), see also Jonung (1991).

In light of this, the 1930 Stockholm Exhibition required an existing and efficient creative network in order to adequately address the needs and desires of all these groups. The nationalization of the university in 1960, when its name was changed from Stockholms Högskola (University College) to Stockholms Universitet (University), constitutes an important landmark in its continued development, which directly leads to issues such as privatisation versus nationalisation, research policy, and research funding. To some extent, this can be said to have ushered in a new generation of policy makers with many links to the personal and institutional networks.
of the preceding period. Incidentally, an entire chapter is dedicated to post-war Stockholm in Hall (1998), which in itself makes this period worthy of a detailed discussion.

Umeå, in contrast to Stockholm, is a small city that was late in acquiring a university (1965). The city’s subsequent development is intimately linked to the expansion of the university. The university’s stated ambition to promote local cultural activity as part of the university’s knowledge-building strategy is particularly interesting. The debates, goals, and application of cultural policies in the 1980s should be discussed. At the same time, these recent developments should be studied in the light of the local educational traditions and intellectual infrastructure that emerged at the turn of the century.

Malmö is an industrial city, which, in terms of knowledge, has been overshadowed by Lund, a considerably smaller university town (Widerberg, 1964). Malmö clearly illustrates the importance of studying the local environment and the conditions of its infrastructure in a wider regional perspective. Malmö’s role as a meeting place for information and culture cannot be discussed without considering the influence of both Lund and Copenhagen. Naturally, this will be highlighted still further with the opening of the Öresund Bridge and the impact of Malmö University (1998) on the region’s information geography. This makes Malmö an interesting example of the results of urban transformations, local cultural strategies, and regional network coverage.

With these three case studies, it would be possible to examine formative processes, how local networks are created, and how strategies are formulated with regard to the interaction between knowledge and culture.

References


Part IV

Culture as Work
Cultural work is not well defined. Nothing ‘cultural’ seems to be that. International comparison of statistics on the cultural sector will reveal substantial differences as to how this sector is conceived (Sanne, 1999; Towse, 1996; Selwood, 1997; Björkås, 1998). In narrow definitions cultural work is taken to comprise almost only professional artistic work, thus representing just a tiny fraction—around one percent—of Western labour markets (Throsby, 1995). By adding (1) medial, intellectual, clerical, educational, scientific, and design, entertainment, tourism and sports related professions, by adding (2) non-professional occupations in various cultural industries, by adding (3) work in various sectors contributing to cultural consumer goods and by adding (4) part-time cultural work statistically ‘hidden’ by bread-winning occupations, by adding (5) non-marketed cultural work, then evidently, the sector will appear much bigger. Just how big I dare not say here. By fairly conventional standards of statistical identification the Swedish cultural work force represents roughly something between 2.5 percent and 7.5 percent of total employment.

There are, however reasons to consider unconventional modes of conceptualising the cultural sector that would make it appear far bigger than that. One such mode departs from the idea of ‘an experience economy’ where the production and marketing of various experiences (including looks, identities, health, status, comfort, style, taste, fun, pastime, travel, excitement, sexual gratification, all kinds of information, etc.) is seen as a dominant feature of the contemporary economy (Pine & Gilmore, 1999) If the production of experiences and experiential goods is the essential characteristic of cultural work, the boundary of that work is far wider than conventionally assumed. I will return to this at the end of the paper.

Considering the conceptual latitude involved we may thus think of the cultural sector conventionally as an economically and so-
cially fairly marginal traditional domain, or unconventionally as a dominant, expansive modern domain of global society.

The social science research interest in cultural work and production has been small in comparison to other sectors. The perceived economic and social marginality of the sector has no doubt contributed to this. The conventional framing of the cultural sector in terms of certain traditional institutions focused by cultural politics (theatres, libraries, museums, mass media, etc.) combined with the narrow scope of genres and themes of interest to ‘culture sections’ and ‘culture programs’ in the media make the sector appear small.

Cultural work has frequently not been considered as ‘real work’, but rather as atypical, more or less gentlemanly, freely chosen, individualistic activities falling outside the scope of the two major forces of interest in 20th century work studies: work management and labour protection. The notoriously sad social conditions of certain artistic professions (in terms of income, employment, health, economic return to education, etc.) have resulted in a number public investigations, which, in the Swedish case, still represent the bulk of systematic information on the conditions of cultural work (Sanne, 1999).

Since a decade or two, social science research on cultural production and work is expanding vigorously. This reflects the perceived growing general importance of cultural production in ‘post-industrial’ economies. General ‘medialisation’ of modes of production, of work practices and skill requirements in all sectors makes forms of work typical of the traditionally conceived cultural sector spread throughout the economy. Modes of work stressing personal commitment, high level professional training, creativity, design, individual expression, symbol handling, etc. decrease the difference between modern office work and traditional cultural work.

In this essay I will attend to the general problem of conceptualising ‘cultural work’. Awkwardly enough such a discussion involves plunging into three conceptual swamps—that of ‘culture’, that of ‘work’ and that of ‘production’. We need to identify roughly the borders between cultural work and non-cultural work as well as those between cultural work and cultural non-work. We need to know what cultural production is.
Culture

When statisticians single out certain work (activities, occupations, professions, trades, branches, industries, etc.) as ‘cultural’ this is predominantly either a matter of occupational statistics (classifying what people are, or call themselves by way of ‘cultural’ occupational categories (‘kulturyrken’ in Swedish), or it is a matter of work in branches and industries classified as ‘cultural’. There is considerable mismatch between these two modes of conceptualisation. A textile designer will count as doing cultural work in occupational statistics, while, if employed in a firm, he or she will be counted as part of textile industry employment, which is not counted as a cultural industry. Conversely an administrative clerk in a theatre company will count as part of the cultural labour force (as the theatre is a cultural industry), while not so in occupational statistics. Whatever the mismatch these two modes of counting cultural work share an idea of a cultural sector (part, segment, division, etc.) of society, which in economic terms can be identified as ‘cultural’. ‘Cultural work’ is typically work in this sector. So let us start by looking into how this ‘sectorial’ sense of culture relates to culture in general.

Reflecting over the concept and definition of culture is a major cultural industry in itself. It has resulted the accumulation in academic discourse of a very large number of seemingly different concepts of culture, far greater than the mere 164 that the anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckhohn reported in an often quoted paper from 1962 (Kroeber & Kluchhohn, 1962).

Making a very long story short, it seems to me that the most basic differences evidenced in the many uses of the term ‘culture’ relates to two distinctions.

One is that between objective (artifactual) culture, and subjective (behavioural) culture. When used in the ‘objective’ sense the function of the concept is to categorise certain phenomena as human artefacts in general (culture in contrast to nature) or as certain types of e.g. aesthetic and intellectual artefacts. When used in the ‘subjective’ sense the function is to categorise subjectivity i.e. behavioural patterns of groups and individuals including all kinds of communicative, expressive, evaluative, cognitive and other mental behaviours. ‘Objective’ culture is ‘outside’ and ‘made’, while ‘subjective’ culture is ‘inside’ and ‘lived’. In the objective sense the term culture is used in the singular; you cannot speak of many cultures.
Culture as contrasted to nature or to politics is an example. When used in the subjective sense culture presupposes many cultures, like Western culture presupposes a number of non-western cultures and like business or youth culture presupposes other cultures.

The other fundamental distinction regulating the uses of the term 'culture' is that between totalising and partialising meaning. It is illustrated in the relation of inclusion between 'culture' and 'society'. When culture includes society (as a whole) and can be used as a synonym for society then the use is totalising. 'Western culture', or 'modern culture' is typically used in this sense. When culture is conceived of as part of, or an aspect of society (as a whole) then the use is partialising. The 'cultural sector' is an example. When speaking of 'sub-cultures' within a frame of nations and when speaking of cultural characteristics of groups as a subset of behavioural traits like e.g. world-views and values you use the partial concept of culture.

By crossing these two distinctions we can map fundamental directions in the uses of 'culture', see figure 1.

The figure represents four principal directions in the conceptualisation of culture. It is not, nota bene, descriptive of four typical uses of the term. In actual use the four directions are normally messed up, so that what is actually meant by e.g. 'ethnic' culture,
'anthropological' culture or 'youth culture' is seldom clear, precisely because they sway in the two dimensions of the table above.

All four concept of culture can be related to work. Young Marx’s sense of work as an Aristotelian human essence clearly relates to Culture 1. Work stands for Man’s making of himself and his world. Problems of ethnic division of labour in modern labour markets typically relate work to Culture 2. Work is related to Culture 4 when the term culture is prefixed with work and work related concepts like work culture, professional culture, occupational culture, work-place culture, working-class culture, work ethic, business culture and organisation culture.

As a statistical category ‘cultural work’ is, however, predominantly related to Culture 3 by means of the idea of a ‘cultural sector’ set apart by products and institutions understood as cultural in contrast to other socio-economic sectors. Work that creates, implements and distributes such products, and work that takes place within such institutions is cultural work. So identifying cultural works turns into the question of what constitutes certain products and institutions as cultural.

Experiential Things

Cultural things are artefacts, but how to differentiate between cultural things and other artefacts? With an ancient form for defining something ‘essentially’, I think that the genus proximum of cultural things is that they are artefacts designed and/or used to generate experiences. They are thus basically communicative. This sets them apart from artefacts designed/used to control the material environment. Cultural work could thereby be identified with activities contributing to the generation of experiences. This is a conceptual ground for why recent big talk about an emergent ‘experience economy’ is tied to the problem of assessing the size of the cultural sector. If almost every industry is a theatrical activity peddling experiences to the market, then one can argue that the cultural sector is the dominant economic sector of modern society.

How reasonable or unreasonable this may sound depends on what the differentia specifica of cultural things is taken to be, i.e. what it is that sets certain experiences and experiential vessels apart as specifically ‘cultural’. Here tradition serves us with an uneasy mess of several conceptual strategies.

1In the Aristotelian tradition pinpointing the essence of something is a matter of combining a genus proximum with a differentia specifica. In “Man is a rational animal”, being an animal is the genus proximum of Man—the closest more general kind of things Man belongs to, and having reason is the differentia specifica, i.e. what specifically set Man apart from other species.
Spiritual Values

One relies on distinguishing things and experiences that are ‘spiritual’ from the non-spiritual. Cultural work will thus be related to the production of spiritual experiences. But the delimitation of such experiences is notoriously unclear. If relying on the venerable spirit/matter, soul/body distinctions the identification of cultural work may turn into a metaphysical rigmarole. From lexica we can learn that intellectual and aesthetic qualities are central to cultural spirituality. Does this make the work of e.g. cooks, tailors, barbers and cosmetics workers ‘cultural’ on the ground that they obviously deal with aesthetic qualities? Teachers are typically not counted in the statistics of cultural work though teaching is clearly defined in terms of generating intellectual experiences in people. Is not the bulk of office work in modern society ‘intellectual’, geared at generating, handling and communicating those vessels of intellectual experience called ‘information’? And what about moral and existential (including religious) experiences, should not they be constitutive of cultural work on the ground that they are clearly spiritual?

Categorisation of varieties of ‘spiritual meaning’ seems indeed central to the identification of cultural work, as well as categorisations of the principal ‘forms’ or vessels carrying that meaning, but it is no easy terrain to walk.

Intrinsic Values

Possibly you can get rid of teachers and office information workers as cultural workers by demanding that the spiritual experiences generated by proper cultural work should be intrinsically valuable. In the report of a recent Swedish Commission on Culture (Kulturutredningen) a prominent theme is that culture in the sense of cultural policy is intrinsically valuable (‘ett egenvärde’) (sou 1995:84). Teachers and office information workers mainly deal in intellectual experiences that are instrumentally valuable. On the other hand people working in mass media are typically counted as cultural workers though they also mostly deal in extrinsically valuable information. More generally, relying on intrinsic spiritual value in certain experiences and products in order to single out the culture of proper cultural work is a very shaky strategy. One reason is that intrinsic valuations go hand in hand with extrinsic ones as e.g. the aesthetic appreciation of a certain painting may go hand in hand with its usefulness as investment. It seems indeed very odd to
make instrumental usefulness in certain things and activities disqualify them as cultural.

High and Low

Another conceptual strategy to delimit the culture constitutive of proper cultural work relies on the distinction between *high* and *low* cultural things and experiences. A scale of quality in cultural things and experiences is presupposed. Proper cultural work deals with high culture. The spiritual experiences generated by entertainment, sports, tourism, food cooking, garments, etc. lack the spiritual height demanded from proper cultural things and experiences. In cultural politics it is common to attack this idea because of social elitism. At stake is not only a matter of status policy and respect for popular tastes and habits in cultural production but also a matter of which branches and activities should enjoy public subsidies on the ground of their cultural worth. The general awkwardness of using scales of quality in ‘spiritual value’ of cultural products in order to delimit cultural work is obvious. Noting the connection in political debate between stamping activities as ‘culture’ and the demand for public subsidies, one may also note that the vast majority of people counted as cultural workers in present Swedish statistics are indeed public employees, publicly funded self-employed, or privately employed in branches with substantial public subsidies. So there is obviously some truth to the gleeful observation that cultural work is such work that the market won’t pay for.

Educative Experiences

Related to the distinction between high and low culture is that between *educative* and *mere entertaining* experiences. The experience of proper (high) culture is spiritually educative, it makes you a cultured (educated) person (‘bildad’ in Swedish), while entertaining experiences are just (passive) consumption, or pastime. They leave you as you are. This distinction is of course tied to the literal meaning of culture as cultivation, in this case the cultivation of the soul. Cultural workers are thus those whose work contributes to this cultivation. Also here teachers ought to be recognised as the kernel group of cultural workers, while they, as said, are normally not counted as such in work statistics. To single out which experiences that, as matter of psychological fact, are educative and which are
not, is in practice almost impossible. The distinction collapses into a web of historically accumulated institutional valuations and practices, making e.g. old entertainment educative and old educative culture entertaining. Continuing the traditional conceptual war on ‘mass culture’ and ‘the entertainment industry’ (in order to keep them outside of proper culture) may still make political sense to some people. But it makes very little sense if you want to appreciate the role and size of cultural work in a modern economy.

Public Address

Indirectly related to the frequent public subsidies of modern work considered as cultural, is still another strategy to identify cultural work. This is by means of its public, by being addressed to publics and audiences of various kinds. Though all work involves communication in one sense or the other cultural work may be distinguished by its communication with proper audiences. This connects, for instance, all artistic professions, journalists, clergy, museum workers, tourist guides and professional sportsmen. By demanding proper audiences we may keep out the millions of information workers in modern production from the ranks of cultural workers. In Sweden teachers are not counted as cultural workers, while public lecturers are. This may be explained by the conceived difference is the nature of the audience they address. Classes are thus not proper audiences in contrast to the public attending public lectures. Few statisticians count scientists as cultural workers though they indeed are producers of the archetypal form of intellectual goods—knowledge. This may have something to do with the nature of the audience of science. The audience addressed by scientists is typically other scientists and this may not count as a proper audience, as there is no clear distinction between the producers and the consumers of culture. (I will return to this below). Work in popular science would in contrast normally be counted as cultural work as it addressed to a properly public audience.

These oddities in applying the requirement of public audiences to discern cultural work are futile however in view of the argument that the totality of consumer market can easily be taken as an audience for experiences communicated by various producers by their goods and services. There is no real conceptual edge to using communication with audiences in order to distinguish cultural work. Rather it reflects a pre-modern economy with very limited markets.
and thus a fairly small distinguishable public sphere within which culture could be identified.

Communicating with some kind of public seems, despite of this, an important characteristic of many types of cultural work. It is indispensable for understanding the role that public recognition plays in minds of cultural workers, pointing to a particular system of motivation and social control alien to most other work.

**Works of Culture**

A final example of conceptual strategies for distinguishing cultural work carries over to the next section of this paper. Cultural work is such work that result in cultural works. Cultural work performs and produces works of culture. A work of culture is a special kind of artefact (including performances), which is socially recognised as an addition (preferably a progressive addition) to the store of relatively lasting cultural objects. Ordinary work does not result in works in this sense but in goods and services that somehow perish and vanish in the course of their production and consumption. A work of culture is typically taken as a piece of creation involving design and objectivation of individual inventiveness. Besides being producers proper cultural workers are *auctores* (originators) of *opera*, and their work is accounted for by enumerating their works.

Cultural work conceived in this way is indeed dear to many cultural workers due to the heroism associated both with the role of contributors to the progress of (objective) culture and the exclusiveness of the role of the individual creator. As most creators fail to impress the environment with their works, the heroism of the misunderstood genius is typically added to the self-conception of cultural work.

Applying works of culture as a criterion for identifying cultural work is however very difficult. That we still would need to differentiate works of culture from non-cultural works is not really the problem. If we insist that cultural workers must be true originators of their works, only very few of those actually counted as cultural workers by public statistics would qualify. Most of these are involved in the implementation and distribution of works rather than in their origination. Modern cultural production—highly organised and industrialised systems, like science, movies and the media—would hardly seem to contain any cultural workers at all, while only technically primitive, highly individualised, pre-
modern modes of production (as in some of the arts) afford the possibility of discerning proper originators. The modern world simply does not fit the venerable jargon of cultural origination patterned on the lone genius.

Another, more formal argument against ‘the works of culture approach’ can point to the inherent bluntness of such a conceptual device as it rest on the grading of notoriously diffuse things as creativity and social recognition of cultural contribution. How do know when an ordinary piece of goods and service turns into ‘a work’? How possibly can we distribute individual creative contributions to complex social productions like a movie? We can probably not dispense with ideas of ‘creativity’ and ‘social recognition’ tied to the concept of works of culture, in order to get a reasonable concept of cultural work, but it is not very helpful.

Cultural Forms and Media

Another quite different strategy of clarifying cultural work starts from the varieties of ‘forms’ that cultural objectivations take. Generally cultural work as a communicative practise relates to media. While ‘media’ in the context of cultural policy often has a fairly well-convened meaning in terms of primarily physical characteristics of some relatively modern ‘mass’ media (press, radio, television, movie, video, etc.) the concept may easily be extended. Not only to traditional media like pictures, books, music, theatre, expositions, dance, opera, lecture, etc., but also to almost any artefact felt to mediate communication. Not only ‘almost’ any. As all artefacts communicate at least some information about itself, its function, its context and history, every artefact can be assigned the function of, and used as a medium. Though moderately extended conceptions of media do indeed account for a substantial part of what public statistics takes for cultural work the conceptual bottomlessness of ‘media’ will not help us substantially in finding out whether the cultural work sector is small or big. Even quite restricted definitions of media (as in conventional cultural policy) turns increasingly difficult to apply to this problem in the wake of revolutionary technical progress in electronic mediation throughout the last fifty years.
Uncertain Mess

Having explored shortly a number of conceptual strategies for specifying ‘culture’ in the concept of cultural work, one can conclude that the chances of finding a stringent *differentia specifica* for the concept of cultural work are small. Cultural work and the cultural sector are loosely defined in actual statistical practices by the help of a messy cluster of relatively inconsistent criteria. Given the general looseness of the concept of culture this is no surprise. It is a bad thing, however, as it impairs seriously the possibility of checking on exciting theories about an ongoing world historical shift towards a dominance of cultural production in the modern economy. So we simply have to try harder in clarifying the delimitation of cultural work.

Work

Work connotes many things. In order to set cultural work apart from other kinds of work more systematically and in order to look for general characteristics of cultural work, we need to reckon with at least five dimensions of work:

- work as activity;
- work as value production;
- work as earning a living;
- work as exercising skills;
- work as socially controlled task.

We may order them in the following fashion, see figure 2:

![Figure 2. Four dimensions of work.](image-url)
Work in the most general sense of activity is placed in the middle. In the horizontal dimension the difference of a means/ends aspect is made. In terms of ends work is activity geared at value production and earning a living/income. In terms of means work is realised as socially embedded and controlled activity on the one hand, and realised as activity embedded in individual skills and dispositions, on the other. In the vertical dimension work may either be seen as a social or an individual activity.

Some of the variety of everyday meaning of ‘work’ and ‘having a work’ is covered here. Work may mean activity in general in contrast to idleness. It may mean socially embedded and organised activity as in having an employment, a job or a task. It may be taken as value productive activity in contrast to unproductive activities or consumption. Your work may be that activity that earns you an income and your work may, even if it does not earn you an income, be what you are skilled to do, your profession.

The table provides us with five dimensions in which cultural work can be characterised and compared with other kinds of work. As we, as learned from the previous section, only have vague ideas of what cultural work actually is, this can be done primarily only in relation to work that by convention is safely cultural.

One may start from the observation of several cultural work groups, particularly artistic professions, that they meet frequent difficulties in having their work recognised as ‘real work’. What can be ‘real’ about work in the five dimensions of work here considered?

Productive?

Cultural workers may meet doubts whether their work is actually productive. Also economists sometimes doubt if cultural work is productive in the specific sense of adding to the GNP. Cultural work may be seen as an aspect of the consumption of otherwise produced real economic wealth. A long historical tradition identifies culture with social ornamentation and luxury. Real work is clearly productive, and there is a tendency to associate productiveness with the realisation of ‘material’ values. The ‘spiritual’ values associated with cultural work may make it worthy and respectable, but not real work.

If cultural work enters as a contribution to GNP depends on the precise economic conditions of its performance. In artistic profes-
sions much production is not registered, partly because information about actual payments are not properly delivered to taxation offices, mostly because large parts of production takes place outside of the market place.

In most other jobs the performance of the activity characterising the job is directly tied to the socially productive meaning of it. In many types of cultural work this is not so. Training and preparation for the communicative performance of the work, takes, in artistic, teaching and sports professions the lion part of total work time. The extreme case is perhaps fiction writers and poets where often all most all working time is taken up by failing to perform the activity tied to the productive meaning of writing, i.e. actually writing the book.

Hobby?

As several cultural workers, as a matter of fact, cannot earn a living by their work, one can doubt if it is a real work or perhaps rather a hobby or a fancy. Real work earn you a living. That cultural work belongs to the few types of work people engage in despite that they cannot live from it, adds to this ‘weakness’ in real work character. Several artistic workers actually work with something else in order to buy time to engage in their art. Something you are motivated to do without pay cannot be real work.

Many types of cultural worker share in a spirit of calling and personal sacrifice reminding of the work ethos of pre-industrial society, quite alien to the dominant work attitudes of modern industrial labour markets. Belonging generally to the ‘liberal professions’ cultural work has an historical association with gentlemanly activities performed for their own sake or in view of nobler reasons than economic gain.

Most fields of professional cultural work are shadowed by amateur work in the same field, i.e. by proper hobbies. In some field the amateurs outnumber the professionals by staggering proportions. In Sweden there are perhaps a few hundred professional choir singers as compared to about 500,000 amateur choir singers.

Profession?

In some types of cultural work there are no specific entry requirements in terms of certified skills and education. Real work has well-defined skill requirements. Modern artists, particularly
painters, often meet public demands for display of traditional technical virtuosity in order to get recognised as ‘real artists’. Museum people, librarians and journalists are nowadays typically required to have some formal academic training for their jobs. A few decades back they did not and it is still debated whether such formal training is actually relevant for doing the job. The skills of fiction writers and poets are often felt to be personal to the extent that formal education seems almost contradictory. Cultural work seems to be more a matter of personality than of clear professional skills. Real work, in contrast, is marked by clearly visible, socially specified and reproducible standards of skills.

Cultural work simultaneously appears as a hobby, a profession, a calling and as ‘ordinary work’ framed by very different institutional, motivational and economic rules. This makes it a tough nut for labour statisticians.

Socially Ordered?

Self-employed cultural workers cannot enjoy that hallmark of a ‘real job’ which employment assigns. If you don’t have a boss and continuous employment you have no real job. The more clearly your work is subordinated to social control the more ‘real’ it is. This is probably a reason for making cultural work seem so attractive to many young people in rich countries, shunning the form of control associated with more remunerable traditional work. While Swedish higher education cannot by far fill its (potentially high pay) training programs in technology, engineering and administration, many thousands of applications for (potentially low pay) training in the arts, the media and the humanities are turned down.

The forms of social control of cultural work are typically less visible and more complicated than in ordinary work. The appearance of freedom in cultural work is often misleading, though formal organisation and hierarchy does not play the dominant role as in most other work. But demands by the public, standards set by colleagues, critics and traditions and the self-imposed calling to grand abstract cultural institutions like ‘art’, ‘truth’, ‘science’, ‘education’, ‘sports’, ‘progress’, ‘culture’, etc. makes cultural work more pervasively socially controlled than most other jobs. It is not a real work that you ‘have’ (and leave ‘after work’). It is rather work that you ‘are’.

The suggested list of reasons why cultural work may appear as
less ‘real’ than other work can be made longer. This question is, however, not in itself particularly interesting. It is used here as a short cut to an understanding of cultural work as one in several dimensions deviant kind work. Conceptualising cultural will need a very substantial effort in pinpointing and ordering similarities and differences among cultural work groups and in relation to other types of work.

**Production**

Cultural work is production. In this last part of the paper I will consider three aspects of cultural work as production. First I will discuss how cultural work relates to the basic economic categories of production, distribution and consumption. Secondly I will suggest an elementary conceptual mapping of the system of cultural production, highlighting four principle types of cultural work. Finally cultural work will be considered in the light of the theory of a mounting global ‘experience economy’. The common point to be made is that ‘cultural work’ does not really fit ordinary principles of economic categorisation resulting in an uncertainty if cultural production is a fairly marginal part of the modern economy, or if it is dominant part. A suitable *memento* is a reference to the anthropologist Michael Sahlins’ calculation in *Stone-Age Economics*, of time-uses for various purposes in known stone-age societies (Sahlins, 1988). Activities related to material needs (economic support) takes something like a fourth or fifth of total activity time while cultural activities related to spiritual needs take the lion’s part of the rest. The suggestion is, in view of present statistics on the cultural sector, that either there is something terribly wrong with modern life, or there is something terribly misleading in how we register production and work.

**What Musicians Do When They Play**

Only if a musician plays for registered payments his production of music enters the GNP. Regardless of this playing music is still production—or is it?

Fundamental to the economic description of work is the distinction between production, distribution and consumption. Playing music is however intrinsically production, distribution and consumption at the same time. When playing the musician produces music, regardless of the balance of interpretation and origination
in this production and regardless of any particular technical, social or economic circumstances. He or she is also producing music when not playing it, when engaged in planning, contemplating, composing, preparing the music eventually played. In playing he or she distributes the music regardless if there is an audience or a microphone there to distribute it further, or not.

With the possible exception of stone-deaf musicians, everyone playing music also consumes what is played, not only in the sense of listening to it, but also in the sense of ‘living it’, ‘enjoying it’ and ‘taking it in’. An important aspect of being a good producer of music is that of being a good consumer of it, having ‘an ear’ for it. Consuming the music is more importantly an intrinsic part of the realisation of something as music. Activities of interpretation, ordering and assimilation on the part of the listener are integral, creative parts of the production of general phenomenon of music as a ‘consumable’ value.

The basic logic of distinct economic sub-systems of production, distribution and consumption fail to grasp many instances of cultural production, and it fails to cover something characteristic of it in general. Are teacher’s producers of knowledge, distributors of knowledge, aids in the consumption of knowledge or actual consumers of knowledge? And what is role of the audiences they address? Are they producers, distributors or consumers?

There is something fishy here. Teachers and their audiences are obviously different parts of a system of cultural production, but what is the economic meaning of the contributions they make? Is the teacher a producer of knowledge only so far that he or she has originated the piece of informative good presented to the audience? Or is making a chunk of information raw material ready for distribution and consumption in audiences the real productive contribution, the value added? Is that knowledge which sometimes arises in the minds of the audience when exposed to teaching the proper product of teaching? Or is it rather produced by the audience?

Teaching is perhaps a particularly difficult case. But it also important as it focuses on the nature of realisation of the value of cultural production; in the minds of audiences, rather in the variety of vessels in which cultural work is objectified, which make them possible to distribute. The desired ‘educative’ effects of teaching in the minds of pupils can be taken as a paradigm for the economic
meaning of cultural production, and, unfortunately it seems that modern economic theory has little to say about it. To economics such effects will either count as investments in skills, as public consumption or it will drown in that general demand pool of (experienced) ‘utility’ that fundamentally explains any economic value. Figuring educative effects as essential to the idea of cultural production is not easy and it certainly smacks of a 19th century sense of a ‘civilising process’ mostly out of tune with modern worldviews.

Cultural Production Systems

Difficulties in applying meaningfully the categories of production, distribution and consumption to the cultural field, cannot make us dispense of categorisations of the general kind in order to sort out cultural work. We may, as just said, be uncertain of how to categorise ‘teaching’ and other work in those terms, and we may be doubtful as to the applicability of ‘consumption’ to the cultural field in general. But we need some idea of a circular flow (as Joseph Schumpeter [1944] called it) connecting dynamically the supply and demand sides of the cultural economy. Modifying categorisations in order to make better sense of cultural production and work is one obvious road to follow. A suggestion of this kind reads as follows, see figure 3:

![Figure 3. Four aspects of cultural production and work.](image_url)
Mapped here are four principal aspects of cultural production. It is a rough picture and there are several middling forms. I distinguish between ‘making’ and ‘using’, thus getting rid of some of the misleading physical, technical and psychological connotations of ‘production’ and ‘consumption’, in favour of a more abstract functional distinction. ‘Consuming’ a book, a lecture or a scientific theory sounds odd, while ‘attending’ to it, is a fairly unbiased term, descriptive of a wide variety of uses of cultural products. In the horizontal dimension, I distinguish between ‘objectivation’ and ‘conception’, on the ground that I figure every process of artefact, whether ‘cultural’ or not, involves conceptualisations in the minds of people, and social objectivations (in action, things, symbolisations (including language) or whatever ‘medium’). ‘Making culture’ thus has two principle aspects—conceptual origination and objectivating implementation. If the origination is a feat of one or many people, or whether it just pops out of the incessant creative friction between wandering conceptual structures, does not matter. Psychology and creative genius is not directly involved, much less the lone creator idea of cultural production.

Implementing a cultural product involves a wide spectrum of more or less complex activities of objectivation. Implementation realises cultural goods in forms ready for use, from uttering or exposing something to web of activities in the large-scale systems of production needed to make a modern movie.

A composer originates a piece of music, it is implemented in a system of instruments, notes, behavioural skills of musician, studio technologies, etc. realising a communicable piece of music ready for use. As a step between origination and implementation many types of cultural production need an interpretative link. Communicating this piece may be a matter of giving concerts, releasing records, showing movies with sound tracks, broadcasting, etc. These activities are in themselves forms of uses of the music, but the typical point of communicating music is indeed that of realising attention to it in listeners. Also the step between communication and attention often involves a guiding, interpretative link, as a teachers and museum guides bring the attention of their audiences to the communicative content of textbooks or expositions.

What is it then to attend to cultural products? Basically it is a matter of re-conceptualisation, of creative infusion in the context of the mind attending to the product. The creativity in attention
could well be emphasised in contrast to the uncreative passivity strongly suggested by the term ‘cultural consumption’. It is not only creative in the sense that every re-conceptualisation requires creative intelligence—that the ‘consumer’ must be a ‘co-producer’. More importantly, it is creative in the sense that attention changes the patterns of attentions themselves. Cultural audiences develop and change their modes of attention (‘tastes’) in the course of attention. They get ‘educated’ aspiring for more refined cultural goods and they get ‘bored’ aspiring for new experiences. The creative consequence of attention to the system of attention is of central importance to the dynamics of cultural systems, revealed e.g. in the dramatic importance of changes in fashion in most cultural fields.

If the product conceptually ‘consumed’ has any likeness with the product conceptually ‘originated’ is inherently uncertain. It depends on the similarity of the contexts of origination and attention, which may be formulated in terms of prevalent tastes. The complexity and quality of the intermediate processes of implementation and communication matters also, as well as the intentional specificity of the product. Many cultural products are ‘amalgams of uncontrolled meaning’ suiting many different modes of attention.

The above conceptual mapping of cultural production contains a diagonal line. On the upper-left half we have the supply-side of the productions system centring on implementation. On the lower right half is the demand-side, centring on attention. The dynamics of cultural productions systems is basically a matter of adaptation between social systems of implementation and patterns of attention (‘tastes’). Taste is here taken in a wide sense, which could in principle be given almost the same functional relation to ‘demand’ as ‘preferences’ or ‘utility functions’ in standard economics. The differences are again that ‘attention’ is ‘cleaner’ as ‘preference’ and ‘utility’ often suggest some specific psychological functionality in the relation between consumption and demand. In another context I would be prepared to argue that my substitution of production—distribution—consumption triad for the origination—implementation—communication—attention quartet of basic concepts is valid for all kinds of production. By being ‘cleaner’ and ‘more abstract’ I think it is superior to the conventional triad and solves a number of consistency problems in general economic analysis. Origination
and communication is the principal connecting roads taken to realise this adaptation. Origination provides the system of implementation with materials to adapt to changes in attention, while communication allows adaptation of the patterns of attention to changes in the implementation system. What we have is proper circular flow model.

My sketch of a cultural production system gives some clues to the problem of identifying cultural work. Generally this work can be subdivided into four kinds of activity on the ground of their functional contribution to the system of production: origination, implementation, communication and attention. We can identify middling forms of work that borders on and connects these four kinds. While these categories are analytically distinct, practical cultural work involves work of all four kinds, though many works groups can be identified in terms of the dominant form of contribution. The focus in e.g. artistic and scientific work is on origina-

tion, though this may be an unwarranted concession to the creative self-conceptions propagated by these groups. The large numbers of cultural workers in cultural institutions, in the media, in various styling industries and entertainment deal primarily with implementa-
noment and communication. Teachers, clergy, art directors, librarians, museum guides are indeed engaged in communicating cultural good, but the functional focus of their work is typically that of moulding attention.

Another observation of the nature of cultural work afforded by the model is connected to the creative role played by ‘consumers’ as co-producers of cultural goods. This makes most cultural work in a society pass unnoticed to work-life statisticians as it is not professionally organised. It contributes also to an understanding why non-marketed amateur production of culture represents such a large share of total production. We do not need producer’s skills in order to ‘consume’ automobiles, we just need user’s skills. To ‘consume’ culture, in contrast, we need producer’s skills. This means that those attending to cultural goods not only feel that they in principle could have been the originator themselves. Moreover they also are originator’s both as amateur cultural worker in the context of hobbies and fancies and as people in general as the ability to make and communicate a variety of cultural artefacts (particularly linguistic ones) is a general condition for everyday social life.
The Experience Economy

Finally I will consider the possibility of radically extending the size of the cultural sector and of cultural work by means of the concept of ‘an experience economy’. Talk, often big talk, about ‘experiences’ as a typically modern economic good has been around for sometime. Much of the focus has been on the media, entertainment, tourism, edutainment, infotainment, the so-called time-sector (telecom, info, media, entertainment) and other ‘experience industries’ (Wolf, 1999). Gleeful expressions like ‘the heritage industry’ suggest something morally rotten in the turning of venerable and exclusive cultural fields into big business and mass markets (Hewison, 1987). Many observations have been made on the aesthetisation of business and the commercialisation of aesthetic field (Stenström, 2000).

An interesting contribution to this new genre is Pine’s and Gilmore’s *The Experience Economy* (1999). Their idea is formulated in a scheme of stages of overall economic development:

- Agrarian economy offers naturally extracted commodities.
- Industrial economy offers manufactured goods.
- Service economy offers delivery of services.
- Experience economy offers staging of experiences

We are now into the fourth stage. The four kinds of economy (agrarian, industrial, etc.) are not to be understood as different sectors of the economy with successive domination. Rather they are mounted successively on each other reflecting how money can be earned by market producers, thus, what consumers are willing to pay for. This is illustrated by ‘coffee’. In the agrarian economy growing and trading beans was the way to make money on coffee. Commercial margins in growing and trading this commodity were eventually destroyed by market competition. In the industrial economy business margins are in the manufacturing of coffee—grinding, roasting, packaging, etc.—but the market competition eventually cuts down also these margins for coffee as an industrial good. The consumer market margins in coffee business then turns over to the delivery of services related to coffee, serving it in trains, catering it, renting coffee machines, etc.

Today, substantial business margins on the coffee consumer market are to be found in staging coffee on a market of experiences. For the 10 dollars your are charged for a cup of coffee on a fancy
tourist café in Venice you pay a fraction of a cent for the commodity, a few cents for the good, perhaps a dollar for the service and the remaining nearly nine dollars you pay for the experience of coffee exclusively staged. In analogy with this they argue that consumer market margins for most modern goods (particularly for standard industrial goods like automobiles, clothes, housing, household equipment, etc.) have moved into a matter of competing for experience value sought by consumers. Globalisation of market competition and the speeding up of the spread of production technologies make traditional strategies of getting a competitive edge increasingly inefficient. The ‘customisation’ strategy typical for selling standard industrial goods in the Service Economy also gives away. Instead styling and staging of experiential features of goods and services become dominant strategies for capturing consumer attention and thus for making a profit.

What seems powerful to me in this theoretically rather easy-going book is that their conception of an experience economy is not a matter of the growth of those industrial sectors that produce experiences in a conventional sense (infotainment, etc.). It is the idea that the whole economy, with all kinds of industrial sectors, good and services, moves into experience production. The explanatory sketch letting world capitalist economic dynamics be driven by profit conditions on consumer markets is simple but basically sound. At least it is a good old-fashioned antidote to the stress on ‘technology push’ in computers and electronic mediation that otherwise dominates explanations of the course of contemporary capitalism in general and the rise of an experience industry in particular (Castells, 1996).

What does this mean for cultural production and work? At a general level it invites us to re-think what the cultural sector is and not least where it is. The institutions, industries and professions conventionally understood as cultural should perhaps not be in focus when asking what happens with cultural production and work. We should look for cultural production within the whole economy regardless of how sectors are defined in production and employment statistics. Conventional big business in industrial goods is perhaps where the bulk of modern cultural production takes place. Acting in the theatre is a paradigm exempla of cultural work. But if the whole of markets society turns into a theatre (not in the traditional metaphorical sense but by fact of economic change), then the paradigm for cultural work must be sought elsewhere.
We could learn that there is something radically misleading in current statistical accounts for the cultural sector. According to official statistics on cultural consumption, Swedish household invariantly spend 5 percent on culture for the period 1975–1995 (SOU 1995:85). This is an example of what I take as a radically misleading economic account of culture. Obviously, the bulk of Swedish cultural consumption is hidden under other statistical categories. If you could make a proper interpretation of the components of value in consumer goods and services, then, according to Pine and Gilmore’s perspective, cultural consumption is far bigger.

The perspective of an ‘experience economy’ may also shift attention from professional cultural work to the amateur. Whatever ready-made experiences and stages that modern business and traditional cultural industries offer to consumers, what is predominantly offered is materials, methods, programs and vessels for self-styling and self-production of experiences and expressive activities. When life increasingly becomes a matter of style and emotive engineering the individual emerges as an author/director/actor of the self. The role of offering the public representative experiences performed by traditional professional cultural institutions may initially flourish in a rising experience economy, but they are likely to wither away eventually. Who needs fiction writers when life is writing fiction?

The reason to consider the experience economy in this paper is not, however, to indulge in speculations on what such a social order may bring in the future, but to bring home the general point: whether conceived in terms of the concepts of culture and work, or in terms of concepts of production and economic value, there is something rotten in the state of conceiving of cultural work in present social and economic statistics. A lot of hard conceptual analysis and theoretical innovation seems to lie ahead before we can meaningfully start to measure the volume and development of the cultural work.

References


Culture in the Economic System
For a useful discourse between economists and culturalists on art and culture to take place, each side has to point out their concrete position in a rather extreme manner in order to highlight the different ways in which the cultural issues are approached and viewed. This paper presents nine propositions from the point of view of culturalists and the corresponding counter-propositions reflecting the politico-economic approach. The paper shows how the economic approach to aesthetics, and to the measure of the value of arts and the cultural policy in particular, differs compared to the views of culturalists and the general public with regard to aesthetics, arts and culture (see also Benhamou, 1999; Blaug, 1999; Frey, 2000; Throsby, 2001).

Experience shows that it is not easy to establish a fruitful discourse between social scientists on the one side, and culturalists on the other side. The discussion often ends up with social scientists speaking to each other, and culturalists speaking to each other. One reason for this difficulty is the use of different terminology. This holds in particular for economists who are used to employing quite specific terms. To overcome the problem, an effort is sometimes made to define terms—but this means that the advantage of a discourse is lost because the exchange becomes highly formalised and lifeless.

In my opinion, a useful discourse can be undertaken if each side speaks in as concrete terms as possible and does not try to impress the other side with highly theoretical constructions. It has also proved to be helpful to state one’s own position in a rather extreme way in order to highlight the differences in how one approaches and views the cultural issues.

In what follows, nine propositions, where I have experienced wide currency among culturalists (as well as in the general public), are advanced. Each of them is presented together with a counter-proposition, reflecting the politico-economic approach.
The propositions are grouped into three sections: the first section discusses the typical features of the economic approach to culture and aesthetics as measures of the value of aesthetic objects by confronting them with what I sense to be the views generally held by culturalists and by the public. The second section presents some facts on aesthetics and culture, where the perceptions of culturalists and the public on the one hand, and economists on the other hand, strongly deviate. The third section is devoted to the often starkly contrasting views with respect to cultural policy and who should decide about it.

**Characteristics of the Economic Approach**

1. **The Value of Aesthetic Objects**

   A. **Proposition:** “The value of an aesthetic site is measured by the number of visitors.”

   This is a charge often heard against economics. The idea seems to be that economics is interested only in numbers and quantities. Thus, it is claimed that economists would suggest closing down a theatre or a museum cultural site, if the number of visitors is small, because it is taken to be of no value from the economic point of view.

   B. **Economic Counter-Proposition:** “The measure of value is the willingness to pay for an aesthetic object. This includes the intensity of appreciation as well as option, existence, bequest, prestige and educational values.”

   This counter-proposition makes clear that economists do not take the number of visitors to be the indicator of value. This is so for two reasons.

   1. The willingness to pay can be high even if only a few people visit the cultural object. What matters is not simply the number, but also the intensity with which the cultural object is enjoyed. This is not an empty statement without relevance in the real world. The opposite is true. Only a short glance at a newspaper kiosk reveals that profit oriented firms are able to cater for minority tastes, and sometimes even for very small minorities. Consider, for example, the dozens of high quality journals devoted to the opera or, for that matter, to the collection of toy soldiers.

   2. The economic value of an art object depends on the preferences of all individuals, and not only on those who pay for it on the
market. Economists have gone to great pains to identify these so-called ‘non-user values’, in particular:

- option values (people value the possibility of enjoying a cultural object in the future);
- existence values (people do not benefit themselves from a cultural object, but benefit from knowing that it exists);
- bequest values (people do not benefit from a cultural object themselves, but derive utility from knowing that their descendants will be able to enjoy it if they choose to);
- prestige values (people derive pleasure from knowing that a cultural object is cherished by persons outside their community); and
- educational values (people are aware that culture contributes to education and therefore value it).

To speak of non-user values is no empty statement because they have been empirically measured. To provide an example: it is well known that only a small share (something like 5 percent) of the population ever (voluntarily) visits an opera house. Nevertheless, several popular referenda concerning the financial support of the Zurich opera house have been supported by a clear majority of the voters. The support of the many non-users could be attributed to the various non-user benefits just mentioned.

Non-user values are often not supplied by the market. Economists have therefore devised many different schemes and techniques to capture the willingness to pay by non-users in order to secure the supply of the respective cultural goods.

2. Induced Business Activity as a Measure of Art

A. proposition: “The value of an aesthetic object is measured by the amount of business activity created.”

It is often claimed that economists are only interested in culture if it produces additional economic activity. Thus, many culturalists think that a classical musical festival can only be rationalised economically if the business created for restaurants, hotels, and the various kinds of shops, exceeds the cost of running the festival.

B. economic counter-proposition: “The economic approach supports culturalists in their effort to stress non-commercial aspects. Purely business interests are opposed.”
The counter-proposition makes clear that economists do not base their evaluation of culture on the amount of business created. Such ‘impact studies’ are only one part of the evaluation. It is important to distinguish between economics (an academic field) and business interests. Owners of hotels, restaurants and shops are obviously interested in the additional business created by culture. But economists are quick to argue that if the profits indirectly made are as large as often claimed, the businesses benefiting should finance the cultural activity in question. Economists consider the total utility created, which also involves the above mentioned non-user benefits, which are not (directly) reflected in the form of market turnover and profits. It is wrong to only consider business interests.

3. Employment and Income as a Rationale for Public Support

A. proposition: “The employment and income generating effects of cultural projects are important.”

Impact studies have indeed been undertaken for many cultural activities, in particular for musical festivals such as the one in Salzburg. They often come to the conclusion that the additional employment and profits created provide a good rationale for public support.

B. economic counter-proposition: “Impact studies devoted to capturing the multiplier effects of cultural projects are dangerous and often counterproductive.”

Economists are critical of impact studies (which are often initiated and financed by the business community) because turnover created does not reflect the value added by the cultural activity. It may well be that turnover rises but profits do not (they may even fall). More importantly, business profits create only one part of utility, while neglecting the already mentioned non-user benefits. Using impact studies is dangerous because if one relies on the additional business created—and that is an approach often taken by cultural managers, e.g. directors of museums or opera houses—one runs the danger that alternative activities are even more profitable from the business point of view. Thus, a sports event such as a Formula One car race is likely to create more business than the local museum does. If one followed the rationale of impact studies, it would then be logical to support the car race, and to no longer subsidise the museum. An economist would not follow that argument.
With respect to the additional employment created, the same argument applies. If another economic policy instrument (say an employment programme in the sports sector) creates more employment than the cultural activity, any basis for the public support of the latter is lost.

**Facts on Aesthetics and Culture**

4. The Wealth of the Arts

**A. Proposition:** “The arts are poor, and are getting poorer and poorer all the time.”

Many culturalists are convinced that the arts and culture today are in a very bad financial situation. The respective complaints have become something of a trademark.

**B. Economic Counter-proposition:** “The arts are getting richer all the time.”

In one respect, this statement is certainly true: art objects, in particular paintings, have greatly risen in monetary value, as everybody following art auction results can testify. It is only a matter of time until the first painting will be sold at more than one hundred million dollars or euros.

This does, of course, not mean that all art is in good financial health. But it does mean that our museums of art are immensely rich if they correctly valued their art holdings. At present, almost all art museums implicitly attribute a value of zero to their holdings, i.e. the art they own does not appear in their balance sheet. The question is how the wealth of art museums should be dealt with.

But even apart from art in the form of objects, it is probably not true that culture is in a terribly bad financial state compared to the past or to other public expenditure items such as—recently—military outlays.

5. Art as an investment

**A. Proposition:** “Private investments in art are more profitable in monetary terms than investments in assets such as government bonds or shares.”

This is a very popular view that has recently been fuelled by banks, which have detected art as a new investment option.
B. Economic Counter-proposition: “To make money, people should not invest in art.”

Interestingly enough, this view is shared by most serious art dealers and persons active in auction houses. It is also supported by serious empirical research. Thus, in joint work with Werner Pommerehne, using data on art auctions spanning more than 350 years (1635–1987) and more than 2,400 transactions on the most important art markets (New York, Paris, London), I calculated an average real net rate of return (i.e. after accounting for inflation and transactions cost) of 1.5 percent per year (Frey & Pommerehne, 1989). An investment in government bonds would have yielded a return of about 3 percent per year. Thus, art investment, on average, is not profitable from a purely financial point of view.

It is, of course, possible to reach higher returns on the art market—if one is lucky. If I had bought a Rauschenberg in my youth I would have realised a high profit. But this argument applies to all investment: if I had bought an object, which afterwards turns out to rise sharply in price, I would realise a high profit. To test this argument, just envisage whether you are prepared to state today what painter will trade at high prices in the future. And if you were really sure, why do you not buy all his or her paintings now (as you could easily get a loan from your bank)?

Cultural Policy
6. Aesthetics and Marketing

A. Proposition: “Aesthetics should be divorced from commercialisation.”

It is often argued that aesthetics can only remain ‘pure’ if not mixed up with business aspects.

B. Economic Counter-proposition: “Marketing should be actively used to safeguard aesthetic objects.”

Economists emphasise the possibilities of tapping the willingness to pay for art by various means. Marketing is one important means of financing the arts and therewith protecting the cultural legacy. Examples are the ‘superstar museums’, which are defined by the fact that it is almost impossible as a tourist to visit the respective city without going to the museum itself, the Louvre and Paris, the Prado and Madrid and, most recently, the Getty and Los Angeles being examples. Superstar museums raise the profits of many in-
dustries, such as tourist enterprises, hotels, restaurants, or souvenir shops. The cultural suppliers must be taught to appropriate some of the business profits created instead of leaving them to the non-cultural enterprises. This can partly be done by raising entrance fees, running their own restaurants and souvenir shops, or by lobbying the political decision makers to impose a special tax on the firms and persons indirectly benefiting (Throsby, 1994; Towse, 1997).

There are a great many possibilities of raising money, which so far have largely been untapped, partly because the cultural institutions, being part of the public sector, had no incentives to move in this direction. Sometimes, it seems at first sight that it is impossible to raise such revenue from cultural activities. An example is land art, which can be viewed by everyone without payment (in the economic language it is a public good). But as Cristo has convincingly demonstrated, this need not be so. He is proud to perform his wrappings without any subsidy, be it from government or private sources. He is able to raise the money by selling sketches and plans of his works—a considerable achievement, which might be imitated by other enterprising artists.

7. Aesthetics and Monetary Values

A. PROPOSITION: “For cultural policy, all that matters are aesthetic values.”

This view seeks to differentiate cultural from other aspects of policy, and claims that they should be clearly set apart.

B. ECONOMIC COUNTER-PROPOSITION: “As resources, and in particular government budgets, are restricted, it is often indispensable to price aesthetic values in monetary terms in order to fight competing claims.”

As soon as the public sector is involved, there is no way of denying the scarcity of financial means. The size of the public budget is limited, and there are virtually thousands of demands competing for it. Culture is only one of them. If the cultural activists refuse to employ the measuring rod of money, they become inconsistent, because they actually use a monetary measure when applying for financial support. Only if the cultural sector refused to ask for money from anybody, could the strict posture of proposition 7A be maintained. But this has certainly nothing to do with reality.
8. Who Should Decide on Cultural Issues?

A. proposition: “Public decisions concerning aesthetics must be left to an educated elite.”

It is often understood as a matter of course that ordinary persons are incapable of judging and therefore deciding on cultural issues. Only those persons who have been educated in art, or have educated themselves in art, are taken to be able to make reasonable decisions concerning culture. Only they know the relevant facts, can evaluate the pros and cons, and are sufficiently involved to take the trouble of seriously considering the issue in question.

B. politico-economic counter-proposition: “It is essential to have generally accepted rules of how decisions on aesthetics are to be made in democracy.”

A democracy is defined by citizens who are having the last say on all issues. This must include cultural issues. It is not compatible with the democratic rationale to exclude any area as a matter of principle. If culture was excluded, many other areas could be excluded as well, using the same arguments as in proposition 8A. Thus, for example, experts on military affairs could claim that they are the only ones able to decide on whether a country should engage in war, or experts on nuclear power could claim that only they are capable of taking a well informed and reasoned decision on the use of nuclear power plants.

The politico-economic counter-proposition does not mean that citizens make all decisions on every issue themselves. In areas where intimate professional knowledge and expertise is required, the citizenry may well decide to leave the specific decisions to experts. This may well apply to cultural issues. However, the extent to which the decision-making power is transferred to experts must be decided by the citizens rather than by the experts themselves (Throsby & Withers, 1979; O'Hagan, 1998).

9. Aesthetics and Direct Democracy

A. proposition: “Aesthetic decisions cannot be left to the citizens.”

The average citizens are taken to be badly informed and little interested in cultural issues. They are therefore well advised to leave cultural decisions to experts.
B. POLITICO-ECONOMIC COUNTER-PROPOSITION: “Aesthetic decisions can and should be made via popular referenda.”

Modern political economy proceeds from the notion of reasonable individuals who are able to take rational decisions. They are certainly not as well informed as the cultural elite but they are able to appreciate the issues once the ground has been prepared by the public bureaucracy, government and parliament. The extensive and open public discussion, which is an integral part of the referendum process, provides the citizens with the necessary information to take a reasoned referendum decision also on cultural affairs. In this pre-referendum process, the cultural experts play a prominent role. They must make their case in a language understood by common people, which means that they must leave their ghetto and concentrate on the fundamental issues.

Popular referenda on cultural issues are a necessary part of a democratic society, which puts trust in its citizens. This accords well with the idea that the citizens are reasonable human beings. It also makes sense because it is unclear what a cultural elite is composed of. Is it people with a formal education in the arts? What level of formal education is needed? Is it sufficient to have a diploma from an arts school, or is a diploma, doctorate or professorship in art history or some other cultural field required? Or is the cultural elite made up of people active in art administration, such as museum directors and curators? Or is the cultural elite made up of those persons actually producing culture, i.e. the artists themselves?

Whatever the answer, there is obviously a great amount of uncertainty as to what constitutes the cultural elite. Moreover, whatever the definition of the cultural experts, they are often severely divided on the merits of particular cultural policies. It must be concluded that there is no such thing as the ‘opinion of the cultural elite’. Rather, there are many different views of individual art experts. And many of these views turned out to be utterly mistaken from today’s point of view. An example is the extreme resistance of the Paris art establishment against the Impressionists.

The basic idea of an open society is that each art expert has the opportunity to communicate his or her view to the citizens, who listen to the various arguments and, on that basis, make a referendum decision.

Compared to traditional methods to evaluate the willingness to pay for cultural projects—in particular the so-called ‘contingent
valuation approach’—referenda induce a discussion focused on a specific cultural issue. The discourse does not have the character of an inconsequential academic discussion, but takes into account the resource scarcities, which public decisions necessarily confront. Another great advantage is that a cultural project is at the same time evaluated and decided upon. This contrasts favourably with the many benefit-cost analyses wherein a project is carefully evaluated, but which is shelved once completed.

Empirical research in the economics of art has convincingly shown that popular referenda may well be used for cultural issues. An example is the referendum undertaken in the canton Zurich opera house already mentioned, or the purchase of two paintings by Picasso (Les Deux Frères of 1905/6 and Arlequin Assis of 1920) in the canton Basle in 1967. Many art experts at that time thought that the decision to buy abstract paintings (which were then still considered by many to be outlandish) was a bad idea. Yet 53.9 percent of the voters supported the proposition. Picasso was so pleased with the outcome that he generously donated two paintings, Vénus et l’Amour and Le Couple, as well as some drawings, to the population of Basle. But these specific examples are not exceptions. Thus, it has been shown that the voters are more prepared to support cultural issues than they are to support other purposes.

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The standard theory of the firm is built on the assumption that there is little interaction between the consumer and the producer. The product or good is manufactured in a factory, using energy, machinery and different types of raw materials and components produced in other factories as inputs. The good is then sold to the consumer at a price determined by the market conditions. Optimally each input should then be used up to a point where the value of the marginal product of the input corresponds to the marginal cost of the input. Energy should for instance be used in a quantity at which the marginal revenue of the use of energy exactly corresponds to the unit price of energy. This simple decision rule does of course also apply to a firm producing communication services, e.g. a radio station. But especially in interactive communication services it is no longer possible to assume that the manufacturing of the output can be separated from the activities of the consumer. The consumer is an active participant, providing inputs in the production of communication services.

Education is a convenient example of an interactive communication process. The inputs are to some extent conventional. Among these conventional inputs are computers, oh-projectors, whiteboards, classrooms, electricity and lecturers. The use of these resources ought to be regulated efficiently according to the criteria, mentioned above. But the efficiency of the use of e.g. teaching time is crucially dependent upon the efficient use of the time used by the students as well. This implies that the time used by the consumers (students) must also be seen as a necessary input into the production process. And the quality of interaction between the producer/teacher and the consumer/student determines the efficiency of production. But it is not only the interactivity with a teacher, seen as input of time that is of importance. The quality or the value of the production of communication services is determined by qualitative characteristics of the interaction between the
consumer, the producer, computers and other communication inputs. There are also higher order interactivities to be accounted for. The development of computer skills in a computer course is dependent upon the quality of interaction between the teacher and the student as well as the interaction between the student and computer software. There could also be variations in the quality of interaction at even higher orders, e.g. the teacher, the computer, the student and other students. But even first order interactions are enough to generate a fundamental difference between standard production economics and the economics of cultural and other interaction.

**The Demand for Communication and Interactive Culture**

Interactivity determines not only the structuring of production and the use of different resources but is also of great importance in the determination of total demand. There is, for instance, no greater point in purchasing a cellular phone unless at least a few of your friends do also simultaneously or beforehand decide to buy a phone. The demand for communication equipment therefore tends to be a case of *interdependent demand*, analogous to the determination of the number of people infected by a contagious decease. Two factors are thus of importance for the expansion of demand—the attractivity of the new communication possibility and the potential of communicating. The same observation holds true for the visitors of a rock festival or the Rio Carnival.

Firstly, attractivity is determined by the price of interaction, the real income of the consumers and available time for interaction.

Secondly, the potential of expansion of interaction is determined by the number of participants who have already accessed the system, and the number who could be new interactors. This is equal to the total number of consumers minus the number who have already enlisted. The number of new consumers can thus be modelled as the product of attractivity and potential:

\[
  x(t+1) = a\text{(price, income, time)} \times x(t) \times [B - x(t)]
\]

where

- \( x(t) \) = number of interactors at time \( t \)
- \( B \) = maximum number of interactors
- \( a \) = attractivity function, dependent upon price, income, and time set aside for interaction purpose
We can further assume that the attractivity is a decreasing function of price and of congestion. This means that if there is a very rapid inflow of new consumers onto a system with limited capacity, the attractivity would go down and further growth would be stifled. Similarly, if the price of interacting increases, this would be expected to lead to a reduction in the growth of demand. With constancy of price, low congestion and sufficient leisure time available the growth of interaction would be a quadratic function of the level already reached.

This process can be illustrated with two graphs. Figure 1 illustrates how the growth of consumption is expanding with the level

![Figure 1. Growth of demand as a function of level of demand.](image1)

![Figure 2. Number of interactions as a function of time.](image2)
already reached up to a certain point, at which the growth is maximal to be followed by declining growth.

This relation between the level and growth of demand implies an s-shaped curve depicting demand as a function of time.

The maximal number of consumers is obviously critical for the whole development of demand. As soon as the growth of the number of consumers tends to decrease, firms normally react by trying to expand this maximal number of consumers by advertising, adapting the product to be used by other consumer groups et cetera. One example is the Internet market, which initially was adapted to the requirements of firms rather than households. With the saturation of that market, consumer access was made easier and the total number of buyers could be drastically increased. In this way it is not uncommon to see demand expanding in a sequence of overlaid S-curves, each one depicting a new process of interaction between new groups of users.

The Expansion of Communication Infrastructure

Financial as well as trade statistics show that there has been a remarkable increase in international interaction since the mid 1980's. This globalisation process is no doubt closely related with the creation of new and more efficient communication links between different regional and national nodes of communication. This creation of new linkages has, however, been a rather slow although steady process involving investments in new international cables and after 1960 an increasing number of communication satellites. The crucial problem is therefore to explain how a slow and steady addition of links could lead to the phase transition that the world has witnessed in the late 1980's and the 1990's. In an explanation of similar phase transitions in biochemical structures the biologist Stuart Kauffman has used simulation techniques to show that a slow and steady random addition of links to a finite number of nodes will lead to a remarkable phase transition when the number of links exceeds half the number of nodes. While the size of the largest cluster of interacting nodes is rather small, when the number of links is relatively small, the size of the largest cluster will rise from less than 25 percent of the nodes to more than 75 percent of the nodes, when the number of random links only slightly exceeds half of the total number of nodes. The creation of new networks for communication thus tends to lead
to highly non-linear responses in terms of possibilities of interaction.

**Returns to Scale in the Communication and Cultural Industry**

There are different reasons for substantial returns to scale in different segments of the communication (including the arts and the entertainment) industry. Even a theatre and a concert hall, being classical nodes of communication, are examples of the economic problems associated with increasing returns to scale. A situation of increasing returns to scale can be simply defined as a situation where the total cost per unit of supply will be falling with an increasing volume of supply. A concert hall with an annual fixed cost of (say) ten million dollars and with its own associated symphony orchestra at a fixed cost of five million dollars would in this case, with an audience of 1000 persons, have a cost per person of 15,000 dollars. With an expansion of the number of persons served to 10,000 the cost per person would decline to 1,500 dollars and with a further tenfold increase of the public served, the cost would be reduced to 150 dollars and so on.

Indivisibility of production capacity is thus an important factor behind the increasing returns to scale in the supply of communication services. The economic problems associated with supply under conditions of increasing returns to scale are closely related to the level and density of demand. This is the reason why concert halls, theatres, ballet companies and opera houses tend to be much more frequent in large metropolitan areas than in the sparsely populated countryside. And it is also an explanation why—to the extent that such cultural communication activities exist in sparsely populated countries—these countries tend to use incomes from taxation to subsidise approved forms of arts and entertainment, as well as public radio and television stations.

The economies of increasing returns to scale associated with fixed equipment are further reinforced by the economies of scale associated with creative activities. In the creation of a fundamentally new cultural product, a theatre play, a film script, a new and dramatically improved method of recording or a new display technique, the cost of creative activity is often high and certain, while the probability of technical success is low and the willingness to pay of the public is fundamentally uncertain.
Financing Interaction Services

Increasing returns to scale, caused by indivisibilities, invariably leads to problems of pricing and marketing. The sunk costs are fixed and marginal costs are close to zero. This implies that any new unit of public (spectator, listener or communicator) will be of value, however little she or he is prepared to pay for the service. At any level of price for this service the marginal increase of revenue is larger than the marginal increase of cost (which by definition is close to zero). The optimal price would be such that it leads to full use of capacity. There is no guarantee that such a unitary price would generate revenues sufficient to cover the yearly cost. To solve this pricing problem, financing methods have three proposed ways.

The first, simplest and so far most popular procedure proposed is to set prices so as to reflect the marginal cost and then to force the population to pay for the fixed cost through compulsory licensing or taxation. This procedure is used to finance public radio and television, publicly owned theatres and concert halls, especially in Europe, museums, agoras and other public places of communication and entertainment. In many cases the practical interpretation of this principle has been to completely tax finance certain communication services. In other cases the prices charged directly to the consumers have been less than ten percent of the average cost, which is the case for pricing of tickets to opera and concert performances in the Scandinavian countries.

The second principle is to let the users of the communication system pay a membership fee corresponding to a reasonable share of the fixed cost and then to have a low user charge corresponding to marginal or variable cost of usage. This is a principle used by many of the new telecommunication companies, operating on deregulated telecommunications markets. This type of club-prices is particularly suited for such communication services, for which membership can be easily defined and more or less permanently applied.

The third pricing principle is sometimes called price differentiation and sometimes price discrimination. There are two forms of price discrimination. One relies on a predetermined and stable subdivision of the consumers into different easily distinguishable subgroups. It is thus common to skim the communication market by charging different prices for the services in different geographi-
Books have historically been sold in different editions at remarkably different prices in different geographical zones of the world. Other media products have more recently followed the same pattern.

It can be shown that the price charged in a geographically well separated market should be progressively higher above the marginal cost of supplying the product the less sensitive the consumers on that market are to price increases. What this means in practice is that the supplies must carefully analyse and estimate the expected price elasticity of demand before setting the price and only charge the price according to marginal cost at those geographical markets where the consumer would stop buying the product, if the price would be increased above marginal costs.

Price discrimination can also be used as a way of skimming the market for revenues if there is no such obvious division of the total market into easily separated sub-markets. First, business and coach class subdivisions are easily implemented if some snob value is associated with each one of these subdivisions, even if the service is uniformly given to all customers. Sometimes separation can be achieved by differentiating price according to time of the year, month, week, day and even time periods within each single day. The subdivision of total demand into different segmented demand categories will bring increases in the average revenue (or average price) charged for the service. But with each successive subdivision the marginal revenue of that subdivision will be lower. Meanwhile, the costs of implementing such subdivisions will be progressively increasing with an increasing number of subdivisions of the market. Thus, there is a limit to the net revenue of applying price discrimination.

The number subdivisions of the market is determined by the marginal revenue of further subdivision together with the marginal cost of keeping the increasing number of groups apart. The optimal degree of price discrimination in such a market is reached when the marginal cost of subdivisions equals the marginal revenue of dividing the market. This is the primary reason why most concert halls, theatres, telephone companies and other producers of communication services limit their price discrimination to a fairly small number of consumer categories (especially compared to the total number of consumers). If there were no cost of subdivision and if all consumers would have their own and different preferences the best way of
skimming the market would be to let each consumer pay a price according to his or her maximal willingness to pay for the service.

The Changing Spatial Pattern of Demand and Supply

The long-term tendencies in the public sector are quite universal. Although most economically developed countries have seen a remarkable growth of the public sector, in most cases out of proportion with the growth of general economic capacity, the public sector is universally facing the problem of increasing mobility of the objects and subjects of taxation. The combination of globalisation of capital and ‘voting with feet’ is forcing countries and regions into a strategy of reducing subsidies to communication and cultural activities and to search for alternative ways of financing the supply of these services. This will force public radio and television companies as well as news media and providers of arts, entertainment and other cultural services into two-part tariffs and different forms of price discrimination to generate the necessary revenues.

In this process there will obviously be a relocation of the supply of opera, ballet, theater and other arts and entertainment forms relying on live performances into the largest agglomerations of people, income and thus demand for these services.

The curse of economies of scale in the provision of cultural, entertainment and other communication services has triggered a search for alternatives to the large-scale provision in fixed locations. The most successful of these innovations has been the entertainment and art festival. The success of many of these festivals is to a large extent explained by the decreased cost of long distance travel. It is today and even more in the future possible for American and western European families of the middle income bracket to visit festivals in Salzburg, Bergen, Edinburgh or Savonlinna and there consume art and entertainment that would otherwise only be possible if the family was permanently relocated to cities like London, New York or Paris. Concentration of audiences in time has been an efficient substitute for concentration in space. The financial success of festivals has surprisingly turned out to be positively related with the visibility of the festivals and their programs in radio and television media. The loss of some part of the public, preferring the armchair and the TV seems to be overcompensated by the marketing effect of the increased feasibility of these festivals in TV or radio. One extreme example of such a television multi-

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plier effect is the New Year's concert by the Vienna Philharmonic. Similar interaction between different means of communication culture and entertainment can be illustrated with the festival tours of ‘The three tenors’ and some of the ‘Woodstock-type’ festivals in different parts of the world.

Creativity Versus Productivity

The productive organisation of industrial society and the industrial city is built on two foundations.

Foundation 1: The proper exploitation of the principle of ‘division of labour’ as explained in Adam Smith’s *The Wealth of Nations*. Let me quote his most prominent section:

To take an example, therefore, from a very trifling manufacture; but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the pin-maker; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them. I have seen a small manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could, when they exerted
themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth part of what they are at present capable of performing, in consequence of a proper division and combination of their different operations. (Smith, 1776)

Thus by specialising each individual on a few simple tasks, productivity can be raised to a four hundred-fold level, provided that the whole production process could be brought under one large factory roof. But the advantage of division of labour did not stop at this level. The British economist David Ricardo brought the idea further, claiming that the same principle could be used at higher level. Whole cities and countries could be specialised on the production of a few commodities for which the city or country would be comparatively most suited. The optimal organisation in space would be such that each city, region and nation would produce one, two or a slightly larger number of commodities to be exchanged by trade with other differently specialised cities, regions and nations. The ideally organised city would be like the car city of Detroit. The ideally organised region would be like the meat procuring state of Illinois and the ideal country would be like the oil producing Saudi Arabia.

This principle of division of labour or functional specialisation was finally established inwards in city planning and architecture according to functionalistic principles.

Foundation 2: All industrialising countries of the 19th century were created on an infrastructural arena of two dominating networks for transportation of raw materials, commodities, people and information. These two dominating networks were waterways with their ports and railroads with their railroad stations.
Both of these networks are subject to substantial *economies of large scale*. Only a few large ports with all facilities can be afforded and only a limited number of railroad lines can be constructed. And in an even smaller number of regions will these two networks converge, so that an integrated factory-port-railroad metropolis could become viable.

Such integrated industrial metropoles we find in Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Liverpool–Manchester, Bilbao and Philadelphia, to name a few typical examples. Much of especially popular literature, film and even music from the first half of this century have used trains, ships, railroad stations and harbour areas as sceneries of the stories told.

But these highly specialised industrial environments have rarely been places of cultural or other creativity as such. Cultural life and its institutions was to a large extent built on the same two principles: Division of labour and specialisation by arts education in musical conservatories, academies of painting and sculpture, specialised ballet schools and so on. Economies of scale and functional specialisation of the arts were exploited in the creation of large metropolitan opera houses, dramatic theatres, concert halls and so on, with specialised performances for an agglomerated mass of consumers.

Specialisation by division of labour did not breed creativity and social, cultural or technological inventions. The centres of creativity were thus located in the metropoles large enough and old enough to be diversified.

The industrial society is coming to an end. It took two centuries to complete the industrial race in Great Britain, one century in Japan and Sweden and an expected half a century in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. We are entering a new post-industrial stage of economic development. And we can increasingly clear see the contours of this new society, built on increasing complexity of its products, communication globally, and the exploitation of creativity and cognitive skills. I have used the term *C-society* to stress the simultaneous orientation toward Complexity, Communication, Creativity and Cognitive capacity as resources of the future.

The focus on creativity does not favour division of labour as realised already by Adam Smith in his critical comment to his own fundamental industrial principle:
In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests of his country he is altogether incapable of judging; and unless very particular pains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war. The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes him regard with abhorrence the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life of a soldier. It corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigour and perseverance, in any other employment than that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues.

But in every improved and civilized society this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to prevent it.

It is otherwise in the barbarous societies, as they are commonly called, of hunters, of shepherds, and even of husbandmen in that rude state of husbandry, which precedes the improvement of manufactures, and the extension of foreign commerce. In such societies the varied occupations of every man oblige every man to exert his capacity, and to invent expedients for removing difficulties, which are continually occurring. Invention is kept
alive, and the mind is not suffered to fall into that drowsy
stupidity, which, in a civilized society, seems to benumb the
understanding of almost all the inferior ranks of people.
(Smith, 1776)

Adam Smith realised that the productivity enhancing technique
was a threat to the creative powers of the individual and to society
as a whole. If ‘division of labour’, ‘specialisation according to com-
parative advantage’ and ‘functionalism’ are catchwords of the indus-
trial society, I would propose that ‘synergy of ideas’, ‘human
communication’ and ‘surprising complexity’ are catchwords of the
emerging C-society and its current and future creative metropoles.

**Fundamental and Variational Creativity**

The psychologist Margaret Boden has subdivided creativity into
two categories, encompassing the arts and the sciences. The first
category is fundamental or structural creativity. The second cate-
gory is derived or variational creativity. In the arts we have a multi-
tude of examples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Fundamental and structural creativity among musicians and artists</th>
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<tr>
<td>Monteverdi</td>
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<td>Bach</td>
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<td>Schönberg</td>
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<td>Alban Berg</td>
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<td>Adolf Loos</td>
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<td>Mies van der Rohe</td>
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There is no obvious qualification superiority of either category.
Both are needed. Creativity of category 1 can obviously emerge in
any location, while variational creativity breeds in an environment
that is highly communicative and synergistic socially and culturally.
Centres of Creativity and Their Communalities

There have been obvious centres of creativity through history—Miletos, Athens, Alexandria; Florence, Bruges and Amsterdam; London, Vienna and Paris; Milan, New York and Los Angeles. Can we learn anything from these examples? There are communalities as, among others, the following:

- Financial resources for the arts and sciences in combination with relaxed control of resource use. Mecenates are good for cultural creativity;
- Open-minded co-operation between individuals from different disciplines and ethnic groups;
- A widespread feeling of imbalances between different needs/demands/problems and the availability of solutions to these problems;
- Variability and complexity of the city architecture;
- Existence of attractive and accessible meeting places;
- Free trade in commodities, services, cultural goods, and information;
- Structural instability of institutions, knowledge and artistic paradigms.

These are necessary conditions of creativity of regions but by no means sufficient for the future. Creativity is easily constrained of even destroyed by policy makers.

Winner Takes All?

Two dimensions have to be considered in forecasting the future of cultural life and artistic creativity.

The first dimension has to do with the pronounced economies of scale due to the public (or collective) value of new ideas. Creativity breeds on scale of the market of the final cultural product and the synergies of a metropolis for the creative process itself. Realising a new concept like Francis Ford Coppola’s “Godfather” films (building upon Shakespeare’s fundamental ideas) required an enormous arena of artistic synergies in southern California and at the same time an enormous easily accessible market of viewers. It required the USA as a whole and Los Angeles in particular. The second dimension is the reinforced fall in cost of transport and distribution by expanding global electronic networks. The winner will eventually take it all when economies of scale in creativity and
marketing are combined with successively lowered costs of information transfer.

However, this is not the whole story. Every form of art and entertainment cannot exploit the advantage of distribution by global electronic networks. Some require the active interaction of creators, performers and public ‘in situ’. And these entertainment and art forms could potentially be thriving in the future if leisure time will continue to increase and if there would be a growing demand for participatory culture.

As a powerful counterforce to the global Sillywood syndrome we may see the emergence of metropoles with highly creative, participatory, improvising art forms, defying the possibility of mass consumption by electronic media. Places of such interactive culture would then be integrated into new networks of communication, exchanging creative culture by direct contact between individuals and groups of individuals.

Reference

Study Background and Aim

The paper reports results from a research project on the topic of culture, jobs and regional development with the aim to increase the knowledge of the contribution of culture to regional economic, and social, transformation. Three aspects of this process are focal.

The first aspect concerns the role of the cultural sector in regional development at large. Cultural activities are often conceived as being part of the public sector responsibilities, implying that the demand for cultural activity is not large enough for the sector to sustain without support from the public purse. However, if regarded in broad terms, the cultural sector contains both private and public parts. If properly delineated and defined, the sector will indeed have a role to play as an engine also in the creation of economic wealth in a region. Thus, the question of the study is to assess the economic importance of the cultural sector seen as an industry.

The study relates to both the supply of cultural production capacity in a region and the demand for culture, locally and regionally as well as externally. The ambition is also to address the question of the functioning of cultural production and consumption markets with their peculiar segmentations, networks and market-clearing dynamics. The culture industry contains small and medium sized enterprises with a high degree of innovation behaviour in their value-creating activities. They are often local and regional firms, involved in various stages of the value-added chain from primary production of cultural and artistic commodities to the final consumption of services which are often involved a global, dynamic, and very competitive market. The film and media industries are prime examples of this contemporary global phenomenon (see Vogel, 1998; Pine I, Gilmore & Pine II, 1999).

The second aspect covered in the study concerns the role of culture in public policies, public strategies, and public-private partnership for the formulation, and implementation of regional de-
velopment policy. One question here is whether a region can successfully specialise in cultural production in the same way as some regions have become university centres, centres for car production, or nodes for manufactured-goods distribution. It this is the case, maybe the cultural sector a candidate to solve some of the employment problems in metropolitan regions, and declining industrial regions of the Swedish settlement system. Following this line of argument, the question becomes how cultural development should be made an element of a strategy for regional development. The ultimate aim of the study is to further the knowledge necessary to support such possible planning and policy measures from the point of view of different actors involved.

The third aspect of the study concerns the development of the production factors for cultural development. The cultural activities under scrutiny will encompass both cultural services and cultural industries. It is often argued that cultural activity thrives in the creative region where there is a multitude of versatile activity niches and a population which contains subcultures exhibiting a taste for a broad range of established as well as avant-garde cultural activities (see for instance Andersson & Strömquist, 1988). The existence of a skilled labour force having positive attitudes towards the activities of the culture sector is another important production factor. Also, it is often argued that cultural dynamics is associated with special institutional and locational assets, and physical environments. The notion of a cultural environment is a shorthand way of expressing the contribution of both the socioeconomic and the built environment’s contribution to the viability of cultural production. The research in this part of the study aims to further the understanding of the location factors for cultural activity be they stable or dynamic, local or global, institutional or physical.

**Infrastructure and Cultural Development**

Traditionally, the location of workplaces has been closely related to location factors such as proximity to ports, rivers, natural resources and large input and output markets. Today the situation for many firms is different due to factors as technical change, and the increasing internationalisation of the economy. As one of the tangible results of this development we can also observe an increasing degree of mobility among firms. In many industries firms are no longer bound to particular geographical location, instead they seek
a production milieu which contains important environmental qualities for the firm. In this perspective a well developed and smoothly functioning infrastructure represents an increasingly important mean of competition. Therefore, the extent and quality of the infrastructure is of strategic significance for individual firms as well as for industrial networks, cities, regions, and nations.

The cultural industry is no exception to this general pattern. The mobile cultural events industry, for instance, will locate its production activity in the most accessible places in a national and international system of citites (see Snickars, 2000). Within a region it will strive to locate its production outlets, temporary or permanent, to a selection of the most accessible locations. There is also a tendency that activity environments are sought by the events industry, as well as many other segments of the cultural industry, which exhibit a cultural ambience. This ambience might well be present in modern urban districts and derelict urban environments alike. The crucial point of the argument is that for firms in the cultural sector the cultural infrastructure in the sense sketched is very important for the viability of the production activity.

Rejuventation of old industrial estates or other production environments in a city or region will often be paralleled with a gentrification process among firms in the cultural sector. Culture activities often tend to seek locations in the city, which are undergoing economic transformation (see Söderlind, 2000). One reason for this is simply their weak rent-paying capability. When the industrial estates are reconstructed this has often implied a complete demolition of the old building stock. This strategy of realising only the locational value of the estate may not be optimal in the new situation with an increased importance of the cultural industries for the economy of the city.

For some of the reasons discussed above, the value of cultural production can be seen as an important part of the social infrastructure of a city. This value is difficult to contain within individual property rights and it is often impossible to create functioning competitive markets for cultural transactions, even in metropolitan regions. This is basically why it is warranted to use the term infrastructure to denote its role. Cultural activities in the city create an open cultural landscape in the city in the same way that agriculture—besides food production—also creates an open cultural landscape in the countryside.
It has long been a well known fact that technical infrastructure is of vital importance as a basis for favourable regional development. Good transport and communication systems as well as well functioning water, sewage and energy systems are basic prerequisites in order for a place or a region to have good development possibilities. Similarly, there is also an extensive and well documented body of knowledge about the significance of proximity to subcontractors and access to qualified support services for firms in the choice of location. There is also evidence about the significance of higher education facilities and commercial services.

During recent years, with the support of research as well as practical experience, new insights have been achieved and knowledge has been developed concerning the significance of cultural and environmental factors in the choice of location. The experiences which have been gained indicate clearly that the latter factors play a very important role in determining the attractiveness of a place. By cultural factors we mean both the different forms of current cultural activities which are offered as well as the heritage and architectural qualities which characterise a place (see for instance Ashworth & Ennen, 1996). It is a central aim of the current study to develop the notion of culture as an infrastructure in the form of social capital, which underpins and supports social and economic development of cities and regions.

**Cultural Industries in the Stockholm Metropolitan Region**

The metropolitan region of Stockholm has essentially a polycentric structure with the City of Stockholm as the strongest player. The rest of the Mälar region can be said to constitute the hinterland of metropolitan Stockholm, see also figure 1. The ample availability of land in Sweden implies that the pressure is not as large on scarce land resources for urban development as in other European metropolitan regions. Lake Mälaren is an environmental asset, and a trade infrastructure, at the same time being the major supplier of drinking water to all the urban settlements in the area. For the moment there is no comprehensive physical plan that controls the future land-use in the region, which houses a number of small and medium-sized urban settlements. The hinterland of the Stockholm region used to be the core of the Swedish manufacturing industry.
The Stockholm metropolitan area is the most service-specialised functional urban region in the western part of Europe with more than three out of four jobs occurring in the private and public service sector, see also figure 2 on next page. Although being one of the largest urban regions in Europe, Barcelona still has a strong concentration of manufacturing activity. It can be noted that the three metropolitan regions have the common trait that they are located away from the core regions in Europe. They are all gateways regions to the south, north and east, respectively (see also Andersson & Andersson, 1999).

A number of research studies have been performed investigating the role of local entrepreneurship for regional development. Another branch of research focusses on the requisites for corporate environments, and cities, of being innovative and creative. The research on innovations has most often dealt with the manufacturing sector, having information technology as a nexus of interest. The idea here is to test a similar hypothesis for the culture industry. As a background to this analysis, the current section will provide some information of the role of the culture industry in the Swedish regions. In particular, the ambition is to show the peculiar role of the Stockholm metropolitan region in the culture industry.
The only reliable source of information is the detailed employment statistics, which are published yearly for detailed regional and sectoral classifications. This source holds information of the full pattern of employment in the economy both for the private and the public sector. The current registers in principle allow the tracing of the full pattern of employment for all individuals each year based on their tax declarations. Thus, if a person has had several sources of income during a year this can be covered. In the current case we have only used the sum of the employment held by each individual during a year. The culture industry is difficult to define since the industrial classification has not been developed with this sector in mind.

In the presentation of results below we will use the standard international classification system, in which the following sectors form the core, film production firms, film distribution firms, cinemas, radio and TV companies, artists, theatres, news agencies, gambling firms, and other recreation firms. In those analyses that
relate to the culture industries in the strict sense gambling firms and other recreational firms have been excluded. In the broad sense the sector had an employment level of some 25,000 jobs in 1997 whereas the amount was 18,500 in the strict sense. The City of Stockholm had some 73 percent of the region’s jobs in the broad definition of the culture industry and 83 percent in the narrow sense. The total number of jobs in the country in the broad definition was 75,000 and 42,500 or 56 percent.

Figure 3 shows the culture specialisation among Swedish municipalities in 1997 in the strict definition of the industry. Some 20 municipalities have a specialisation in cultural jobs more than double the national average. A majority of the municipalities in the uppermost segment of the specialisation hierarchy are found in the Stockholm metropolitan region with the City of Stockholm occupying the top position. Some 180 of the municipalities have a specialisation index of less than half of the national average. The number of jobs is insignificant in most of these local labour mar-

Figure 3. Culture specialisation in Swedish municipalities 1997 (national average = 1).
It may be noted that five municipalities have no jobs at all in the culture industry defined in the strict sense. They are all located in the northern and inland part of the country. The figure shows the skewed regional structure of the industry indicating that the culture sector is a specialised service sector, which belongs to the upper segments of the settlement system hierarchy.

Figure 4 illustrates the division of labour between the different parts of the Stockholm metropolitan region. It should be noted that we will use the term Stockholm metropolitan region to encompass the whole of the Stockholm region and its economic hinterland disregarding the subdivision into political jurisdictions. In operational terms this means that we have surveyed the industry in both Stockholm County and the four surrounding counties, extending some 200 km in north, west and south directions. When we use the term Stockholm County we refer to the jurisdiction at the county level. It has some 25 municipalities within it. Reference it made to the central municipality in Stockholm County as the City of
Stockholm. We will use the term Stockholm region broadly equivalent to Stockholm County.

The question raised is whether there is weak or strong intra-regional specialisation within the metropolitan region and which sectors exhibit the most distinct patterns. In figure 2 a specialisation index value of one means that the sector’s share of the total employment in the City of Stockholm is the same as the sector’s share in the rest of the metropolitan region. It turns out that only service industries have a specialisation index above one in the City of Stockholm with the postal services sector as the limiting one. The highest specialisation is in financial activities, printing and publishing, interest-based organisations, and culture industries.

Table 1 illustrates what industries are the most clustered ones at the municipal level in Stockholm County. The idea is to investigate whether the culture industry is one of those clustered industries. This does not turn out to be the case, however.

There are in fact 25 industries which have a location quotient relative to the Stockholm region as a whole of five or more. This clustered employment amounts to somewhat less than three per-

**Table 1. Location quotients for selected industries in the Stockholm region municipalities 1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Location quotient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>Nynäshamn</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone &amp; Clay</td>
<td>Värmdö</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper &amp; Pulp</td>
<td>Norrtälje</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>Södertälje</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Ekerö</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipyards</td>
<td>Sigtuna</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber &amp; Plastics</td>
<td>Nynäshamn</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>Södertälje</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
<td>Järfälla</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>Botkyrka</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>Norrtälje</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Upplands-Väsby</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Sigtuna</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>Norrtälje</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>Nynäshamn</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
cent of the possible industry-municipality combinations in the database. It is evident that the specialised industries are almost exclusively to be found in manufacturing. The transport service specialisation of Sigtuna reflects the location of Arlanda airport north of the city centre. The telecommunications specialisation of Nynäshamn, in the south, arises from the location of production facilities of the Ericsson corporation in that part of the region. The municipalities involved are almost exclusively to be found in the periphery of Stockholm County. In fact, the City of Stockholm has no peculiar specialisation profile at all when the analysis is performed at this detailed level of aggregation.

Innovation Potentials within the Stockholm Cultural Industry

One central question in this study is the level of innovation activities (product, process, organisation) and the variation of these across industries and regions. Such a study can further the understanding of what constitutes the innovation potential of a cluster of firms in the culture industry within a region or across regions. The idea pursued here is to accept the definitions of innovation used in earlier studies (Nutek, 1998; Fischer, Revilla Diez & Snickars, 2001) and apply these also to the culture industry. The hypothesis is that the culture industry can be regarded as any other service-producing industry both in its support to manufacturing firms in their innovation work and in its internally generated need for innovation.

Another question relates to furthering the empirical understanding of the innovation networks among a set of firms within a metropolitan region. It may be expected that a city or a region will house a number of activities which interact with each other at different geographical scales. Some of those interactions are associated with innovation activities while others are parts of normal business relations. The main dividing line that defines whether interaction is of innovative type concerns the degree of novelty for the actors involved. The innovation cycle is used as a conceptualisation of the different steps that any new activity embraces both for the user and the actors working with the user to supply new products or processes. The question then is in which sectoral and regional networks, and in what stages of the innovation cycle, the external firm networks become most important. A related question concerns the strength of the innovation networks between firms of different type, and the role of R&D institutions in the region and elsewhere this context.
An empirical study has been performed of the innovation potential and innovation networks in the Stockholm metropolitan region (sometimes called the Mälar region). The study is one component of an international study where the European regions of Vienna and Barcelona are compared to Stockholm (see Fischer, Revilla Diez & Snickars, 2001). In earlier phases of the Germany-based international research programme within which this study has been performed comparisons have been made of the innovation traits of a number of German and French regions. The current study has corresponding ones for old industrial regions and core regions of Europe. The three regions selected here belong to the economic periphery of Europe at the same time having strategic roles in their part of Europe.

The study of the regional innovation system in the Stockholm metropolitan region has involved all firms in manufacturing and business services with at least 10 employees in 1996. Furthermore, similar questions have been asked about innovation behaviour of all R&D institutions in the extended Stockholm region. Thus, it is possible to compare how firms belonging to the manufacturing sector, the business services sector, and the R&D sector look upon their roles in relation to other actors in the regional production system.

Figure 5 on next page provides a principle illustration of the conceptual framework of the innovation study. The study regards the innovation activities in a regional context to be placed within an intra-regional and interregional milieu consisting of other firms, suppliers, customers, competitors, and R&D actors. The environment also comprises the institutional setup in the form of legal and administrative frameworks as well as physical infrastructures. The framework in further developed in Fischer, Revilla Diez & Snickars (2001).

The sample of manufacturing firms includes some 450 establishments belonging to manufacturing firms (27 percent of the total number in the region), some 350 establishments within business services (26 percent) and some 175 R&D establishments (52 percent). The response rate has been set to allow statistical representativeness at a macro level but not to accommodate detailed analyses for subgroups of sectors and sub-regions. The collection of data from the R&D sector is among others a trait of the study for which it stands out from earlier work in the field.
In the Stockholm study that is reported here, a special role has been given to culture in the regional innovation systems in two principal regards. Firstly, the culture and media industries, as well as the finance and banking sectors, have been included among the business service sector, see also the list of sub-sectors from which answers have been received in the survey in table 2. The table can be seen to contain an operational definition of the composition of the culture and media industry used in the survey. Secondly, all firms and institutions have been asked to assess their contacts with culture and media industries, and to state the role of cultural activities and cultural environments as location factors and carriers of locational value to the innovation activities. The table reveals that the culture industry comprises film and media firms, artists and theatres, news agencies, as well as gambling and recreational firms. The main dividing line within the sector is between entertainment and classical culture. Internationally both parts are seen as important elements of the sector which is often termed the entertain-
ment industry or the experience industry (see also Vogel, 1998; Pine et al., 1999; Wolf, 1999).

Table 3 on next page shows the composition of the business services sector in the Stockholm metropolitan region while the table compares the structure of the cultural industry to the other firms in the business service sector. It is seen that the IT firms employed about the same number of persons as the culture and media industry in 1997 while the marketing and consulting firms make up the same employment share of the sector as a whole as those two sectors together. The whole business service sector is strongly concentrated to the Stockholm metropolitan region which a share more than double the one for the employment as a whole. Some 57 percent of the marketing and consulting firms in the country were found in the Stockholm metropolitan region measured in terms of employment in 1997. The corresponding numbers for the IT industry and the culture and media industry were 46 percent and one third, respectively. The other important observation is that the sec-

Table 2. Composition of sub-sectors among business services including a definition of the culture and media sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business service industries surveyed</th>
<th>Marketing and consulting firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IT firms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software consulting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer firms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software product firms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer service firms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Database hosts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other IT firms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and media firms</td>
<td>Corporate consulting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Film production firms</td>
<td>Architect offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Film distribution firms</td>
<td>Technical analysis firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinemas</td>
<td>Public relation firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio and TV companies</td>
<td>Advertising firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists</td>
<td>Home marketing firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theatres</td>
<td>Other marketing firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling firms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other recreation firms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

181
**Table 3.** Composition of the business services sector in the Stockholm region 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors and basic indicators</th>
<th>Number of jobs</th>
<th>Sector share (%)</th>
<th>Share of Sweden (%)</th>
<th>Share in Stockholm County (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IT firms</td>
<td>25 200</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing and consulting firms</td>
<td>74 600</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and media firms</td>
<td>25 200</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All business services</strong></td>
<td>125 000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All jobs</strong></td>
<td>826 000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.** Share of workforce in selected service industries in the Stockholm region with university education in 1997 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of firm</th>
<th>IT firms</th>
<th>Marketing and consulting firms</th>
<th>Culture and media firms</th>
<th>Business service firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm County</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of region</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm metropolitan region</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.** Firms with innovation share of total production costs more than five percent (percent of responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firms</th>
<th>Share of firms (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IT firms</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing and consulting firms</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and media firms</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All business services</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tors in question are also concentrated to the central parts of the Stockholm metropolitan region. Four out of five jobs in the sector are found in Stockholm County with a clear domination of the City of Stockholm. The concentration is highest for the IT firms.

Earlier studies at the national level have clearly indicated the connection between education, R&D and innovation (see for instance Nutek, 1998, for the case of Sweden. Table 4 shows that the education level is clearly lower for the average culture and media firm than for business service firms on average. Still, as many as one out of four employees in the culture industry had a university education in 1997. The education level is clearly highest in the IT firms. There are no significant differences between the central part of the Stockholm metropolitan region and the hinterland.

Culture has the same level of innovation intensity as the average business service firm, see also table 5. The sample size is too small for any stricter conclusion to be drawn. However, the empirical evidence shows that more than one third of the firms in the business service sector invest at least five percent of their production cost in innovation-related activities. The interesting thing about the table is that IT firms on average tend to have a more concentrated structure as regards the focus on innovations.

The culture industry has a lower share of firms participating in innovation activities than the rest of the firms in the sample as seen from figure 6 on next page. The figure illustrates the share of firms in the survey that have stated that they are engaged in three different forms of innovations.

Product innovation is more common as a development activity than organisation, market or process innovation. The pattern for the culture industry differs from that of the other business service firms in this respect. The marketing and consulting firms state that they perform somewhat more organisational innovations than the others while the IT firms are more often engaged in process innovations. None of these results deviate from what one might intuitively expect. It is noteworthy that the culture and media firms do engage themselves less in innovation activities than the rest of the firms. Some of the reasons for this might be that innovation is a less common concept used among these firms to focus on transformation processes. They see these activities more often in terms of creative and shaping processes.
Figure 6. Share of firms participation in various forms of innovation activities (percent).

Figure 7. Share of firms in the business services sector involved in innovation cooperation by character of customer (percent).
Innovation Networks within the Stockholm Culture Industry

The culture industry is a networking industry as most other parts of the business service sector. The networks do not only relate to innovation processes but also to ordinary business relations. If, for instance, an IT consultancy firm sells computer systems to a company they will circumscribe these activities with a series of service offers. The general tendency is for the service firms to become more involved in networking for these, and other related, reasons.

Figure 7 is intended to give a picture of the role of the three broad macro sectors as partners in innovation work with the business service sector. The pattern of co-operation is similar among all categories of business service firms as regards contacts with R&D institutions. The co-operation pattern is very similar for the culture and media firms and the marketing and consulting firms. IT firms are more intensive in networking, which is in line with that sector’s role as a provider of communication opportunities.

The co-operation in networks of innovation is concentrated to different stages of the innovation cycle. The definition into stages follows the research literature on innovations in manufacturing (Fischer, Revilla Diez & Snickars, 2001). The first three phases of the cycle belong to the non-competitive stage whereas the other three involve competition between firms. Figure 8 on next page shows the networking of firms in the business service sector in different stages of the innovation cycle.

We see from the figure that networking is most intensive in the early stages of the cycle. The patterns is somewhat different for IT firms than for the marketing and consulting firms, and the culture and media firms. IT firms seem to stay involved in later stages of the cycle, following the clients well into the competitive stage of the innovation cycle. This is again a reflection of the crucial role played by IT in innovation activities at large in the Stockholm metropolitan region. Even though the pattern is not quite clear one can draw the tentative conclusion that firms in the culture industry are as involved in innovation activities with clients in the first stages of the cycle. The involvement tends to decline faster for those firms than for other business service firms in the region.

The firms in the business service sector in the Stockholm metropolitan region have been asked to state the major hindrances they
Figure 8. Firms in the business services sector involved in innovation co-operation by character of activity in different stages of the innovation cycle (percent).

Figure 9. Background factors for the initiation of innovation cooperation in different firms in the business services sector (percent).
see towards innovation activities that they would like to pursue. For the average firm in the sector the lack of skilled labour in the primary bottleneck with the IT firms giving that a higher score than the rest. It is interesting to note that the second most important hindrance is the lack of capital. Here it seems that the culture and media firms feel larger difficulties than the others. Culture and media firms mainly lacks capital. It might also be noted that relatively few firms state that co-operation with other firms, or with R&D institutions, is a major hindrance for their innovation activities. At least for the R&D institutions this result is partly a reflection of the fact that the contacts with R&D institutions are less prevalent in the first place.

Figure 9 shows that culture firms are more customer-related than average in their use of earlier contacts for current innovation work. The figure contains the summary results of responses to the question which background factors have been most important for the current innovation activities of the firm. It is seem that the pattern is similar across the three segments of the business service sector. Around one third of the firms state that they are using networks created during studies or research while around one fourth of them state that contacts generated with earlier employers is important. Some 35 percent of the firms say that they have generated the innovation ideas together with their current network of customers. For the culture and media firms one can broadly say that the firms out of five state that the background for current innovation activi-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IT firms</th>
<th>Marketing &amp; consulting firms</th>
<th>Culture &amp; media firms</th>
<th>All business service firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of capital</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessment</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of skilled labour</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result implementation</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with firms</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with R&amp;D</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 10. Positive factors for the establishment of innovation co-operation in different subsectors of business services (percent).

Figure 11. Share of innovation partners in different sub-regions for various components of the business services sector (percent).
ties are networks that have stayed on from earlier education, research or customer contacts while two firms out of five say that the generate the ideas primarily with their current customers. The policy observation is that the role of the personal history of the employees seems to be larger than one would expect.

This picture is complemented by the information contained in figure 10 where we list some factors which the firms have seen as positive components for the current innovation co-operation. The first observation is that spatial proximity is regarded as a less important factor for the network creation than the other ones. Even if the spatial factor is not so important it seems that face-to-face contacts are. Such contacts can of course be upheld even at longer distances, for instance, in conjunction with conferences, fairs and exhibitions, and most importantly in the direct contacts with customers. The firms also mention that a similar sectoral knowledge and equal qualifications are important factors for the emergence of innovation co-operation. The latter factor has a relation to the result presented above that contacts established earlier in the career are important.

When comparing across the sub-sectors of the business service industry it seems that the patterns are relatively similar. It may be noted that the sectoral knowledge is assessed to be somewhat more important for culture and media firms that for the others. Also, the respondents in that sub-sector tend to place somewhat less emphasis with the importance of equal qualifications. On the other hand they judge face-to-face contacts to be more important than the other firms. The picture that emerges from this analysis is that the flow of information is a positive factor for the chance that innovation co-operation will emerge. Spatial proximity as such is not regarded as a crucial factor. On the other hand contacts between persons seems to carry more weight.

Figure 11 illustrates that the networks of culture firms are more Stockholm-oriented than the business services average. Two out of three contacts in innovation work are taken with firms in the Stockholm metropolitan area. The share of contacts in other countries varies somewhat between sub-sectors and is largest for the culture and media firms. Those firms have much fewer contact partners in the rest of Sweden than the other firms. The results are of course partly a reflection of the location of the supply of partners. Bigger regions house more potential partners than smaller regions.
The result that the IT industry is more locally oriented than the other firms is somewhat surprising at first sight. It is a reflection of the high market demand for services provided by those firms in their home market.

Figure 12 indicates that the culture and media firms have approximately the same number of innovation partners as IT firms whereas the marketing and consulting firms have a somewhat broader network of partners. The average IT or culture and media firm will on average be involved in innovation work with eight partners, with somewhat less than half of them in the Stockholm metropolitan region.

The marketing and consulting firms, on the other hand, have on average 12 partners of which six are located in the Stockholm metropolitan area. Even if one can suspect that the business service firms have had some difficulty in clearly defining what contact partners they have for their innovation work from the contacts they have with firms involving so-called normal business relations, the results indicate a network-oriented business service industry in the Stockholm metropolitan region. The number of innovation partners will need to be reasonable for there to come out a large enough flow of marketable products since the success rate will normally be relatively low.
Culture as Infrastructure for Innovation Activities in the Stockholm Region

The metropolitan innovation potential is only partly determined by factors internal to the firms and institutions involved in the innovation activity. One of the external factors is hypothesised to be the nature of the innovation networks, and other networks, to which to firm or institution belongs. According to this argument, the networks transfer positive externalities thus increasing the innovation potential, which in the longer run lead to enhanced economic growth through an increased frequency of innovation. The theory applies both to the manufacturing sector, which has traditionally been seen as the major carrier of innovation potential and to the service industries of the new economy, which are nowadays seen as major carriers of economic growth potential. The theory of national innovation systems considers mainly sector-specific factors as important in this context. The innovation potential then lies within a cluster of economic activity, which includes the firms, the labour they use, and the institutional structure in which they operate. Institutions differ across nations, and so does the competence given to labour through the educational system.

The approach of metropolitan innovation systems argues that regional factors are necessary to explain the differences in the innovation potential among economic sectors. The economic development occurs in space, and the metropolitan regions are major actors in the economic development game. The metropolitan regions differ in their capacity to act as incubators for innovation (see for instance Capello, 2000). These differences have been measured in the survey using a number of environmental indicators. One particular type of indicator has been formed by asking the respondents to grade the qualities of the region according to a set of predetermined environmental factors. The factors are intended to measure the quality of supply factors in the metropolitan environment relating to capital, labour, manufacturing networks, manufacturing producer service networks, R&D networks, other innovation networks, infrastructure factors, and factors relating to public sector activities in the promotion of industrial development.

Figure 13 on next page provides a summary of the results of this analysis focusing on the differences and similarities of firms and R&D institutions. The question addressed is how the different actors perceive one another as producers of positive externalities,
Figure 13. Ranking of the quality of a set of environmental factors in the Stockholm metropolitan region for innovation in manufacturing firms, producer service firms and R&D institutions (average grading using a five degree scale).

how highly they value the quality of the urban infrastructure in the metropolitan region, both hard and soft, and how they assess the performance of the public sector in various respects. The intention is to provide guidance in the selection of policy to boost the potential of the region in serving as an efficient environment for innovation. The figure does not show how highly the respondents value
the factors relative to one another but how they rank the performance of the Stockholm metropolitan region as an environment for innovation in the selected aspects (a five degree scale has been used).

The most distinguishing feature of the results presented in figure 13 is that industry and university perceive the quality of the environmental factors quite differently. For the R&D institutions the most highly valued assets of the metropolitan region are factors related to the supply of academic competence and the functioning of academic networks. They value the hard and soft infrastructure factors in the region higher than the manufacturing respondents. They are somewhat more positive to the activities performed by public agencies in the promotion of university-industry linkages.

The second distinguishing feature of the results is that the average grading is not higher than in the order of two in the five-degree scale. This indicates that the respondents have not seen a reason to praise the Stockholm region as an innovative environment to the extent that one would maybe anticipate. Of course, the grading is relative and depends on expectations. It is warranted to interpret the result to indicate that the respondents feel that the region is not performing up to its full potential. A benchmark for that would have been to see the average being raised from around two to at least the middle of the five-degree scale. It should be noted that the fact that the scale is relative and refers directly to expectations means that it is difficult to compare the results with other regions in Europe.

The third distinguishing feature of the results is that the producer service firms grade the environmental factors more positively in several important dimensions that the manufacturing firms. Since the manufacturing firms are more prevalent outside of the core of the metropolitan region this might be seen as an indication that the supply quality is not a well developed in the periphery as in the core. For the producer service firms both the supply of customers and providers of intermediary inputs are highly graded. Apparently, the Stockholm metropolitan region provides ample opportunity for them to find new customers, and choose appropriate suppliers of intermediate products.

It is a fourth distinguishing feature of the results that all respondents give high grades to both the hard and the soft infrastructure factors. The variations are realistic with due notice taken of
the differences between the respondents. The cultural factors are seen as well developed as the transport and communications ones. One might also notice that the respondents have given relatively low grades to the institutional infrastructure factors as innovative networks, and R&D capacity. One explanation might be that firms and institutions see these factors mainly as sectoral ones, operated and influenced mainly by national innovation actors rather than being a part of the metropolitan environment. Again, the results here show that there is a rather distinct barrier between industry and university. Firms do not grade the quality of the contacts with the universities at all as highly as the contacts with customers and suppliers.

The fifth and final distinguishing feature of the results in figure 11 is the low rating of public activities relating to innovation from the point of view of both industry and university. It might be noted that the manufacturing firms have the least good to say about the supply of public counsel, public support to firms, and public efficiency. This could be interpreted as a signal that the activities of the public sector are too national in character. Firms in the metropolitan region might not have enough experience from cooperating with public agencies so that the assessment is based on more general expectations.

The results of the comparison of the valuation of environmental factors are important in that they further emphasise the results of other parts of the survey pointing at the lack of knowledge about the other actors in the metropolitan region. The result that one actor, for instance the R&D institutions see their contacts in a different way than the firms with which they co-operate is also clear from responses to questions on co-operation in different stages of the innovation cycle. It is evident also from responses to questions concerning hindrances to co-operation between university and industry.

Maybe one of the main contributions from a study as the current one then is to point at these differences in anticipations and expectations. It is as if the actors in the region are not fully aware of the qualities that their co-operation activities have given to the region as an infrastructure system and incubator for urban innovation (see also Capello, 2000).
Concluding Remarks

The study reported here has a distinctly empirical orientation. The main thrust of the analysis has been to test the hypothesis that the culture industry firms are, in a broad sense, as innovative as the average business service firm. Of course, the analysis is limited by the fact that the sample of firms in the survey is relatively small. Therefore, the analysis has not at all dealt with the differences and similarities between firms within the culture industry. Also, the study is explorative in the sense that we have not performed any formal hypothesis testing. Neither have we penetrated deeply into the causal links between the activities of the firms in the culture industry and the role that culture plays as a location factor and soft infrastructure for the Stockholm metropolitan economy at large. The study should be seen as an initial explorative attempt to further the understanding of the structure of the culture industry in the region as regards a factor that is often seen as being of central importance for the economic development in the region, viz the innovation potential and innovation networks.

We may summarise the results of the study in a few conclusions, which are set at a level where it is reasonable to assert that they hold for the culture industry as such and not only for the sample we have happened to gether in the survey. The picture that emerges is that the culture and media industry has reasonably similar characteristics as other business service firms, which is a result that might be somewhat surprising in view of the relatively low level of attention that innovation work in these firms has in public policy.

- The innovation-intensive firms in the culture and media industry spend at least as much on innovation as the other business service firms.
- Culture and media firms have a higher share of product innovations than the rest of the business service sector.
- Culture and media firms co-operate with other firms and R&D institutions in the same fashion as other business service firms.
- About two out of five of the innovation activities of the culture and media industry arise from contacts with customers while the remaining share has the origin in earlier contact networks.
- The culture industry uses approximately the same number of partners in their innovation work as the IT industry.
The innovation networks of the culture industry extend beyond regional and national borders to a higher extent than the average business service firm.

Cultural activities, and the built urban environment—the cityscape—of the Stockholm metropolitan region are stable infrastructure factors across manufacturing firms, business service firms, and research institutions in their innovation work. Culture functions as a soft infrastructure as is valued as highly in the region as the classical hard infrastructure factors as transport and communication supply. This is a result of the study, which is definitely worth conveying as an input to policy-makers in the Stockholm region. The likelihood is high that the conclusions also hold for other regions in the country.

**References**


Future Perspectives
**Background**

This volume of papers that I have been asked to reflect upon is a step in a process to stimulate scholars from various backgrounds to involve themselves in research, which is broadly relevant to issues of cultural policy. My own background in anthropology, research policy and planning, interdisciplinary efforts, and international research co-operation prompts me to place my contribution in a somewhat broader context. They are perspectives, which in my view ought to be raised in the research work ahead.

I am not alone in observing that there is an increasing interest in the broader society to understand and deal with cultural problems and promote cultural creativity—generally and within the sector of cultural policy. This creates opportunities as well as new responsibilities for scholars of culture. It calls for a serious dialogue between researchers, policy makers and members of civil society, increased contributions of cultural research, and greater political and financial support for these efforts.

The increased centrality of culture does not leave culture itself—or cultural research for that matter—untouched. The whole cultural field is simultaneously affected by trends towards politisisation, commercialisation and technologisation. If leading economists, state-officials and scientists begin to see culture as the societal basis of the fundamental goals of human development, culture will be increasingly conceived in strategic monetary or technocratic terms. Culture becomes regarded as a means of managing conflicts or enhancing integration, a form of capital to be accumulated or a generic resource to be bred. The process of culturalisation of society thus encounters another process of instrumentalisation of culture, and each of the two affects the other. This in turn gives rise to new problems to perform research on and also makes such research problematic in new ways. One challenge will be to focus on issues of concern and relevance for cultural policy.
without losing sight of the wider cultural dimension of reality, in which these are imbedded.

In its broadest sense culture is the dimension of meaning in and of life. At the same time it is used to describe a specific sector in society—the world of the arts, literature, music, theatre and the media and related fields. The first covers culture as an aspect—indeed the essence—of all human interaction, the second denotes a sector of specific expressive activities and to some extent a field of governmental or otherwise sponsored support. Both are closely related. It is precisely within the broader dimension of culture accompanying and informing all human action that certain cultural preferences are selected as being so meaningful and important that individuals, groups, communities and states in all societies are willing to devote collective energy and resources in support of them. This gives rise to a special cultural domain of creative, expressive and communicative activities for which a more restricted definition of culture as sector can be applied. Such an understanding ought to be the basis also for research on problems encountered in matters of interest for cultural policy.

Some Snapshots from the Volume

In the current volume important statements are made, questions raised and worries shared. I will only telegraphically identify some of the issues raised as a background for some reflections on cultural research which I argue are important also for efforts to broaden and deepen research relevant to the planning and implementation of cultural policies.

Tony Bennett analysed the specific relationship between culture and governance that he circumscribes as the field of cultural policy, and Carl-Johan Kleberg made constructive comparisons between the environmental movement and what needs to be done in what he called the third phase of cultural policy. Geir Vestheim took the discussion to the arena of power, rapid structural changes, and problems of accommodation and adaptation that these factors place on cultural policies. With guidance from Stefan Bohman we discussed issues of appropriation of and competition between different types of cultural heritages and Karin Becker demanded that cultural policy research analyse the political processes within the cultural and cultural policy fields, which could help us to understand, among other things, the culture of cultural politics. The pos-
sible connections between regional cultural policy interventions as a means to stimulate creativity were explored, and doubted, by Sverker Sörlin. He suggested that such creativity is much more dependent on the fine and complex mechanics of existing competencies evolved in specific historical circumstances, than on any combination of prefabricated institutional boxes.

Svante Beckman attacked the myth that defining culture, and the field of cultural policy within it, is a hopeless undertaking or, at best, a Sisyfian task. He suggested that we orient ourselves and identify what we are talking about through a situation-analysis approach combining the focus on culture as object and culture as social relations with the contexts and the levels of cultural manifestations and that we distinguish between ‘fat’ and ‘meagre’ descriptions. Bruno Frey advised us that from the perspective of the economists an important challenge is how to ‘culturise’ economy and economists rather than to ‘economise’ culture by analysing cultural expressions, policies and outcomes solely or mainly in economic terms. Åke E. Andersson and Folke Snickars touched on the complex issue of instrumentality and argued that culture, in the culture policy sense, with its ‘soft’ infrastructure provided overarching utilities without which social, economic, political and technological planning and projects would go astray in the knowledge society in general and the creative region in particular.

Against the background of such issues I will now briefly touch on some of the broader concerns that are behind them or which they give rise to.

**Cultural Research and the Field of Science and Technology**

We need to critically compare the field of cultural research and its ‘social standing’ with that of the field of science and technology. Such an exercise reveals a fundamental problem of parity, or rather imparity. It also lays bare destructive misconceptions of the relationships between the two pursuits of knowledge and conceals their mutual interdependence.

With considerable oversimplification it can be argued that while the sciences deal with phenomena and problems that belong to the ‘given’, i.e. nature, the cultural and social scholars are focusing on what is ‘man-made’, i.e. aspects of the production of human creativity (Janlert & Jonsson, 2000). The latter gives rise to three major
fields for socio-cultural inquiry. Humans produce organisations and societies that are expressions of a structural-functional ordering of human relations. These are the acres of social science. To these we have to add the fields where the humanities and cultural researchers explore how people order their lives, activities and relationships through a logico-meaningful creation and integration, which finds expression in pyramids, poetry and lifestyles and myriads of other things. Thirdly, through similar cultural creativity, the given is interpreted and reconstructed so that even our natural environment no longer remains solely the given but what humans make it to be.

Viewed from these grand perspectives it is obvious that cultural research—rather than entertainment for the privileged—is a necessity of the same dignity as the project of the sciences. The hard conclusion of this argument for scientific parity that must be drawn is that cultural research, which explores the creation, maintenance and transmission of human realities, belongs in the same league as science and technology. That, in spite of this fact, both the sponsors and the enactors of cultural research today seem willing to accept a downward classification to the lowest level in the science series, is in the long run a dangerous mistake.

On the Issue of Relevance of Research

Any call for involvement of cultural researchers in analysis of policy issues, gives rise to questions on the relevance of research. However, at the same time this is a concept that has become semantically as well as politically tarnished generating either misunderstandings or knee-jerk reactions.

Any human action—including research—is obviously relevant for some kind of purpose. What is important is to articulate its relevance in terms of fundamental and justifiable values. Here declarations of human rights can provide guidance for the identification of relevance either articulated by researchers or by people and organisations outside of the research community. However, there is a significant difference between political, social or any such similarly defined relevance and what may be termed value-relevance. The latter has to be convincingly argued on the basis of human rights or otherwise justified on ethical grounds. Examples of such cultural research would be programmes aiming to contribute to reduction of poverty, inequalities, discrimination, social exclusion, conflicts,
violence and other injustices and for the strengthening of social participation, democracy, justice, equality, health, and security.

One common misunderstanding is the view that value-relevance negatively affects the theoretical calibre of a research undertaking. Such opinions might come in handy if one wants to be evasive and avoid involvement. They are nevertheless wrong. Declared ambitions of value-relevance must not only be ethically justified. They must be pursued through a scientific endeavour of high theoretical and analytical quality, which can create linkages between scientific abstraction and concrete human experience, which are convincing and credible for the people involved. If such standards are not upheld, the criteria of relevance not only become empty but also harmful.

The Need to Mobilise Research for Shaping Policies

Cultural policy originally grew out of identification of and concern for the conditions within the cultural sector—basically defined as the arts, and later the media, and the professionals working within these branches. Today the challenges, the opportunities and the responsibilities of cultural policy are changing and broadening. That is the basic message in the report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, Our Creative Diversity (1996) and in the Stockholm Plan of Action produced by the International Conference for Cultural Policies for Development, The Power of Culture (1998). Culture can no longer only or mainly be restricted to the opera-house or gallery kind, but must be looked upon and treated as a basic driving force behind human behaviour. The transition of many societies into a post-industrial phase has also changed and in many cases expanded cultural interests, stimulated expressive behaviour, affected the scope and size of the cultural sector and created new demands on societies, their governments, and on cultural policy.

In addition there is a growing understanding of the deficiencies in the mainly economic perception of reality that has dominated the political discourse and development ideology for the last half-century and which, generally, has ignored the dimension of meaning and culture. The understanding is spreading that a key territory in which development has to happen is the space of the mind; that significant causes of, for instance, environmental degradation and ecological damage are located in lifestyles. The dimension of
meaning and culture—which has become a casualty of one-sided technological and economic planning—is as important and as real as the physical and organisational dimensions of society.

At the same time, culture must not be regarded as a good in and of itself. Cultural traditions as well as professionally ‘produced’ culture can be destructive and unethical from the standpoint of the universal values of human rights and environmental respect. We only need to remember the abuse of cultural policies by dictatorships, not least in Europe, to realise that culture—isolated from ethical considerations—risks becoming as misused, as divisive and as dangerous as have been race and racial policies.

In research, advocacy, and mobilisation of culture in human development, much can be learned from Rachel Carson and her followers in the environment movement. They managed to combine a holistic understanding of the environment with scientific precision and a deeply ethical perspective and thus helped to transform the meaning of our natural habitat from something to be conquered and exploited to something to be respected, nursed and protected and where necessary regenerated. The same responsibilities of knowing, ‘giving voice to’, protecting and where necessary re-creating our cultural environment, must become major priorities both for cultural policies and for the research necessary to underpin and guide these policies.

It is obvious that research of relevance to cultural policies will be very different depending on broader cultural environments in which these are formulated. In Sweden cultural policy so far has concentrated on activities “within the realms of literature, stage, visual arts, music, cultural heritage and media such as radio and television” (Kungl. Maj:t:s Proposition 1974:28, p. 287). Later architecture and design have been added. This has served well as a basis for action so far. However, with the changes proposed by the Stockholm Plan of Action, the nature and scope of the cultural policy area need to be reconsidered.

In this context it is important to note that Our Creative Diversity takes the broader, anthropological definition as its point of departure. This is a milestone in culture policy planning. The Stockholm Plan of Action, which adopts the same approach and is quite explicit on what the goals for a new cultural policy ought to be, however, is weak in drawing conclusions on what this would mean for the new territory of cultural policy. The challenge now is to ana-
lyse what the consequences of such a view are, and for this we need research.

**State and Market**

There are other reasons for intensified research into culture and cultural policy. Today—as always—the world is changing. As in many other fields of social life the role of the state and its various institutions has changed, although the state is still of great consequence for cultural activities and the cultural policies in a country.

It is fairly clear from the ongoing debate on the relative role of the state and the market that both are essential, but that neither can be the prime mover in the betterment of the human condition. The role of the state might need to be reoriented and made more effective. This does not mean that it should be seriously weakened or eliminated. Without a revitalised, and resourceful democratic state and the political commitment of its elected representatives and its government institutions, health for all, education for all, equality between genders and access to and participation in cultural creativity will remain utopian.

Another rationale for such efforts is that the state is a main protector of cultural diversity. States are also crucial as (potential) guardians and enforcers of human rights. On the other hand the state is also a formidable obstacle to the formulation of shared values and a threat to cultural diversity by ignoring its own cultural minorities or immigrants and in its maintenance of national interest as superior to human interests.

At the same time, such discipline and efficiency as the market can bring, should also be mobilised for cultural policy purposes. But most importantly the citizens themselves must be enabled or allowed to become the engines of action and change. The political, legal and administrative systems of the state must consequently be reorganised to provide an environment which facilitates their participation and own efforts, enlisting the help of voluntary agencies, professional expertise, culturally competent research and where possible and feasible of the market as well. Capacity building is needed.

Furthermore, we need to remind ourselves of other, often dramatic, changes which are taking place and which also affect the field of cultural policy. Cultural differences are being dramatised through political rhetoric and action. Existing disparities—educa-
tional, religious, economic and political—are being cast in cultural and ethnic terms. The ‘others’, be they immigrants or ethnic minorities, are being portrayed as protagonists instead of partners, representing obstacles instead of opportunities. The focus has moved from tolerance and co-operation towards exclusion and boundaries. We need a new phase of cultural policies, in line with the thinking articulated in the World Commission report, the Council of Europe project study, and the Stockholm conference. For this we need to develop new knowledge, new methods of working and new partnerships, not least with research and researchers. To this end we must also strive to overcome some further obstacles that seem to hamper such co-operation.

**World-Views of Policy Planners and Students of Culture**

There are often broad and deep cultural differences between students of culture and economists. As the latter have been dominant in the development debate and work, the former have in general opted out. This reflects a fundamental cleavage between a mainly positivistic and mechanistic tradition in economics, which places high value on methodologies and instrumentality, and humanistic and cultural studies, which emphasise meaning, context and interpretation. It is easy to understand some of the despair in the cultural camp stemming from the political dominance of the economics camp in society and development. But, and here our arguments have to be sharpened and also directed towards the community of cultural scholars, the answer to the problem is not to withdraw from the battleground, but to foster courage and commitment to critique and participate in reshaping the distorted paradigmatic foundations of a one-sided development ideology.

There is sometimes fear that co-operation between cultural scholars, policy makers and politicians will lead to oversimplification, discrimination and sins of commission even more damaging than the sins of omission that occur by not taking cultural research into account. There may also be apprehensions that, whatever the efforts to promote cultural research, such understanding and competence would have little impact on the convictions and interests of the dominant and powerful alliance of economic and political stakeholders. Experiences tend to justify such misgivings. Brief comments on cultural matters are usually invited to introduce
planning documents and sometimes figure as ‘background noise’ in official evaluations. In both cases such contributions are usually regarded as being of little consequence.

Such statements lead to perceptions that cultural information and analysis is used as decoration rather than as a meaningful tool. To this should be added the sheer difficulty of specifying the ways in which cultural research can contribute to policy choices and what types of cultural knowledge and normative qualities, that such policy analysis ought to contain. The remedy would however not be to further withhold the cultural competence, which is required for a culture sensitive approach to social development. That would only help to pave the way for, or maintain, the view that culture can be treated as a bunch of limited and dependent ‘cultural variables’, to be thrown in as yeast after the dough. Instead a strengthened and sharpened ‘cultural argument’, which in itself has great theoretical and ethical strength, must be articulated and brought to bear to change prevailing distortions and oversimplifications in politics and societal planning. The research community faces a double challenge. Based on a humanist credo it must involve itself in an ongoing discussion of values and aspects of professional performance and quality. At the same time it must strengthen its commitment and ability to provide a constructive cultural critique of policies and politics that can help to reduce oversimplifications and convenient, ready-made approaches. If successful, this will also strengthen the respect for the voices of people, including minorities, their cultures and human rights.

**Culture for Human Rights, Democracy and Sustainable Development**

Culture should not be regarded as a good in and of itself. Many cultural traditions are destructive and unethical from the standpoint of the universal values of human rights and from the environmental respect. Isolated from ethical considerations, culture risks becoming as misused, as divisive and as dangerous as the concept of race has been. In addition, in many parts of the world, the promotion of culture has been badly handled by dominant political forces. Although globalisation undoubtedly has had some positive effects, the cultural erosion accompanying globalisation of communication and economic life is perceived as a negative and often threatening development by people and nations in all conti-
ents. The corruption of cultural belongings and values in conflicts ranging from discrimination of immigrants to ethnic cleansing and genocide are other instances of the darker side of culture and the boundaries that it can create.

In a world where culture thus is increasingly becoming politicised, it is understandable to find hesitation among researchers against involvement. Compared to earlier generations of researchers, there are however today new factors—indeed instruments—which should help to overcome such hesitation and mobilise researchers to participate in broad spectrum of advocacy, mobilisation, research and practice. The new situation and the accompanying opportunities and responsibilities have been created through global negotiations and agreed conventions on human rights. These instruments provide important ethical reference points for research and at the same time protection against political and cultural corruption of research. This has radically altered the basis for both research and the involvement of cultural researchers in societal matters.

In addition, through ratification processes of different kinds, states have not only accepted human rights as binding rules. They have in reality pledged themselves to undertake something much more comprehensive. The United Nations' Human Rights Commission has established that ratification entails a series of necessary obligations, namely to recognise, respect, promote, protect, implement and fulfil all the stipulations of the human rights conventions adopted. According to this, it is no longer enough to respect and protect rights. The obligations cover also the larger responsibilities to improve and disseminate knowledge, strengthen and mobilise political will, build competence and capacity—individually and institutionally—in order to translate and implement the human rights norms into social practice, and thus fulfil their intentions in letter and spirit. Analysing the implications of these challenges and building the knowledge base for such efforts will require the commitment and participation of cultural research in the future.

Viewed in this light, it is no longer sufficient to explore and analyse how the socially and culturally ‘normal’ is transformed into the ‘normative’, and how these two spheres interact, although this will still continue to remain an important task. In addition, we need also to learn more about how the normative (human rights) can be
transformed into normal social, political and cultural practice towards gender equality, democratic governance, poverty reduction, health and relevant education, social and national security, conflict resolution and peace, and last but not least responsible market behaviour.

**A National and International Research Agenda**

To face up to the many and diverse responsibilities that have been exemplified above, the organisation and financing of cultural research has to be improved through the strengthening of research co-operation and the promotion of an effective division of labour making use of comparative advantages and competencies within the research community. A vital part of such efforts is to develop a workable research agenda.

Researchers and politicians together managed in *Our Creative Diversity* to present a new view of the situation of the world that resulted in the political demand for recognising and respecting culture’s role in development. This found expression in the Stockholm Plan of Action, which also called on the community of researchers to assist in building the base of knowledge required to inform and energise action in the cultural field. Among other things, there are urgent needs for comparative and generalised analyses and for new forms of research co-operation that these will require. Increasingly, cultural scholars must also engage in dialogue with people in society and their governments, politicians, agencies and organisations of civil society.

The term research agenda is used in the Stockholm Plan of Action as a comprehensive notion to cover something much more than negotiating and preparing some document containing compiled ‘wish-lists’. It mainly refers to a process, which can generate a series of recommendations relevant for specific contexts and separate cultural, developmental and culture policy concerns. Some examples of different categories of research to be considered are given here. It goes without saying that the categories are mentioned here only as illustrations of some of the segments that need to be considered:

**Basic Research**

Aimed at promoting and refining theories and methodologies for the analysis and understanding of manifestations of culture in
their own right, their interrelationship with other dimensions and factors of human life, and their construction, communication and transformations over time.

Comparative Culture Research

In a situation of intensified globalisation also in the field of culture, the increasing multi-cultural nature of human societies and the need to protect cultural diversity, the strengthening of comparative cultural research is urgently needed to deepen and broaden the knowledge and understanding of both cultural variations and cultural similarities.

Evaluative Research

With the purpose to analyse and understand the results and experiences, in cultural terms, of processes of technological, social and economic change on all levels and of policies—also cultural policies—adopted and implemented internationally, nationally and locally by international organisations, governments and others.

Critical Research

Although research by its very nature is critical there are special needs for an engaged and at the same time detached culture research, which can explore paradoxes, expose contradictions, conflicts of interest and verbal smoke screens and challenge established positions.

Interdisciplinary Research

Quality of cultural research and reliability of its findings cannot be achieved without a high degree of disciplinary specialisation and contextual analysis. However because of the socially embedded and cross-sectoral nature of manifestations, cultural research of the human conditions also needs interdisciplinary approaches for which methodological tools and organisational support should be designed and provided.

Culture Impact Analysis and Research

Increased awareness and political pressure has led to a growing demand for research on the pre-conditions and consequences of social, economic and technological development programmes. Among areas for such concern are gender and environment. A simi-
lar attention is needed for the field of culture and should include culture consequence research for an improved, culture conscious, social, political and economic planning.

One example to learn from is the environmental Agenda 21. There are a number of arguments in favour of a strategy of a cultural Agenda 21. Like Agenda 21 with its forty different components, the needs in the cultural field will never be satisfied by one single action plan. Instead a series of detailed sub-strategies, each with a firm basis of research and each with realistic financial modalities, is needed.

Such an approach is furthermore required as the field of culture in the widest sense is as broad as environment. Therefore, the work on a research agenda ought to be divided into more manageable sectors. The research needs in the major areas of literature, visual art, music, media, architecture, food and other creative activities, simply differ so much that it would be very unpractical—or even counter productive—to develop a common agenda under one umbrella of cultural research. However, as is the case in Agenda 21, there could well be chapters for problems common to all sectors and for the research that this requires.

The starting point for elaborating a research agenda should be a review of the state of the art of the knowledge already existing on the issues to be addressed. However, this meta-demand to do research on what has already been researched has relatively often little value in academia. Nevertheless, overviews of existing knowledge are of paramount importance in order to identify gaps in knowledge that need to be filled. It is also crucial for ambitions to exchange experiences and learn from best theories and best practice. It is also necessary for providing essential information for planning and decision-making already at the idea stage of programmes. Thus analysis of existing knowledge should be given high priority in the elaboration of any policy-relevant agenda of cultural research.

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